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
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# **Christian philosophy; a treatise on the human soul**

**John Thomas  
Driscoll**



Geo. J.illard 125



*Gen. J. Guillard*  
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

A  
TREATISE ON THE HUMAN SOUL

BY THE  
REV. JOHN T. DRISCOLL, S. T. L.

NEW YORK, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO:  
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1898



MAR 9 1938

I have carefully examined Father Driscoll's philosophical treatise, and hereby testify as to its orthodoxy and thorough Catholic soundness. The quotations are numerous and excellent. The entire work reflects great credit on its author and will be productive of instruction and edification to our Catholic community.

F. X. McGOWAN, O. S. A.,

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in the hope that its reading will rouse to the  
dignity and value of a life  
THIS VOLUME  
is  
RESPECTFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY  
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Mrs. F. G. Petit  
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## PREFACE.

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This treatise is an attempt to set forth the main lines of Christian Philosophy, as enunciated in the catechism and as systematized by the schoolmen, especially S. Thomas.

At the present time philosophical studies occupy the attention of very many. This is true in a special manner of Psychology. The mind instinctively craves the knowledge of its nature and destiny. Unfortunately, the theories proposed in the name of philosophy bring confusion not precision, obscurity not light. In our schools and colleges text-books on Psychology are put into the hands of students with the result that false notions are implanted and the true value of our dignity is blurred or lost. In certain quarters the physical sciences have been popularized and extended beyond just limits. To answer this need of the soul for a knowledge of itself, to set forth briefly the principles of a true and sound philosophy is the aim of this work.

The method followed is comparative. The question is proposed; various solutions are classified; the theories are contrasted; that one is held which is the best able to answer the facts.

As far as possible the questions have been treated for the ordinary student. Hence the uninterrupted text, the division into paragraphs and sections. At the same time any one who

desires more extensive information need only look up the notes at the foot of the page.

Some special questions, e. g., sense and intelligence, the faculties, etc., have been omitted, inasmuch as they pertain more directly to other departments, e. g., the Philosophy of Mind.

If this small volume awaken in a reader the consciousness of his nature and dignity; if it strengthen a faith weakened by erroneous notions; if it lead one to embrace that religion of which it is the handmaid, the writer will consider his labor more than repaid.

WATERVLIET, N. Y.,

FEAST OF PATRONAGE OF S. JOSEPH, 1898.

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# INTRODUCTION.

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## I.

§ 1. Psychology, from the Greek *ψυχή* and *λογος*, means a disputation or treatise about the soul. Taking the word in its widest signification it means a philosophy of the soul, in contradistinction to Cosmology, which is the philosophy of the external world.<sup>1</sup> By the soul is meant the principle of life, the principle which animates and vivifies an organism. We can distinguish three grades of life: vegetative, sensitive and intellectual. Plants possess vegetative life; i. e., they grow; animals possess vegetative and sensitive life; i. e., they grow and feel; man possesses vegetative, sensitive and intellectual life; i. e., he grows, feels, thinks. Man, therefore, possesses life in all its fullness. With the plant he grows and nourishes; with the animal he grows and feels; but over and above he has what is characteristic of his nature, marking him off from other living beings; i. e., thought and will.<sup>2</sup> Psychology, therefore, means the philosophy of the soul of man, of the soul as the principle and source of sensitive and especially of intellectual operations, and has been designated the "science of mental life."<sup>3</sup> Notion.

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Ward says Psychology cannot be defined because we cannot limit its subject-matter, i. e., we cannot distinguish at the outset between internal and external experience. cf. Encyc. Britt. art. Psychology. This is not true. Consciousness testifies to the contrary.

<sup>2</sup> S. Augustine De Lib. Arb. l. II, n. 13.

<sup>3</sup> For history of the term "Psychology," cf. Sir W. Hamilton's "Metaphysics," I, p. 130.

Subject  
matter.

§ 2. The subject-matter of Psychology is set forth in its definition. By mental life is understood consciousness, our states of consciousness, the sum-total of our conscious experience. In this sense we speak of mind as subjective in relation to the external world which is objective. However, Psychology employs objective methods, as we shall see. It does not consider the mind as personal, but as the endowment of the human race; it does not view the mind as independent and apart, but treats of the phenomena of consciousness in themselves as such, in their relations to the principle producing them, i. e., the soul, and to what conditions their actual exercise, i. e., the bodily organs. Hence its complete subject-matter is animated body or a "sound mind in a sound body." It places before our view all the operations and phenomena of our conscious life. Thus it investigates sensations, thoughts, wishes, desires, feelings, imaginations, memories, affections and emotions. It formulates the laws which rule their working, and finally from these, as data, determines what we are to hold concerning their source or internal cause, and the relation of this principle to the bodily organism.

Conscious-  
ness.

§ 3. In employing the term consciousness we must guard against ambiguity. The word has more than one meaning. (a) In the most general and widest signification it is used to designate mental life as a whole, i. e., our states of consciousness, as opposed to unconsciousness. In this sense, as we have seen, it includes emotions, volitions, etc., and forms the subject-matter of Psychology. (b) It designates immediate and direct knowledge which the mind has of its own acts or of something external acting upon it. In

this sense it includes only cognitive acts of a special kind, and is opposed to mediate and reflex knowledge. (c) Finally, it signifies the reflex and deliberate act by which the mind attends to its own operations or states, and recognizes them as produced by its own activity. In this sense it is more properly called self-consciousness. It is thus a special kind of mental activity which investigates and studies the working of our minds, brings out clearly and distinctly what we have directly experienced. In the second and especially in the third meaning consciousness becomes the chief method and instrument of Psychology.

§4. By keeping in mind the different meanings which the word consciousness has, we can easily understand the position of writers who at first sight seem to disagree. The mistake of confounding different things shall thus be avoided. Thus Rabier<sup>4</sup> distinguishes two theories and two schools divided on the nature of consciousness: (a) Those who hold that consciousness means the very essence of psychical phenomena, the common form of all the faculties of the soul, and is to them as light is to color. This view, he says, is the opinion of Aristotle.<sup>5</sup> (b) Those who consider consciousness as an accident, an additional phenomena, somewhat as light is to objects without which they cannot be conceived. Thus it becomes a distinct faculty and its function is to perceive the acts of inner life. It is the open eye of the mind, the witness of our psychic phenomena. This,

<sup>4</sup> *Psychologie*, p. 52.

<sup>5</sup> "The interior light that illumines everything that takes place in the soul." Cousin *History of Mod. Phil.* xi, p. 247; Stuart Mill *Logic*, BI, ch. 1, §§ 3, 5.

he says, is the opinion of Reid, Stewart,<sup>6</sup> Royer-Collard, Hamilton. But on a close examination there is no real opposition. Consciousness is both one and the other. In the first meaning it is the common form of all our mental activities. In the second it is the eye and witness of our mental life. In the former it is what we study; in the latter it is the chief source and instrument of our knowledge. For we not only are conscious of mental states, but we also have the power of viewing *self* as the subject and agent of our mental states. This perfection is the crown of our intellectual life just as the power of self-determination is the crown and glory of the acts of volition.

## II.

### SOURCES.

Intro-  
spective  
method.

§ 5. The subject-matter of Psychology is consciousness. The states of consciousness are only observed by the act of self-consciousness or introspection, i. e., by "looking within." This is the subjective or introspective method. It is the primary, direct, immediate source through which a knowledge of mental life is obtained. Socrates was the first to make self-examination a philosophical method. His principle was "know thyself."<sup>7</sup> The science he elaborated by its aid was more moral than mental. With St. Augustine this principle and method was of great value. "I desire," he says, "to know God and the soul; nothing

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Hamilton Met. Lect. xii, p. 145. "It is the recognition by the mind or, ego, of its acts and affections." Hamilton Met. Lect. xi, p. 133; yet the same author writes "The fundamental form, the generic condition of all modes of mental life." Met., p. 127; cf. Porter, the Human Intellect, p. 83.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Phaedros.

more.”<sup>8</sup> For this it is necessary to enter into one’s self.

From the knowledge of self man can rise to a knowledge of God.<sup>9</sup> With St. Thomas introspection is the basis of a beautiful and profound exposition of the virtues and vices.<sup>10</sup>

Objections  
to method  
of intro-  
spection.

§ 6. Comte<sup>11</sup> maintains that direct observation Compte.  
by introspection is impossible. To him direct contemplation of the mind by itself is an illusion for two reasons: (a) The thinker cannot divide himself in two, of whom one reasons while the other observes him reason. “The organ observed and the organ observing,” he says, “being, in this case, identical, how could observation take place? This pretended psychological method, therefore, is null and void.” (b) Internal observation gives almost as many divergent results as there are individuals who practice it. This objection is well met by J. Stuart Mill, who holds “that a fact may be studied in two ways, either by direct knowledge at the very time or through the medium of memory a moment after.” And, he adds, “Mr. Comte would scarcely have observed that we are not aware of our own intellectual operations. This simple fact destroys the whole of his argument. Whatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe.”<sup>12</sup>

<sup>8</sup> “Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino.” Soliloq. l. I, 7; cf. Trin. xiv, 7; Confess. x, 17, 24, 25; de Ordine, n. 47.

<sup>9</sup> “Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas; et si tuam naturam mutabilem inveneris, transcendere et teipsum. Sed memento cum te transcendis, rationem antem animam te transcendere. Illuc, ergo tende unde ipsum lumen rationis accenditur. De vera relig. 72.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Sum. Theol. 2a, 2ae.

<sup>11</sup> Positive Philos., London, 1875, vol. I, pp. 381-389; Cours de Phil., Posit. I, 34 sq.

<sup>12</sup> Aug. Comte & Posit., p. 64; cf. Sully Illusions, pp. 208-211.



Spencer. § 7. Mr. Spencer holds that no one is conscious of what he is but of what he was a moment before. His reason is that it is impossible for the mind to be at the same time subject and object.<sup>13</sup> We admit that it may be difficult to thus conceive the mind; nevertheless it is a fact. Dr. Maudsley,<sup>14</sup> and Mr. James,<sup>15</sup> say that in observing our mental states, we lose them or modify them so that they are no longer the same. Mr. James is unreserved in praising Compté's reasoning. He writes "that a feeling to be named, judged or perceived must be already past; that no subjective state while present is its own object, e. g., when I say 'I feel tired,' 'I feel angry,' the present conscious states are not the direct feelings of fatigue or of anger. It is the state of *saying-I-feel-tired*, or of *saying-I-feel-angry*, entirely different matters, so different that the fatigue and anger apparently included in them are considerable modifications of the fatigue and anger directly felt the previous instant."<sup>16</sup> So Hoffding: "In the moment when I wish to observe a state of consciousness, that state is already past, or has blended with other elements. What has been fully and clearly experienced will remain in memory and by means of memory can be examined."<sup>17</sup>

§ 8. Thus introspection becomes retrospection. This position cannot be held. It is true that I can recall past states in order to observe them; but it is

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Spencer's First Principles, p. 65.

<sup>14</sup> Physiology of Mind, ch. i.

<sup>15</sup> Psychol. I, pp. 189, 190.

<sup>16</sup> Vol. I, pp. 189, 190. Mr. Hamilton also says that the phenomena can only be studied through it reminiscence. Met. xix, p. 263.

<sup>17</sup> Outlines of Psychology, p. 17.

also a fact verified by the conscious experience of every one that I can directly observe my own thoughts and emotions; or, in the language of Mr. Mill, "Whatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe." Mr. James again falls into an error in his reflection upon the value of introspection. He holds that the only grounds on which the infallible veracity of the introspective judgment might be maintained are empirical. "If we had reason to think it has never yet deceived us," he writes, "we might continue to trust it."<sup>18</sup> The mistake is in confounding the primitive testimony of consciousness with a judgment formed by associations of ideas or habits, e. g., consciousness of a sensation and the localization of the organic part affected. These are found joined together. The former is a fact immediately known in consciousness; the latter is a judgment based on the association of ideas and whose correctness depends on bodily sensibility and the development of acquired sense-perceptions. The judgment may be erroneous, as we shall see.

§ 9. To establish a science of the mind, introspection employs objective means of verification and of control. Hence the external, indirect and mediate source which embraces all those means of acquiring a knowledge of mental life which are outside of and beyond the immediate observation of my own mental states. In obtaining material from this source we reason by analogy, i. e., we reason on the ground that other persons have like motives and acts. By the testimony of my own consciousness I might write Confessions, as St. Augustine, Memories as Rousseau, an Apology pro Vita Sua,

Intro-  
spective  
method  
aided by  
objective  
sources.

<sup>18</sup> Ib.

as Card. Newman; but the result would not be Psychology. It would be an important contribution to the study of mental life, but not a scientific treatise. My own individual experiences as such, however beautiful and valuable, are only personal; whereas Psychology is the science of the human mind, and treats not of the individual but of the species, of mankind. Introspection, therefore, calls to its aid the *objective* method. This method consists: (a) In the observation of others. We watch their words and actions, their looks and gestures. From these we strive to learn their mental states, their habits and tendencies. In the class-room, on the street, in society, we study Psychology. This can be done indirectly, as when we infer the condition of mind from an ordinary conversation or behavior; or directly when another in words makes known his desires, thoughts, sentiments or passions, and sets forth their interdependence or the part they play in his mental life. (b) The products of the mind in science and in art furnish rich stores of information. Science is the effort and proof of intelligence. Art is nature as mirrored in the human soul. Poetry, literature and the fine arts are the highest and most perfect work of the soul. They reflect the noblest sentiments, they express the most delicate thoughts. The man is revealed in his work. (c) Great assistance is derived from the study of the mind, in its various stages of development. Thus, a new department of Psychology has been opened up by investigations into the child-mind. The information gained is put to account in devising the best means of education. Action of environment, influence of home, religion, society, education are taken into account. Not only the development of the individual is of

These sources are (a) ordinary observation.

(b) Science literature and art.

(c) Study of mental development in the individual.

value. The records of civilized life and growth of nations contain rich stores. History is the world's stage. The customs, institutions, laws, civil and political annals, religion, traditions — all these express the efforts of the human soul. There imagination, taste, genius in war or in the peaceful avocations, the great and noble faculties, expand and bloom. Side by side we behold heroic and sublime resolves which uplift and ennoble, and low and fatal passions which bring degradation and ignominy. Man appears before us at his best and at his worst. (d) Animal Psychology, as it is called, brings light from another quarter. It presents the results of studies concerning the instincts, habits and activities of the lower animals. Care must be taken, however, not to apply these conclusions to human life with too much rigor. Man is an animal and shares with the animal, sensation, instinct and lower sensitive feelings. Thus their action can be illustrated to a certain extent from animal life. But man is more than a mere animal. He possesses intelligence and free will. These must be taken into account in the analogies drawn from the lower forms of life. (e) Physiology and Anatomy supply us with much useful information. They explain the structure and functions of the different parts of the nervous system. They give the physical bases of the operations of sense. Psychology studies the human mind working in the body. Hence, brain and nerve Physiology is necessary. It shows that phenomena of thought are accompanied by phenomena of the nervous system. Formation of habits, transmission of hereditary tendencies are questions for the solution of which we depend more or less on these studies.<sup>19</sup>

In civilization.

(d) From study of animal life.

(e) from study of human body.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Aristotle's Psychology by E. Wallace, Introd., pp. xxx, cxxvii.

(f) comparative  
philology.

(f) Another source is language and the study of language. The connection between language and thought is intimate. The one is the expression of the other. The thinker may pass away and his place taken by another, but his thought has a permanent embodiment in the written word, and lives on for the instruction and delight of future ages. The study of language is the study and discipline of mind. Its words reveal the nicer shades of thought, the endless variety of conceptions, as in the Greek or Latin, or the imagery and comparative poverty, as in the speech of savages.<sup>20</sup> Its structure shows the forms of thought, the characteristic turn and traits of their minds. The labors of Whitney,<sup>21</sup> of Muller,<sup>22</sup> are of great value to the Psychologist. Sufficient attention has not been given to the help which these studies afford. "It is remarkable," writes M. Ribot,<sup>23</sup> "that English contemporary Psychologists, who have profited so largely by the recent progress of physiology, have borrowed nothing from linguistics." He expresses a belief that comparative philology will reveal things to us of much more intimate and delicate bearing upon the mechanism of the soul and its variations than physiology.

(g) mental  
diseases.

(g) Finally, we have recourse to Pathology, the science of organic disease. Criminals, persons under hypnotic influences, the deaf and dumb, eccentrics, the insane, are examined and studied with a view to illustrate mental activities. Abnormal mental operations, e. g., dreams, illusions, somnambulism, hallucinations, are explained and traced as far as possible to their

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Quatrefages the Pigmies.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Language and Study of Language.

<sup>22</sup> Science of Language.

<sup>23</sup> Engl. Psych., pp. 50, 51.


causes. It is wise to avoid the mistaken notions of some writers, e. g., Dr. Maidsley,<sup>24</sup> E. W. Cox in *Mechanism of Man*, Ribot,<sup>25</sup> who lay too much stress on this study. These activities are abnormal and must be so regarded. They therefore furnish no positive data on which to build the science of Psychology. Nor are they to be considered as constituting the proper and direct subject-matter of our study. Psychology investigates "the sound mind in the sound body," and abnormal phases or states should be viewed in this light.

§ 10. By uniting the results obtained in these various ways to the subjective method a normal psychology of introspection is established. By it we study the mental phenomena in each human being, and study them in each condition. Psychology, therefore, does not treat of what is personal, accidental or particular, but of what is essential and universal.

§ 11. It is true that introspection is the real basis, just as an anatomist by dissecting one human body, finds there materials to construct a science of the structure of every human being. So, when I know myself, I know human nature. But comparison of knowledge thus acquired with the other sources, help me to separate the particular from the universal, the personal from what is part of our human nature. Philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas; moralists as Seneca, Pascal; poets as Homer, Euripides, Horace, Shakespeare; novelists as Goethe, Scott, Dickens, Thackeray; preachers as St. Chrysostom, Bossuet, Newman, did not speak of the individual simply, but of man; not of man in one country and time, but of universal man. In studying man we study human

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Physiology of mind*.

<sup>25</sup> *Diseases of Personality*.



nature. We see reflected in a masterly manner the thoughts, sentiments, wills which throb in our own souls. Thus internal and external methods, both united, give a true scientific basis to Psychology.

### III.

#### A SCIENCE.

(a) proper  
object.

§ 12. Psychology seeks to know the nature of the soul, the nature and laws of mental and moral phenomena. It claims to be and is a true science. The conditions and processes which go to constitute a science are here found. (a) First of all it has a real and proper object. It investigates sensations, sentiments, ideas, memories, judgments, reasonings, desires, passions, etc. These are as true and as real as the circulation of the blood, as the existence of physical or chemical forces. Even materialists who deny the existence of the spiritual principle in man, must admit that they think, and feel, and will. This subject-matter is proper to Psychology, and constitutes a field apart where no other science enters.<sup>26</sup> Thus, mathematics studies the general properties of material bodies in a most abstract manner; physics deals with forces; physiology and anatomy with the functions and structure of the human frame. Only Psychology claims as

<sup>26</sup> It is not true, therefore, to maintain that "Psychology must be regarded as a branch of general biology." cf. Hoffding *Elements of Psychology*, p. 25; G. Lewis cf. Ribot *English Psychology*, p. 287; also *Problems of Life and Mind*, 1st Series, p. 101; or to hold, with H. Spencer, that there is no precise line of demarkation between physiological and psychological facts. cf. Ribot, p. 148 sq.; or with Hoffding, that *Physiology and Psychology* "deal with the same matter as seen from two different sides, like, e. g., the convex and concave sides of the same curve." *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 69.

its own the varied phenomena of mental and moral life.<sup>27</sup>

§ 13. (b) Again, it has an infallible means of know-<sup>(b) its proper sources.</sup> ing and investigating its subject-matter. This instrument is self-consciousness or introspection. Introspection reveals the inner life with all its phenomena of sensation, of intelligence, of appetite and will. Care must be taken, however, not to attribute solely to self-consciousness facts which are the outcome of judgments in which an element of experience or of association of ideas is found, as, e. g., the localization of a sensation.

§ 14. (c) It has a scientific method. Method is an <sup>(c) a scientific method.</sup> orderly process of arranging facts and reasonings with a view to form a compact and well-connected whole. It embraces the statement of facts, the formulation of laws which explain them, and finally their systematic classification. Now, Psychology acquires its facts by observation. The student enters into himself, views his own mind working, and notes down its processes and their results. To observation, experimentation is added. In this act we recall a past fact through memory, analyze it, compare it with a present fact of consciousness. Having possession of facts which have stood the test, we then proceed to discover the laws

<sup>27</sup> Dr. Bain seems to hold that mental phenomena are not distinguished from material by any common character. This is the contention of Materialism. cf. Bain *Sense and Intellect* Intr., ch. 1, 2. Prof. James holds that there is only one kind of conditions which the student of scientific Psychology cares to know about, and these are the brain-states; and that until some Galileo or Lavoisier arises with a psycho-physic law that will govern all mental facts, we can have no *science* of Psychology. cf. "is Psychology a Science?" by Prof. Ladd, in *Amer. Journ. of Psych.*, 1894, vol. 1, p. 392, coll. p. 286. cf. also *Philos. Rev.*, 1892, vol. 1, pp. 24, 146.



which regulate their interaction, the faculties or principles whence they spring, the nature of the thinking principle which is the bond of their unity. This process is induction and seeks to formulate the principles and laws of the human mind. These laws are then subjected to a process of verification, for, by means of deduction, their practical application is tested. Our own personal experience is illustrated and confirmed by results drawn from the various other sources. The interrelation of facts, of principles and of laws is the basis for a true classification of mental phenomena and of the processes involved in their production. Finally, the conclusions thus established are thrown into a system in which facts are brought naturally into relation with their causes and with one another.<sup>28</sup>

This  
method  
followed.

§ 15. This method is pursued in the following pages. As far as possible erroneous inferences or classifications will be pointed out and contrasted with the natural and true processes of mental life.

#### IV.

##### DIFFICULTIES.

§ 16. Every science or department of study has special difficulties which must be understood in order to pursue investigations with a prospect of success. Psychology is not without them. A practical proof is seen in the many systems of mental philosophy which have in the past and do now hold the adhesion of thoughtful men.

(a) the  
nature  
of the  
phenom-  
ena.

§ 17. (a) The main difficulty is found in the nature of the phenomena which Psychology investigates.

<sup>28</sup> Hoffding denies that Psychology can be a sharply defined science; to him there is not one Psychology but many Psychologies. *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 26.

The facts of mental life are numerous, varied, rapidly passing, and complex.<sup>29</sup> Hence it is possible to confound the testimony of consciousness with a conclusion which is based on the association of ideas, e. g., a sensation of touch comes immediately from consciousness, its localisation is determined by the development of sense-experience; or to confound consciousness with an inference from it, e. g., in the perception of an external object, I am conscious of the sensation, but I *infer* the distance or the magnitude of the thing perceived. Only by close psychological analysis we distinguish what pertains to consciousness from what does not. Again a sensation or feeling is complex, difficult to analyze and take apart, e. g., motives.

§ 18. (b) Another difficulty arises from the method <sup>(b) the method.</sup> of our study. The ordinary mind is engrossed with the external world. A difficulty is experienced in turning aside from the objects of sense to concentrate attention upon the facts of our inner life. Repeated attempts are necessary. Abstraction and introspection are the employment of only the few. Even then there is a danger of superficial examination, of hasty and partial inferences, of an untrue classification.

§ 19. (c) A third difficulty is found in the words and <sup>(c) language.</sup> language used to describe our mental life. By a necessity of our nature we must represent the phenomena of mental and of moral life by analogies drawn from the material world. Thus, *perception*, *apprehension*, i. e., a grasping, *conception*, *judgment*, etc. Here there is room for uncertainty and ambiguity.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Hamilton Met. Lect. xix, p. 264.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Leibnitz Nouv. Ess. III, i, 5.

(d) partial  
views of  
mental  
life.

§ 20. (d) Finally, inadequate conceptions of mental life and development throw a stumbling block in the path of many. If I do not realize what man is, if my conceptions of him are partial, if I omit from consideration his mental capacities in whole or in part, or conceive of him from analogy of mere mechanical combinations and movements, I shall meet countless difficulties, and fall into many serious and vital errors. Thus, Materialists fail to distinguish in man the rational from the animal; or others as Leibnitz and Des Cartes exaggerate his spiritual nature; or others with our modern Sensists confound intelligence with sensation; or finally, like the Determinists, deprive man of his noblest faculty, the crown and glory of his rational nature — free-will.

## V.

### BEARINGS ON OTHER SCIENCES.

§ 21. Psychology is a theoretical science. Its subject-matter and methods show this. Nevertheless, it has relations to a number of practical sciences in as much as it furnishes a basis on which they rest.

(a) regu-  
lative  
sciences.

§ 22. Thus (a) It supplies rules and laws for the regulative sciences, so called because they determine the rules of human thought and action. Hence, Logic and Ethics are based on Psychology, and take their starting point therefrom.

(b) educa-  
tional  
sciences.

Peda-  
gogics.

§ 23. (b) Again, it is the basis for those sciences and arts which aim at influencing the minds of others. Hence, Education learns from Psychology the nature of the mind, of its laws and processes, and with this knowledge is enabled to estimate the value of the agents or means employed to gain the desired results.

Oratory is another illustration. The speaker addresses <sup>Oratory.</sup> his audience with a purpose to convince their minds and commit them to the acceptance of certain truths or of a certain line of conduct. His arguments, examples, words, are all directed to gain this control over them. He must know how to appeal to reason, how to incite the passions, how to gain the sympathies of his hearers. All this supposes the knowledge of the mental processes. Finally, Psychology has a practical bearing on the arts of Politics and Government. As such it may be termed the science of Human Nature, and is the foundation of what St. Gregory calls "The <sup>Government.</sup> art of arts, the government of men."

## VI.

### DIVISION.

§ 24. The division of Psychology is based upon its definition. Psychology is the science of the soul. The soul exerts its activity in two great channels: The cognitive acts., e. g., intellect and sensation, and the appetitional acts, e. g., volition and desire. Hence, the existence and nature of the soul are first to be investigated and established; this is (a) "Psychology of the soul." With a definite conception of the thinking principle we can examine the nature and modes of its activities; (b) "Psychology of Cognition" or "Psychology of the Mind." Finally, the nature of the Will and of the emotions are set forth in (c) "Psychology of the Will," or, in common speech, "Psychology of the Affections." Thus, the Soul, the Mind and the Will form the logical and natural divisions of a complete knowledge of man's rational nature.

Importance of a Psychology of the soul.  
(a) the basis of our mental life.

(b) neglected by modern writers on Psychology.

Prof. Ladd on Phenomenal Psychology.

§ 25. The following treatise is proposed as the initial step in the effort to obtain a philosophical knowledge of ourselves. (a) It treats of the existence and the nature of the soul. These questions underlie all our studies in mental and moral life. As a logical necessity they require a previous treatment. To investigate the operations of the soul in a scientific manner without knowing its existence and nature is to build without a foundation. (b) Because of its neglect by contemporary writers on Psychology. Sully, James,<sup>31</sup> Murray, Davis, Koelpe, Hoffding and others, rigorously exclude it as not pertaining to Psychology as a science. Hence, the phenomena of a "Psychology without a soul," so universal in our day, and the consequent tendency of those studies to approximate to Physiology.<sup>32</sup>

§ 26. In view of this tendency in modern thought it is interesting and instructive to read the vigorous protest against such teaching made by one of the leading contemporary professors on Psychology. "In the universal estimate, whether popular or scientific," writes Mr. Ladd, "the character of the connection which exists among psychic facts is somewhat peculiar. At the outset of our investigation we wish to assume this connection in a manner as free as possible from all debatable metaphysical tenets. In *some manner*, how-

<sup>31</sup> It may, however, be said that the assumption of such an ego or subject is, after all, extra-psychological. No psychologist seeks to explain the phenomena of thought and feeling by the aid of such a conception, which consequently becomes a purely formal one. Sully "The Human Mind," vol. I, p. 9. James considers the soul-theory to be "the line of least logical resistance," yet feels the necessity of assuring his readers that he is not guilty of accepting it, but considers a phenomenal Psychology amply sufficient. Psych. i, pp. 181, 182.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Hoffding Outlines of Psychology, pp. 14, 25, 29; Murray Psychology; Davis' Elements of Psychology; Koelpe.

ever, we are *obliged to assume it in order to study Psychology* at all. For this universal estimate assigns all psychic facts to some psychical individual, some so-called 'mind' or 'self.' Indeed, the character of the consciousness from which this estimate springs is such that *nothing seems more absurd, more inconceivable, than the assumption of psychic facts which belong to no one.* The phenomena of human consciousness, in general, can be observed and studied only on the popular assumption that they always appear as phenomena of some so-called human being. All phenomena of consciousness are facts either of your mental life or of mine, or of some other so-called 'person' in the popular sense of the word."<sup>33</sup>

## VII.

### SCHOLASTIC PSYCHOLOGY.

§ 27. The principles set forth in the following pages are the principles of scholastic philosophy. Historical claims of Scholasticism. Historically Scholasticism has many claims to a careful consideration. It is the product of the most intellectual era the world has ever seen. It is the greatest monument of carefully reasoned and connected thought that the human mind has produced. It gave precision and scientific form to the great system of Christian theology. In its best and purest form it lives in the teaching of the Catholic church. Her doctrines are worded in the phraseology of St. Thomas. When we teach "matter and form of the Sacraments;" when we maintain that "the soul is the substantial form of the body," we propose truths which can only be understood after learning a fundamental tenet of Scholastic Philosophy.

<sup>33</sup> Ladd Psych. Descrip. & Explan., p. 5; cf. also, Prof. Bowne in "Metaphysics, a Study of First Principles," p. 351.

Its importance at the present time.

§ 28. Furthermore, the problems which occupy the time and thought of the present day were not unknown to St. Thomas. He discusses them with clearness and vigor.<sup>34</sup> Mr. Huxley sees in it "an open country which is amazingly like his dear native land."<sup>35</sup>

Failure of modern philosophy

§ 29. (c) Finally, a brief review of modern Philosophy shows that it has failed in the attempt to establish a scientific theory of the world and of man. Des Cartes is its founder. His definition of substance is the basis of Spinoza's Pantheism; his theory of the union of soul and body gave rise to the doctrine of exaggerated spiritualism formulated by Malebranche and Leibnitz and developed in the materialistic reaction of the eighteenth century which, in its inception, was a vindication of the unity of man. His greatest disciple was Locke. The veiled empiricism of Locke became sensism with Condillac, and thus furnished a source of materialism. The phenomenalism of Locke was the source of Berkeley's Idealism, and through Berkeley of Hume's scepticism. Hume's influence was great. Kant wrote the "Critic" in the hope of putting philosophy again on a sound basis. His work is judged by results. In Germany Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, taught idealistic pantheism and gave rise to the materialistic revolt of the past generation. Hamilton attempted to reconcile Reid and Kant. He broaches theories which have produced the agnosticism of Hux-

<sup>34</sup> Cf. I., q. 45; q. 67, a. 4; q. 71, q. 72, a. 1; q. 18; cf. Azarias Philosophy of Literature, p. 97, sq.

<sup>35</sup> Scient. & Pseudo-Scient. Realism, in Essays Upon Some Controv. Quest., p. 186, sq. On the objection that Scholastic Philosophy is unintelligible. cf. Fr. Harper S. J. "Metaphy of Schools," Vol. I, intr.; "Lectures by a Certain Professor."

ley. In the hands of Mill, Hamilton was an easy victim. Coming from Hume in direct line we have the school of French and English positivists, the materialism of Priestly, the associationism of Mill, Bain and Spencer. The failure of modern Philosophy is shown in the recent attempt to reconstruct a system, in the cry of "Back to Kant," and in the "Neo Kantian" or "Neo Hegelian" teaching of our day. But this teaching is only ephemeral. With that intimate knowledge of men which marks the statesman and the philosophic mind, with that wisdom which guides the elect of the Holy Spirit, our great Pontiff, Leo XIII, has perceived the intellectual anarchy of our time and has found a remedy. This is the study of Scholastic Philosophy as proposed by St. Thomas, its greatest teacher.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *Encyc. Aeterni Patris*.



## PROEMIUM.

A rational  
Psychol-  
ogy of the  
soul is  
necessary.

§ 1. Psychology of the Soul treats of the existence and the nature of the soul, of its union with the body, of its origin and duration. These problems are at the basis of our conscious life. They are assumed in every treatise of Experimental or Descriptive Psychology. To the inquisitive mind of the youth who learns in the catechism that he has a soul, and that his highest aim is to mould its life on the principles of Christian faith, these questions rise, it may be, in simpler form. The thoughtful student, hampered by erroneous metaphysical notions, or frightened by the exaggerated claims of physical science, sees them in all their depth and perplexity. He despairs of a sound solution, and tries to satisfy himself in tracing the development of mental life, or faces the question manfully, and proposes an explanation which is at variance with known facts of individual experience. There is not one who has not felt the demand made upon himself to explain the nature of his own being, and who has not, with more or less persistence and success, attempted its solution.<sup>1</sup>

The  
method of  
reasoning  
to be fol-  
lowed.

§ 2. The general line of reasoning is from effect to cause, from phenomena to their subject and agent. In the operations of mind and of will revealed in individual conscious life, is found existence of their source or principle, which is called the human soul. From the kind of activity and the nature of the action, is inferred the nature of the agent; from the perfec-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Brownson's Quar. Rev., 3d Series, vol. III; "Questions of the Soul," S. Augustine de Quant. An. n. 1.

tion of the effect is ascertained the perfection of the cause. The conclusions follow one after the other in logical sequence; united they unfold what is sought for.

§ 3. A distinction is drawn in Logic between the definition and the description of a thing. We are said to describe a thing when we separate it from other objects in a general way, by calling attention to the function it performs, to the manner of its production or to some general characteristic. We define a thing, however, when we reveal its constitution and nature. The former logically and naturally leads up to the latter. A description presents to the mind an object distinct from others, and invested with one or more attractive marks. The mind is aroused and stimulated to examine more minutely, to penetrate the outer form and lay bare its intimate constitution. This it does by the acts of analysis, of comparison, of classification, etc., but not always with the same success, e. g., in physical objects. The result is the definition.

§ 4. It would, therefore, be contrary to the rules of right reasoning to give in this place a definition of the soul. The aim of the work is to do that. One quality after another is taken up and examined. Only at the conclusion, therefore, can we have that knowledge of the soul which would justify a definition. Nevertheless, we cannot speak of something which we do not know. Some notion is necessary, even though it be vague. Here we ask for that knowledge which is sufficient to mark the soul as the definite object of our thoughts, and distinct from all others. This is attained by saying that the soul is the principle by which we live and move, perceive and understand.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> St. Thomas Quaest. de an II, 2; Aug. Enarr. in Ps. 137 n. 4; Lib. de Beata Vita n. 7.

A fact, no  
assump-  
tion.

§ 5. In thus telling what the soul is, we state a fact. Its truth is attested by individual experience. We know that we have the life of the body, of sensation and of thought. This life is manifested in certain forms of activity. A body deprived of life is dead.<sup>3</sup> Accepting the fact of life, we conclude that it must have a cause. There is no necessity to make assumptions with "the right reserved, as the result of the process of investigation, to criticise, to adopt or to reject, to modify and to restrict or expand—this very same assumption with which the investigation began."<sup>4</sup> Such a standpoint is illogical, produces confusion and a dissatisfaction for the subject treated.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Aug. Serm. 65, n. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Ladd Phil. of Mind, p. 55.

<sup>5</sup> *Utrum aeris sit vis vivendi, reminiscendi, intelligendi, volendi, cogitandi, sciendi, judicandi; an ignis, an cerebri, an sanguinis, an atomorum, an praeter usitata quattuor elementa quinti nescio cujus corporis, an ipsius carnis nostri compago vel temperamentum haec efficere valeat, dubitaverunt homines; et alius hoc alius aliud affirmare conatus est. Vivere tamen et meminisse, et intelligere, et velle, et cogitare, et scire, et judicare quis dubitet.* Aug. de Trin. lx, n. 14.

## SUBSTANTIALITY OF SOUL.

§ 1. All things exist either as substance or as modifications of substance; they have either a substantial reality or they are activities, qualities, dispositions of that reality. Aristotle enumerates nine classes of accidents, or, as they may be called, substantial modifications; these, with the one class of substance, make up the ten categories of real beings.<sup>1</sup> The discussion of the soul's reality, therefore, is primarily resolved into the question: Is the soul a substance or only a modification of a substance, i. e., of the body.<sup>2</sup>

### I.

#### MODERN AND SCHOLASTIC TEACHING.

§ 2. At this initial point of our investigation modern Philosophy separates from Scholasticism. Erroneous opinions on the notion of substance lead to fatal errors in its applications. It is impossible to have a true conception of the Soul's substantiality, if the wrong notion of substance itself is held. Unable, then, to know what the soul really is, how can I speak with correctness of its properties or of its relation to the body? My thought and language are vitiated throughout. Such is the condition of those who have followed Modern Philosophy.

Errors of modern philosophy found in wrong notion of substance.

§ 3. Modern writers, who have erred on the substantiality of the soul, may be classed into (I) those

Classification of modern writers

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* I, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Prof. Bowne, "Metaphy, a Study of First Principles," p. 352; Aug. de Trin. x. n. 15.

(1) Soul a logical subject only

(2) Soul is only a bundle of sensations

(3) Soul is unknown and unknowable

(4) there is no soul.

Scholastic teaching.

who hold the soul is not a reality but only a logical subject of our mental acts, e. g., Kant, Wundt. (2) Those who contend that the soul is only a bundle of qualities, e. g., the school of Associationists, e. g., Hume.<sup>3</sup> (3) Those who affirm that the soul is unknown and unknowable, and yet postulate it as the subject of our conscious states, e. g., Locke,<sup>4</sup> Thomson,<sup>5</sup> Spencer,<sup>6</sup> S. Laing,<sup>7</sup> and James.<sup>8</sup> "The term soul may be regarded as another synonym for the unknown basis of mental phenomena."<sup>9</sup> Prof. Bowne says that we know nothing of the nature of substance.<sup>10</sup> (4) Those who deny its existence altogether, i. e., Materialists, ex gr. Tyndall, Huxley.

§ 4. Scholastic Philosophy, with Aristotle and the Christian Fathers, vindicates the true dignity of man by proclaiming the soul to be a substantial principle.

<sup>3</sup> Human Nature, p. 1, § 6; Mill. Davis: "It will be better, however, to exclude all consideration of substance and use the word mind to stand merely for a complement of activities," Elem. of Psych., pp. 52, 132. Thus Hoffding: By mind we mean nothing more than the sum of all those inner experiences, viz., sensations and ideas, feelings and decisions. cf. Outlines of Psychology, pp. 12, 29; cf. Sully, Human Mind 1, p. 134. Hence, the modern school of Phenomenal Psychology or "Psychology without a soul," e. g., Sully, Hoffding, Murray, James, cf. Jowett's Plato, vol. IV, p. 175.

<sup>4</sup> "Our specific ideas of substances are nothing else but a collection of a certain number of simple ideas, considered as united in one thing." Ess. on the Human Understanding, B II, ch. 23, § 14; cf. also B I, § 18; B II, ch. 13, § 19, c. 23, § 1; ch. 23, §§ 2, 4.

<sup>5</sup> System of Psychology, vol. 1, p. 114.

<sup>6</sup> Princ. of Psych., p. 2, ch. 1.

<sup>7</sup> A Modern Zoroastrian, p. 126.

<sup>8</sup> Vol. 1, pp. 355, 338.

<sup>9</sup> Hamilton Metaph. Bowen, ch. VI, p. 88; cf. Hamilton in Reid nA, § 2; Metaph., p. 97.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Metaph., p. 7.

St. Thomas refutes Alexander, who said the soul was a determinate mode of mixture of the human body. Empedocles, who held that the soul was a certain harmony.<sup>11</sup> Those who maintained that the soul was a bodily substance; Galen, who contends that the soul was a temperament of the body,<sup>12</sup> and defends the teaching of Aristotle.<sup>13</sup>

## II.

### PROOF.

§ 5. The proof is drawn from an analysis of the concept of substances. Substance is defined as "id quod Definition of substance. per se stat," i. e., a being which exists, *per se*, in the sense that it does not need another being as a subject in which it may inhere, e. g., tree is a substance, whereas color is not, because it can only exist by inhering in some other thing.

§ 6. A more searching examination of this definition reveals the simple elements which go to make it up. Analysis of the definition. In the concept of substance we distinguish: (a) *Being*, (a) being. for it is a real existing entity of which the mind has the intuition. (b) *Potency*, for every being possesses activities which flow from its essence, the knowledge of which enables us to form some conception of its nature. (b) potency. It was this potency, inherent in substance, which Leibnitz emphasized in defining substance as "being possessing active power." The definition is correct as far as it goes, but is insufficient and incomplete. (c) (c) stability. *Stability*: The fundamental element in the notion of substance. As we look out into the world about us,

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Aristotle's *Psychology*, by E. Wallace, BI, ch. iv.

<sup>12</sup> *Complexio*, cf. Aug. de Trin. x, n. 9, 10, 11.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. S. Thomas *Contra Gentes* III, ch. 61, 62, 63, 64, 65.

two great facts are presented to our intelligence: The changes and the permanence of things. Everywhere changes take place; there is a constant flux and reflux; what is now was so in the past. Heraclitus based his philosophy on this fact; his fundamental principle was *πάντα ῥεῖν*. Every individual object takes on new appearances under the influence of weather or of other natural causes. Nevertheless, amid these constant changes there is observed at the same time a certain stability. The tree, e. g., buds in early spring, is soon covered with foliage, it flowers, the fruit appears, grows to ripeness, the leaves assume the many rich hues of autumn, slowly drop, the branches are bare and bleak; yet the tree abides and will, year after year, go through the same round without ceasing to be what it is. So you, e. g., have changed very much in the course of years, from childhood to youth, to manhood, to old age; you have changed in your disposition, in your hopes and ambitions, in your joys and sorrows, but you remain the same. It is you who have undergone all and suffered all. The hopes and fears, joys and sorrows come and go with varying intensity and duration like clouds that pass over the face of the heavens, some quickly flitting by, others moving low and heavy. What is abiding and stable is your own self. By stability, however, we do not understand the indestructibility of an object.<sup>14</sup> God's power is infinite. Destruction is commensurate with creation. What He has made, the same He can destroy. Moreover,

<sup>14</sup> Thus Kant, "That I, as a thinking being, *continue* for myself and naturally neither *arise* nor *perish* is no legitimate deduction from the concept of substance." Kant Trans. Dialect., p. 285; Lotze also holds that the "conception of 'substance,' *per se*, contains the predicate of indestructibility." cf. Lotze Outlines of Psychology, ed. by Prof. Ladd, p. 112.

natural forces, either of themselves or under man's directing power, can cause the dissolution of many things. Hence the word has a relative not an absolute meaning. (d) This element of stability discloses naturally the final element in the composition of substance, viz., substance is viewed as *subjectum accidentium*, the *subject of accidents*. An accident is a change or modification affecting some object, e. g., the qualities as color, etc., the forms and appearances of a thing are called accidents. The thing itself, which abides constant and identical amid the variations of modifications affecting it, is considered as the subject in which they inhere. Thus, e. g., I am variously affected in the course of the day by feelings of sadness, of indignation, of resentment, of confidence, of joy. They come and go and are said to modify me. I am, therefore, the subject which suffers them; they exist in me and affect me.<sup>15</sup>

(d) subject  
of acci-  
dents.

### III.

#### APPLICATION TO THE SOUL.

§ 7. The analysis of the notion of substance into the elements of *being*, *potency*, *stability*, *subject of accidents*, is not fanciful deduction from abstract thought; nor is it an unwarranted assumption; nor a substance unknown and unknowable with Locke and Spencer. Our conception of substance springs from individual experience, and its analysis is based on and verified by

The analy-  
sis based  
on facts.

<sup>15</sup>In being, *per se*, Ladd seems to conceive either "beings abstracted from all concrete attributes or modes of activity in relation to other beings, or being that exists totally isolated in itself and by itself (Phil. of Mind, p. 117), and "once and for all let it be tossed over into the death-kingdom of meaningless abstractions. And why should any one feel that *real souls* have suffered thereby the slightest loss." P. 123.



the same experience. We deal with facts in the world of facts.<sup>16</sup>

The soul is  
such a  
being.

§ 8. Consciousness reveals our inner experience. It makes us aware of our thoughts and sensations, of our volitions and feelings. It tells me that I think, that I will, that I feel. In the one and same act, by which the thought or feeling is grasped, is apprehended the *subject* which thinks or feels. This subject is the *I*, the *Ego* or the *Me*. The *Ego* is not known independently of its modifications; nor are the modifications known independently of the *Ego*; but both are known in the one indivisible act. Just as in external nature substance is never perceived without qualities, nor qualities without substance; but in the one concrete act both are apprehended.<sup>17</sup> Thus, the *Ego*, with its modifications, become the subject-matter of consciousness. In this very fact the notion of substance is implied. In the *Ego* are revealed (a) the element of *being*. *I* am a real existing being.<sup>18</sup> The knowledge of the *I* is an intuition of consciousness. (b) *Potency*. The activity of the *Ego* is a fact of consciousness. I act in many ways, and my activity is manifested variously. I am conscious of a source of energy within me which is never exhausted. Desire, ambition, divers motives, incite me to action. I reach

It has the  
elements of  
(a) being.

(b) po-  
tency.

<sup>16</sup>Mr. James holds that the only positive determination of substance is *Being*. *Psych.*, vol. I, p. 344. This is not correct, as the analysis shows. Balmes enumerates five elements of substance: *Being, unity, potency, permanence, subject of accidents*. cf. *Fundamental Philosophy*, vol. II. Dr. McCosh gives three: *Being, unity, potency*. cf. *McCoch Intuitions of the Mind*. But his analysis is not complete; the characteristic note of substance, i. e., its abiding power amid various modifications, is not mentioned.

<sup>17</sup>By this there is no desire to deny that accidents can exist without substance, e. g., as in the Eucharist the accidents of bread remain while the substance is changed.

<sup>18</sup>Cf. Spencer *First Principles*, p. 64.

out in thought and in hope to objects beyond. The power within me is unfailing and unlimited. It throbs within my brain.<sup>19</sup> It pulsates in every nerve and artery of my body; it pictures upon my imagination the most varied and striking objects; in my intellect it is busied with judgments, reasonings and inferences; it makes my will strong and unbending; it is manifested in love or hatred, in anger, pity or revenge. Hence, Mr. James' resolution of all I am and know myself to be, into mere passive content of feeling, is false.<sup>20</sup> In all my conscious acts I am active and know myself to be active; I am conscious not only of passive impressions, but of doing something.<sup>21</sup> This activity working here and now within me, and conscious of its activity, is no figment of the imagination, "no transcendental being of inflated metaphysics," but something real. It is a real energy revealed in the analysis of every conscious act.<sup>22</sup>

§ 9. *Stability*: Consciousness reveals a constant <sup>(c) stabil-</sup>ity. change in the world within us. Thought succeeds thought; emotion gives way to emotion. To-day I am oppressed with a feeling of sadness and despondency. Yesterday I was happy and joyous. To-morrow, perhaps care and responsibility will affect me. Nevertheless, in the midst of all these changes *I* remain the same. This Stability of the Ego enables me to look

<sup>19</sup>This meets the contention of Dubois Reymond that mental phenomena stand outside the law of causality, and show a breach in the principle of sufficient reason. cf. "On Limits to the Knowledge of Nature," Dubois Reymond, 1872.

<sup>20</sup>Psychology, vol. I, ch. IX, X.

<sup>21</sup>Cf. Spencer First Principles, § 26.

<sup>22</sup>The failure to detect the elements of potency as having its source in substance has led Hume, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Wundt, to consider the soul as activity only. cf. Davis Elements of Psych., p. 132n. Hence the just criticism made of their writings as "Psychology without a soul."

back on the years gone by and collect all the changing experiences of a life. Childhood, youth, manhood, are so many states through which I have passed. They appear different because of the difference in my thoughts and affections, in the circumstances and the duties in which I was employed. Yet they run into one another; there is no break in the continuity; and this is due to the self-same abiding *Ego*.<sup>23</sup>

(d) Subject  
of acci-  
dents.

§ 10. This last element naturally follows from stability. The fact that *I* abide amid the constant change of emotion, reveals the fact that these are only modifications of the *Ego*. I am affected by them. They are referred to and centered in me as in a subject. They are manifold, but I am one; they are diverse, but I am the same; they come and go in constant succession, while I abide. Consciousness reveals the *ego* as the subject which receives, remembers, compares and combines or separates the ideas, volitions and feelings which make up my life.<sup>24</sup>

Conclu-  
sion.

§ 11. The elements, therefore, which go to make up the notion of the substance are found realized within us. In each and every one there is a substantial principle which is the source and basis of his life. This substance is the soul. Hence we can say that the substantiality of the soul is an intuition of consciousness. In face of this what can we say of James, who holds that the substantialist view of the soul has no standing in experience and is quite needless for expressing the actual subjective phenomena of consciousness as they

<sup>23</sup>Bp. Temple, from the knowledge of the stability of the *Ego*, draws an argument against the Relativity of Knowledge, viz., that we cannot know things in themselves. cf. Bamp. Lect. 1884, Lec. II.

<sup>24</sup>Leibnitz Nouv. Ess. lii, c. 27.

appear.<sup>25</sup> "Or again Transcendentalism (i. e., of Kant) is only substantialism grown shamefaced and the Ego only a cheap and nasty edition of the soul."<sup>26</sup>

## IV.

## THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE MORE CLEARLY

## DEFINED.

§ 12. Here it is necessary to be on our guard against confusion of ideas. Clearness and precision in the elementary conceptions are often neglected, with the result that carefully reasoned conclusions and elaborate systems of knowledge are faulty throughout. So, too, in this question. At the basis of all our knowledge are found intuitions, i. e., self-evident truths.<sup>27</sup> The fundamental notions are intuitions. The primary principles are intuitions. Thus for example the concepts of being, of substance are intuitions. This is true of internal as well as external experience. A serious difficulty, however, is to give precise definitions to these elementary notions. They are so simple that we are inclined to accept them readily without pausing to examine in what way one differs from another.

Difficulty of analyzing elementary conceptions.

§ 13. Thus in the concept of substance I find the elements of being, of potency, of stability and of the

Distinction between substance and essence.

<sup>25</sup> Psych., vol. I, p. 344.

<sup>26</sup> Prin. of Psych., vol. I, p. 365. "Nullo modo recte dicitur sciri aliqua res, dum ejus ignoratur substantia. Quapropter, cum se mens novit, substantiam suam novit; et cum de se certa est, de substantia sua certa est." Aug. de Trin. x, n. 16. "Nihil enim tam novit mens, quam id quod sibi praesto est: nec menti magis quidquam praesto est quam ipsa sibi." ib. xiv, n. 7. "Cognoscat (mens) ergo semetipsam, nec quasi absentem se quaerat, sed intentionem voluntatis qua per alia vagabatur, statuatur in semetipsam, et se cogitet. Ita videbit quod numquam se non amaverit, numquam nescierit." de Trin. x, 11, 12.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. G. W. Ward Philos. of Theism.

subject of accidents. All these are integral elements of the concept; the characteristic and distinctive elements are *stability* and the *subject of accidents*. Now, any being, of which these are verified, is a substance, e. g., an angel, man, brute, tree, stone are substances. They are beings, possessing activities and abide in spite of successive changes. But when we try to find out what kind of substances these are, or in what way one differs from another, we have passed beyond the concept of substance and are occupied with that of essence. For the essence of a thing is that which makes it what it is. Thus it is evident that a distinction exists between the substance and the essence of an object. That a thing is a substance we know by intuition; what however, is its constitution only comes to us after reasoning on its properties, and very often, especially in physical substances, remains unknown, e. g., that a tree is a substance is evident; but what makes it a tree is an inquiry into its essence. In like manner the substantiality of the soul is an intuition. The confusion of the concepts "substance" and "essence" permeates English Psychology from the time of Locke. Instead of a definition "of substance" in reality a definition of "essence" has been proposed; they have passed by the *fact* in the effort to explain the nature of the fact. Thus we have the "unknown substance" of Locke, "the unknown something behind and under phenomena" of Hamilton, the "unknowable" of Spencer.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> The conclusion drawn was that the substantiality of the soul is an intuition of consciousness. By this I mean a self-evident truth. To explain: (1) We must distinguish between *direct* and *reflex* knowledge; *direct* knowledge is had from the immediate presence of the object; *reflex* is the act of the mind revolving the *direct* knowledge for the purpose of analysis or of clearer perception. (2) The elements of the notion

§ 14. But it is false to suppose that an intuition of the substantiality of the soul should enable me to see into its intimate constitution; that I should detect at a glance and unfold its secret springs of action; that there should be no hesitation or doubt or discussion about it. This is a confusion of concepts and a logical fallacy. The concept of a particular essence or nature, which is essence viewed as a source of activity, is only obtained after reasoning from certain data.<sup>29</sup>

Essence is the result of reasoning.

§ 15. These data are, e. g., that it is a substance, that it acts in such a manner, that it has certain qualities or characteristics. Then by a process of reasoning we infer what must be the nature of the substance, after an analogy to our inference of a man's character from his words and actions. This is true of external and of internal experience. Thus an inquiry whether or not the soul is a substance, is not an investigation of its nature. The former is only preparatory to the latter. Of the one we have an intuition; the other is the product of discursive thought.<sup>30</sup> It is evident that Mr.

of substance are *being, potency, stability, subject of modifications*; now the two former, i. e., *being and potency* are grasped by the act of consciousness alone; the other two, i. e., *stability and subject of modifications* are known by the present act of consciousness joined to the act of memory. In stating that the notion of the soul's substance is self-evident, I refer only to the direct and ordinary knowledge or conviction which every thinking being has, in holding that he is some being. The reflex knowledge or the analysis of this conviction is the work of the psychologist. Thus Fr. Harper says that the conviction of the soul's substantiality is a "spontaneous judgment." cf. *Metaphysics of the Schools*, Vol. II, p. 405-407.

<sup>29</sup> The term "intuition" is used in its scholastic sense as a "self-evident truth." It has no reference, therefore, to the "sense-perception" of Kant or the "innate idea" of Des Cartes; in both senses modern writers employ the word.

<sup>30</sup> St. Thomas expresses this distinction of concepts with his usual clearness: "Ad primam cognitionem de mente haben-

James does not refer to Scholastic Philosophy when he writes: "The commonest spiritualistic opinion is that the soul or subject of the mental life is a metaphysical entity, inaccessible to direct knowledge, and that the various mental states and operations of which we reflectively become aware are objects of an inner sense which does not lay hold of the real agent in itself, any more than sight or hearing gives us direct knowledge of matter in itself. From this point of view introspection is of course incompetent to lay hold of anything more than the soul's *phenomena*. But even then the question remains, How well can it know the phenomena themselves?"<sup>31</sup>

The conclusion certain.

§ 16. We may hold then, as certain that the soul is a substance.<sup>32</sup> The testimony of consciousness concerning the fact cannot be gainsaid. I hold it so, I am convinced because it is self-evident. We cannot, therefore, admit the contentions: (a) Of Locke, who holds that the soul is a substance but that we know this with full certitude from Christian revelation alone and that reason can give us only some probability.<sup>33</sup> (b) Of Lewes, that the substantiality of the soul as well as its simplicity are assumptions.<sup>34</sup>

dam sufficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est principium actus, ex quo mens percipit seipsam, et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam praesentiam. Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam non sufficit ejus praesentia; sed requiritur diligens et subtilis inquisitio: unde et multi naturam animae ignorant, et multi circa naturam animae erraverunt." Sum. Theol. I. q. 87, a. 1.

<sup>31</sup> James Psychology, vol. I, p. 187.

<sup>32</sup> We cannot agree with Hamilton, "We know nothing of mind and matter considered as substances; they are known to us only as a two-fold series of phenomena" in Reid, note A2; Met., p. 97; cf. Spencer's Prin. of Psych., § 268, sq.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Essay, BIV, ch. 3, n. 6; BII, ch. 27, Frazer's edition.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Lewes Problems of Mind, 1st series, p. 323.

§ 17. Having the conception of the soul's substantiality clearly defined and proved as a fact, we can, with profit, examine more closely into some false views which have exerted a great influence on the student of Psychology. These errors are not proposed only as the convictions of individual writers. They are indicative of certain streams or tendencies of modern thought. Errors.

## V.

ERRONEOUS CONCEPTIONS OF THE SOUL'S  
SUBSTANTIALITY.

§ 18. During the last few years a strong reaction to Kant has been manifested among conservative non-catholic writers. It arose from the failure of Hegel's Idealism. A foothold was sought to stem the tide which threatened to carry men to materialism. The cry arose, "Back to Kant." There it was hoped a firm basis could be found. Thus, Max Muller sees in the study of Kant, the best hope of a philosophical rejuvenescence for England and America, even more than Germany. We see the leaning to Kant in Prof. Green, Prof. Ed. Caird, <sup>35</sup> Mr. Courtney, of New College, Dr. Wallace, of Merton College, Dr. Watson, of Queens University, Canada, Max Muller's new translation, Dr. H. Sterling Text-Book of Kant. Influence of Kant.

*The Transcendental Theory of the Soul.*

§ 19. Kant calls the substantiality of the soul the first paralogism of Transcendental Psychology. <sup>36</sup> He defines substance as "that the represen- His opinion on substantiality of soul.

<sup>35</sup> The Critical Philosophy of Kant, 2 vol., 1889.

<sup>36</sup> Crit. of Pure Reason, Muller's Trans. Dialect BII c. i., p. 284.



tation of which is the absolute subject of our judgments, and cannot be used, therefore, as the determination of any other thing." From this he concludes that the "I, as a thinking being (soul) am substance."

His criticism of the soul's substantiality.

§ 20. Having stated the argument in his own words, he then subjects it to a severe criticism. He holds "that pure categories, and among them that of substance, have in themselves no objective meaning unless they rest on some intuition."<sup>37</sup> He expressly says that "sensibility alone supplies us with intuition; these intuitions become thought through the understanding, and hence arise conceptions,"<sup>38</sup> that "our intuition must at all times be sensuous;"<sup>39</sup> that "we are so constituted that our intuition must always be sensuous, and consist of the mode in which we are affected by objects;"<sup>40</sup> that "the understanding is not a faculty of intuition;"<sup>41</sup> that "the internal sense, by means of which the mind perceives itself or its internal state, does not give an intuition (*Anschauung*) of the soul (*Seele*) itself as an object."<sup>42</sup>

The value of the concept of substance according to Kant.

§ 21. What, then, he asks, is the value of the concept of substance? And the answer given is that it is practically of no advantage, and we could do very well without it. He maintains that the properties of permanence, etc., cannot be drawn from the pure category of substance; nor in this case is there any experience to lay hold of; "For though the I exists in all thoughts, not the slightest intuition is connected with

<sup>37</sup> P. 284.

<sup>38</sup> *Trans. Aesth.*, p. 1.

<sup>39</sup> *PI*, s. 11, p. 28.

<sup>40</sup> *P2*, *Intro.*, p. 41.

<sup>41</sup> *P*. 56.

<sup>42</sup> *P. I*, *S. I*, p. 18.

that representation by which it might be distinguished from other objects of intuition. We may very well perceive, therefore, that this representation appears again and again in every act of thought, but not that it is a constant and permanent intuition in which thoughts, as being changeable, come and go.”<sup>43</sup>

§ 22. From this he concludes that “reason imposes upon us an apparent knowledge only by representing the constant logical subject of thought as the knowledge of the real subject in which that knowledge inheres. Of that (i. e., the real) subject, however, we have not and cannot have the slightest knowledge. Besides this logical meaning of the I, we have no knowledge of the subject in itself; the proposition that the soul is a substance signifies a substance in idea only, and not in reality.”<sup>44</sup>

It is the logical, not the real substance which the mind grasps.

§ 23. (a) The difficulties which Kant attempts to solve are not inherent in the question itself, but spring from his own peculiar principles. They are the logical results of his theory of knowledge. Kant's attempt to reconstruct the philosophy of thought was a failure. We cannot be expected to admit, without protest, principles which led Fichte to absolute Idealism or Nihilism; developed into the pantheism of Schelling and Hegel;<sup>45</sup> gave reason for the revolt against metaphysical reasoning led by Comte, and the substitution of the positive philosophy;<sup>46</sup> influenced Hamilton in the philosophy of the conditioned, and

Criticism of Kant's views (a) Kant's difficulties are the consequence of his own principles.

<sup>43</sup> P. 285.

<sup>44</sup> Ib. Hegel holds that the mind is a *subject*, not a substance. cf. Wallace's Hegel Proleg., ch. VII.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Ed. Caird the Critical Philosophy of Kant, vol. II, p. 645.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Chapter on Positivism.

through him gave birth to the Agnosticism of Mr. Huxley.<sup>47</sup>

His meaning of  
"Phenomena" is  
false.

§ 24. (b) It is not true to say that we know only ideal appearances, i. e., phenomena. The meaning Kant gives to the word "phenomena" is false. With Kant a phenomenon is a thing, in as much as it is the object of thought. But he maintains that the mind in the act of knowing clothes the object with ideal forms. Hence, the mind grasps the ideal appearance, never the real appearance of the object. This ideal appearance is his "phenomenon," as distinguished from the "noumenon," i. e., the thing itself in its real concrete existence. Now this strange theory is contradicted by common sense; we know things manifesting themselves; the phenomena which the sense grasps are concrete facts, e. g., my own existence. Again, this opinion of Kant is opposed to the data and methods of physical science. Science deals with real things. The axioms and rules of mathematical science must be verified in concrete objects in order that the calculations founded upon them may have any validity.<sup>48</sup> The same is true of Chemistry,<sup>49</sup> and of Physics.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>47</sup> XIX Cent., Feb., '95. "There is absolutely," says Fichte, "nothing permanent, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own. Images constitute all that apparently exists; images that pass and vanish without there being aught to witness their transition. I myself am one of these images; nay, rather a confused image of images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream; into a dream made up only of a dream. Perception is a dream, thought — the source of all the existence, and all the reality which I imagine to myself of my existence, of my power, of my destination — is the dream of that dream."

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Jevons *Prin. of Science*, p. 8.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *New Chemistry* by Prof. Cooke.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Tyndall "Light and Electricity," p. 60.

Finally, Ontology is a science of real being. The first principles of reason, e. g., the principles of contradiction and of identity, etc., are not purely ideal. They have an objective value beyond the range of sense-experience. They can be expressed as logical or as ontological verities. If I say that "It is impossible to affirm or deny at the same time the same thing of the same subject, if the circumstances be the same," I formulate a rule which is our guide in the world of affirmation and negation, and has thus a logical force. But if I affirm that "the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time," I state an ontological truth which holds sway in the world of reality, and is verified of all existences, whether or not they be the objects of sense perception.<sup>51</sup>

§ 25. (c) It is not true to say that intuition is purely a sensitive act. There is a higher order of truth than that of sense; thoughts are not the transformation of sensitive impressions. We have pure intellectual ideas and principles, i. e., pure in the sense that they are not the product of sensation. In the *Critic*, Kant himself discusses pure intellectual concepts which exist as subjective facts. Now sensitive intuition cannot furnish these. Finally, if sensitive intuition were a condition of reality, could I not contend that the pure idea of relation, the principles on which the phenomena of light, electricity, affinity, etc., depend, are nothing but empty words? I cannot represent these in sensitive intuition; yet, I cannot deny their real existence.

§ 26. (d) It is false to say that the concept of substance has no objective value, and that it is *logical*.

<sup>51</sup> Balmes BIV, ch. 13, 14, 15, 16, 21, 22; Ward Phil. of Theism; Prof. Bowne, "Metaphysics, a Study of First Principles," p. 371, sq.

only, not *real*. The logical subject or substance is something conceived of in the mind as a subject having attributes, whether or not it exist in reality, e. g., we form an abstraction or personification, and describe them as real beings, with qualities and attributes, thus "The *quality* of mercy, the *redness* of the rose," etc. The grammatical term "abstract noun" expresses the logical subject. But grammar teaches that there are concrete nouns, and that between the abstract and the concrete noun there is a vast difference. The latter expresses a reality existing as such. The former is only a generalization of an adjective. Now the adjective expresses a real quality, and the abstract noun formed therefrom can only be understood and explained by this reality. This generalization from the concrete to the abstract is a process of thought. It goes on constantly within the mind, and is exemplified in ordinary conversation as well as in written discourse. But it is false to hold that this process is necessary for the formation of every concept which the mind employs as subject of a statement. The existence of concrete nouns shows that every subject is not a logical subject. And a careful analysis of the logical subject, and its mode of formation shows that the *real* distinction of *real* substance and of modifications, is presupposed.

Substance  
not in-  
ferred  
from the  
pure cate-  
gory.

§ 27. (e) It is false to say that we infer from the pure category of substance that the soul is a substance. Such an inference would not take us out of the ideal order. On the contrary the general idea of substance is warranted by a fact of experience. A close analysis of the data of consciousness reveals the elements which go to make up the concept.

Revealed  
in con-  
sciousness.

§ 28. Consciousness shows the distinction between substance and accident by testifying to the distinction

of the I and the thoughts or feelings affecting the I as a primary fact of my inner life. All my thoughts and feelings are referred to *me*; in *me* they are collected and united; and *me* they variously affect and modify. If the I were not a reality, how could it be an object of consciousness, or how explain the distinction between *me* and *my* thoughts, and the relation of the one to the other? In every thought and feeling the I is present as a real fact of inner experience. In thus asserting the real existence of the I, emphasis is laid upon an elementary truth. Any artificial system of thought which attempts to reason away its real worth, must inevitably fail.

§ 29. *Wundt* sets out with the contention that the "soul is not merely a subject in the logical sense, but a *substance*, a real being as whose manifestations or transactions the so-called activities of the soul are apprehended." Nevertheless the influence of Kant is apparent when in the development of the task he regards the soul as the *logical* subject of inner experience, e. g., the soul is an act of *apperception* which accompanies all our acts, or it is the sum-total of psychic acts. To the idealism of Kant he joins the Monism of the modern German school.<sup>52</sup>

Kant's  
view re-  
produced  
in Wundt.

## 2°. *The Phenomenal Theory of the Soul.*

§ 30. Phenomenalism is the doctrine of those who hold that we know appearances only, not the nature of things.<sup>53</sup> Its parent is Locke. He defined substance

Phenom-  
enal  
realism.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Ladd *Phil. of Mind*, p. 50. With Lotze and Wundt the term *apperception* means to discern the relation between objects and is had when by an act of attention mental data are unified into a related whole. cf. Baldwin *Psych.*, p. 56.

<sup>53</sup> Phenomenalism treated here maintains that we know the real objective qualities; in this sense it must be distinguished from the ideal phenomenalism of Kant.

as the unknown support of a heap of qualities.<sup>54</sup> Berkeley pushed this definition to extreme Idealism, contending that this unknown does not exist, and that the only realities are the ideas of the soul. Hume went even farther by denying the substance of mind and holding it to be only a group or series of states.

Theory of  
association.

§ 31. Hume's position has been adopted by the English school of Associationism. They bid us look into our conscious mental life, where we find the ever-present thought or sensation or emotion, which gives way to another, and so on while life lasts. The present thought or feeling thus appear as waves in the "stream of consciousness." "The wave of consciousness constitutes the mind," is, according to Mr. Morgan, the answer of Empirical Psychology.<sup>55</sup> "The term 'mind' is applied not merely to the physical wave at any moment of consciousness, but to the wave of consciousness in its totality."<sup>56</sup> Thus, Mr. Bain glories in having destroyed forever the material principle.<sup>57</sup> To Mr. Spencer, mind is a synthesis or aggregate of many feelings, actual and nascent, and of many changes among them.<sup>58</sup> He only differs from Mr. Mill in using

<sup>54</sup> Mr. Thomson, "Elem. of Psych.," Vol. I, p. 114; Mr. James, "Prin. of Psych.," Vol. I, p. 355, express themselves in the same words.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *Introduct. to Compar. Psychol.*, pp. 26, 31.

<sup>56</sup> Modern Psychologists, however, differ in explaining the nature of this "stream." Thus, Hoffding holds that the states form a stream "in memory which connects them." cf. *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 49. Sully finds its basis in "a healthy and well nourished condition of the brain." cf. *Human Mind*, vol. I, s. 13, 15; so, also, Ribot cf. *Diseases of Personality*. Mr. James says that "the bond is the 'warmth' and 'resemblance' to the central spiritual self now actually felt;" as a result they are "recognized and appropriated by the 'judging Thought,' i. e., the present self." cf. *James Psychology*, vol. I, pp. 356, 341.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Senses and Intellect*.

<sup>58</sup> *Princ. of Psych.*, vol. I, p. 500.

the word "Unknowable" in place of "possibilities of sensation."<sup>59</sup>

*Mill.*

§ 32. No work of the past generation has exerted so powerful an influence for evil upon the English mind as Mr. Mill's "System of Logic." His penetration in detecting the weak points in Mr. Hamilton's philosophy — the prevailing philosophy of the day, and the vigor of his criticism, gave to him and to his principles a higher position and greater value than were just.<sup>60</sup> He is styled the logician, Mr. Spencer the metaphysician, and Mr. Bain the psychologist of the Associationalist School. An examination of his teaching, therefore, means a criticism of the most powerful and influential school of English Philosophy.

§ 33. Mr. Mill's theory of matter and mind provoked strong and widespread discussion in England.<sup>61</sup> He resolves the belief that "the mind exists" into the belief of a permanent possibility of our states of consciousness. In this he is a faithful disciple of Hume. To Mill the knowledge of mind is relative; we only know it as the notion of *something* permanent in opposition to our passing states and acts. But he adds, this permanent may be only a possibility. Therefore, the notion we have of mind is the notion of the series of actual sensations, and of the infinite possibilities of sensation. He calls mind "a thread of consciousness, supplemented by believed possibilities

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Balfour Found. of Belief, p. 124; also, S. Laing, "A Modern Zoroastrian," p. 126. Closely akin to this, in sound at least, for it is difficult to attach any sense to the words, is Mr. Arnold's "tendency making for righteousness."

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Examination of Hamilton by J. S. Mill.

<sup>61</sup> Exam. of Hamil., ch. XXI.



of consciousness," or "a series of feelings with a background of possibilities of feeling." But he continues, "if we speak of mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something, which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." He confesses that this cannot be explained. "I think," he says, "by far the wisest thing we can do, is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory of how it takes place, and when we are obliged to speak of it in terms which assume a theory, to use them with reservation as to their meaning."<sup>62</sup>

Criticism  
(a. his difficulty is  
the consequence  
of his own  
theory.

§ 34. (a) Mr. Mill clearly sees the difficulty, but, like Kant, he fails to recognize that it springs from his theory, and that he alone is responsible. His false conception of substance as a collection of qualities; his failure, with Hume, to grasp a real entity in which these qualities inhere, and which they modify; his attempt to explain all mental phenomena by the laws of association; his mistake in viewing the mind as the sum-total of actual and possible states, instead of a real activity producing these states, and in which they adhere; his blindness in taking the shadow for the substance, or rather the clothes for the reality, have led him to explanations which break down when rigidly analyzed in the face of facts. His whole theory falls to pieces in the attempt to explain the simple act of memory.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Exam., pp. 212, 213.

<sup>63</sup> W. Ward Phil. of Theism.

§ 35. (b) To explain the fact of consciousness he is reduced to the strange statement that "a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series," an explanation approved by Mr. Bain.<sup>64</sup> But do they reflect that the "awareness" is something different from the "series," and that it sounds like a poor apology for the soul? (b) a petitio principii.

§ 36. (c) The fact is not inexplicable. Let us appeal to our inner life. Do our thoughts and feelings and volitions show us a "series of feelings aware of itself," or do they reveal a real ego permanent and identical in the midst of successive changes, which variously modify and affect it? The answer comes without hesitation. The substantial reality of the Ego is a primary fact of conscious experience, the only explanation of our conscious existence. This is true not only of the learned philosopher, but of every thinking being. It is forced upon us in every waking moment of our lives. (c) fact not inexplicable.

§ 37. (d) Finally, if we know only sensations and groups of sensations of necessity we fall into the error of Phenomenal Idealism. This is illustrated in the case of Mr. Mill himself.<sup>65</sup> (d) consequences.

### 3°. *Buddhist Theory of the Soul.*

§ 38. Within the past few years Buddhism, as a philosophy and as a religion, has attracted much attention. The fascinating character of Gotama, the singular charm of his moral system have led many to consider influence of Buddhism.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Mind XI, 459.

<sup>65</sup> The reader may peruse with profit Jevons' "J. S. Mill" in Contemp. Rev., January, 1878; Prof. Bowne's "Introduction to Psychological Theory," p. 13; where a criticism of Mr. Mill is found; also, Mr. Courtney's "Metaphysics of Mr. Mill." The best criticism, as Mr. Mill acknowledges, is found in Philosophy of Theism by Dr. W. Ward.

it more perfect than the religion of Christ. As such its treatment belongs to another department of Christian Apologetics. At present we shall question its teaching concerning man.

its teaching on man.

§ 39. Buddhism teaches that man consists of an assemblage of different properties or qualities. (Skandhas.) These are *material* qualities (Rupa) twenty-eight in number, *sensations* (vedana) which are divided into six main classes, *abstract* ideas (Sanna), six in number, corresponding to the six classes of sensations, *Tendencies* or *Potentialities* (sankhara) in fifty-two divisions, and *mental powers*. (Vinnana.) Neither the qualities nor the groups of them are permanent. The *material qualities* are like a mass of foam; the *sensations* like bubbles on the water; the *ideas* are like the uncertain mirage; the *tendencies* are like the plantain stalk without firmness or solidity; the *thoughts* are like a spectre or magical illusion.<sup>66</sup>

on the soul.

§ 40. The soul is none of these Skandras; nor is it the result of a combination of them all. Buddhism is very explicit on this point. "Thus mendicants," says Gotama, "the unlearned unconverted man regards the soul either as identical with, or as possessing, or as containing, or as residing in the material properties," and so on of the other Skandhas. "By regarding soul in one of these ways, he gets the idea 'I am.' But the learned disciple of the converted has got rid of ignorance and acquired wisdom, and, therefore, the ideas of 'I am' do not occur to him."<sup>67</sup>

there is no soul.

§ 41. The soul, therefore, does not exist; it is not anything real; it is rather a conception formed from

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Hardy Manuel of Buddhism, p. 424.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. Abhidharma Koshya Vyakhya cit by Burnouf. Introd. a l'histoire.

the combined action of the Skandhas. There is no abiding principle in man; the body changes and is dissolved; the Skandhas change and expire at death. Death is the breaking up of the combination; it is not the separation of soul from body, but the dissolution of body, and of the groups of elements on which life depended.<sup>68</sup>

§ 42. Buddhism is not content to deny the existence of the soul; it brands belief in its existence a heresy. stamps this belief heresy. In the first stage of the path of freedom the student must abandon *Sakkayaditthi* "the heresy of individuality," one of the three primary delusions. Again, *Attevada* or "the doctrine of the soul," is classed with sensuality, as one of the four Upadanas, which are the immediate cause of birth and death, of pain and sorrow. The will is blinded by delusion to crave for personal existence, and hence the source of the belief in an immortal soul. This egotistical desire binds man to life and hinders salvation. The voluntary surrender of our individuality is the great step; we then are free.<sup>69</sup> "This ignorance of the soul," says Prof. Davids,<sup>70</sup> is the most important fact in the history of Buddhism." And it is indeed worthy of surprise that a religion preaching this Gospel of nescience and annihilation should be heralded as the final answer to the most important questions concerning man's life and destiny. It rests on the low plane of modern Agnosticism and Positivism, and is to be treated accordingly.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Buddhist Catech. by Subhadra Bhikshu, p. 76 sq.; Copleston Buddhism, p. 113; and for the popular form of this teaching cf. "Questions of Mahinda."

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Colebrooke Essays I, ch. X; Prof. Corvell's ed.

<sup>70</sup> Man. of Buddhism, p. 30.

## MATERIALISM.

no variety  
in its main  
teaching.

§ 1. The history of Materialism presents little variety. Whether it appears as a tendency more or less pronounced, as in English Philosophy from the time of Locke, Hobbes and Priestley, or in the bold and crude form of a system as proposed by Lucretius in ancient times,<sup>1</sup> or by Buchner in our own century,<sup>2</sup> its teaching can be summed up and set forth in a few main principles. These are: The eternity and indestructibility of atoms; nothing produces nothing; the eternity of motion and the infinite possibility of its combination; the iron sway of necessary laws throughout the universe; the rejection of final causes; the principles of spontaneous generation, and of natural selection, at least, in germ. Their application to the material and organic world, to human life and action, both of the individual and of society, gave rise to the mass of teaching embraced under the term Materialism.<sup>3</sup>

from  
ancient to  
modern  
Material-  
ism only an  
apparent  
change.

§ 2. In our day its defenders have brought to elucidate and develop their principles, facts and hypotheses drawn from the progress of the physical, chemical and physiological sciences, without, however, effecting an essential change in the principles themselves. The passage from ancient to modern Materialism, therefore, shows no change in the standpoint or fundamental principles; it only reveals a new collection of facts and arguments to support the same teaching.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. de Rerum Natura; Aug. de Utilitate Credendi, n. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Force and Matter.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Lange Hist. of Materialism.

The clothes in which it is dressed are new. In aim, in principle, in thought, it is the same as the primitive theory; and we find Mr. Tyndall in a public address proposing to the scientific world the doctrines of Democritus as the final conclusions of modern thought.<sup>4</sup>

## II.

### MODERN MATERIALISM.

§ 3. Modern Materialism, especially in Germany, owed its origin to the reaction led by Schoppenhauer and Feuerbach against the *apriori* philosophy of Kant, as developed by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. The result was the inversion and transformation of Hegel's Idealism into pure Naturalism. The distrust of Metaphysics became widespread; it was held to deal with idle speculation and airy nothing. Philosophy was considered a failure; it had attempted to solve the great problems of man's life and destiny, with the result that theory gave way to theory, until at last the mind found itself in hopeless confusion. Des Cartes gave birth to the Empiricism of Locke; this to the scepticism of Hume; to confute Hume, Kant wrote the Critic of Pure Reason; Transcendentalism became with Fichte a Subjective Idealism in which "life was a dream and he himself the dream of a dream," and with Hegel developed into a false, exaggerated system, whose foundation was the denial of the Principle of Contradiction.

§ 4. At the same time the physical sciences rose into prominence; under an almost exclusive study they rapidly developed, and by the steady avowal of seeking facts according to the methods of observation and

modern Materialism has its source in (a) revolt against *a priori* metaphysics.

(b) in exclusive study of physical sciences.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Tyndall Fragments of Science Art, "Belfast Address;" Prin. Tulloch Modern Theories in Phil. & Religion, Art. "Scientific Materialism."

experiment, they seemed to promise a sure basis to a mind bewildered by the groundless and conflicting assertions of a false philosophy.

(c) in the  
prevailing  
Empiri-  
cism of  
France  
and Eng-  
land.

§ 5. In France many were prepared for the new teaching by the revival of the Empiricism of the Eighteenth century, under the new form of Compté's Positive Philosophy, and we have the refined and sensuous Materialism which pervaded the regime of Louis Napoleon.<sup>5</sup> In England the Sensism of Locke developed into Scepticism by Hume performed a like service, and produced Mill's theory of Association, Spencer's Evolution and Bain's identification of thought and feeling with bodily motions. In both countries the prevailing habit of thought was somewhat alike, and exerted mutual influence.<sup>6</sup>

Leaders.

§ 6. Its leaders are Molleschott,<sup>7</sup> Carl Vogt,<sup>8</sup> Buchner, whose work<sup>9</sup> may be called the Gospel of German Materialism. Buchner gives to matter the power of producing life: "The soul is the product of a peculiar combination of matter;" "in the same manner as the steam engine produces motion, so does the organic complication of force-endowed materials produce, in the animal body, a sum of effects so interwoven as to become a unit, and is therefore by us called spirit;" "mental activity is the function of cerebral substance; it is emitted by the brain as sounds are by the mouth, as music by the organ."<sup>10</sup> "As there is no bile without liver, so there

Buchner.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. McCosh Christianity and Positivism, ch. VII.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. chapter IV, Positivism and Agnosticism.

<sup>7</sup> Circular Course of Life, 1852.

<sup>8</sup> Lectures on Man, 1854 & sq.

<sup>9</sup> "Force and Matter," 1854.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Opinion of Empedocles that the soul is a harmony, St. Thomas Contra Gentes II, 64.

is no thought without brain." The analogy is false, as we shall see; that bile should come from the liver it is easy to understand; but thought is of such a nature that it cannot come from the brain alone. Vogt, in an uncouth and vulgar style, holds that the interaction of mechanical forces explains all things. Vogt.

§ 7. Molleschott contends that the constant movement of the material elements explains physical and psychic life. "The identification of mind and body," he says, "is not an explanation, it is a fact, neither more nor less simple, neither more nor less mysterious than any other fact; it is a fact as weight." "No one assuredly pretends to explain gravitation by means of distinctions between it and matter. One states it as an immanent property, as a fact upon which it is useless to speculate." "It is as impossible to say why the brain thinks, as to say, why zinc and copper joined by a humid conductor generate an electro-motor force."<sup>11</sup> Haeckel, the exponent of Monism, expresses the same doctrine in the words: "The real materialistic philosophy asserts that the vital phenomena of motion, like all other phenomena of motion, are effects or products of matter."<sup>12</sup> Hence he denies the distinction between animate and inanimate bodies.<sup>13</sup> To him organic and inorganic forces are the same in kind; in their real nature they are one and indivisible. Molleschott.

§ 8. This materialism is crude and coarse. It could not withstand the vigor and fire of criticism. In its native land it has been superseded by a more refined kind, though the purpose and teaching are essentially This form of Materialism has passed away in Germany.

<sup>11</sup> Life & Light Disc. at Zurich, 1865.

<sup>12</sup> Evol. of Man, vol. II, p. 456.

<sup>13</sup> Hist. of Creation, vol. I, p. 23.



the same. Thus Lange admits that there is no longer a literary outcry of indignation when a new edition of "Force and Matter" appears; that Molleschott is almost forgotten by the great public; and that Karl Vogt is now seldom mentioned except in reference to some special question in anthropology or some isolated and immortal utterance of his drastic humor.<sup>14</sup>

### III.

#### SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM.

Scientific  
Material-  
ism.

§ 9. Hence the attempt to formulate a scientific Materialism. This is a characteristic product of our own times. It affects a scientific tone; it appeals to positive experience in verification of its assertions; it manifests an exclusive leaning to the physical sciences, especially physics and chemistry; its explanations of certain phenomena, e. g., the phenomena of life are arbitrary but somewhat plausible; when pushed to a crucial point, it seeks refuge in vague generalities or in a wise confession of man's limitations and ignorance; it enters the arena with a definite bias carefully concealed under ample protestations of fairness, but shows its true colors in the course of the argument by skillfully arranging facts, conjectures, hypotheses and figures of Rhetoric so that the passage to a wide and unwarranted conclusion is almost imperceptible.

Its advo-  
cates.

§ 10. The most prominent advocates of this form of Materialism are Mr. Tyndall and Mr. Huxley. They do not believe that matter, as is commonly meant by the term, can account for the phenomena of physical or psychic life. Their views of matter are higher and purer. To them matter is different from what is gen-

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Lange History of Materialism, vol. III, p. 27.

erally believed, and its capabilities are very great. As <sup>Lotze.</sup> Lotze expresses it: "Matter is actually something much better than the name tells and that what it appears to be from the outside."<sup>15</sup> Hence they infer that if we knew the nature and potencies of matter, we could explain the formation of ideas, and the operations of psychic life. Mr. Tyndall admits "A tendency <sup>Tyndall.</sup> on the part of matter to organize itself and sees incipient life, as it were, manifesting itself throughout the whole of what we call inorganic nature."<sup>16</sup>

§ 11. No one denies potencies to matter. But <sup>Examina-</sup> material potencies alone do not tend to organization. <sup>tions of</sup> There is a great difference between crystallization, <sup>Tyndall's</sup> which he adduces in confirmation of his view, and <sup>"Mechan-</sup> organization as found in living beings.<sup>17</sup> "Incipient <sup>ical Theory</sup> life, as it were," is a phrase very ambiguous. Taken <sup>of Life."</sup> as a figure of speech, which the words "as it were," would justify, the meaning is clear and no fault can be found. But when interpreted in a literal sense, the phrase is erroneous. It is true that many vital phenomena can be explained by the laws of Physics and Chemistry. The process of digestion can be explained by Chemistry; the heart-action, the nervous system by Physics; and the transformation of heat into motion can, they hold, account for life. But it must not be forgotten that these forces are only instruments, and behind their normal action is a vital power which causes them to act and to act harmoniously.

§ 12. It is thus false, or at least ambiguous, to speak <sup>growth is</sup> of growth as "The cycle of molecular action." There <sup>not "mo-</sup> <sup>lecular</sup> <sup>action."</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Lotze Outlines of Psychology by Prof. Ladd, p. 93.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. "Scientific Materialism" in Fragments of Science, vol. II, p. 81.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Mivart Truth, 304, 323, 327, 444, 158, sq.

is only a partial statement of the truth; the nature of growth is far different from the interaction of physical forces. It is false to assert that "The animal body is just as much the product of molecular force, as chalk or sugar," that "The formation of a crystal, a plant or an animal, is a *purely* mechanical problem." Unorganized matter in any shape or form is inadequate as the cause of the various forms of organized existence; and organized matter, as such, can only be explained by postulating a directive and unifying agency presiding over the action of the material forces. In his Belfast address, Mr. Tyndall admits that matter, "as defined for generations in our scientific test-books," is unable to account for life. Hence he urges us to change our notions of matter. Having done so, he traces "The line of life backward," until "the vision of the mind authoritatively supplements the vision of the eye," and "by an intellectual necessity crosses the boundary of experimental evidence and discerns in vulgar matter the promise and potency of all terrestrial life."

Mr. Tyndall's  
method of  
reasoning.

§ 13. This is an illustration of Mr. Tyndall's reasoning. He destroys the ordinary meaning attached to the word "matter," makes it vague and shadowy, so that it might be applied to anything and everything, and draws the conclusion he already had in mind. An apt illustration is had in the cray-fish which muddles the water in order to escape. Following out this line of thought Mr. Tyndall could safely say, in the same address that "the Human Understanding is itself a result of the play between organism and environment through cosmic ranges of time."<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> When Prof. Barker declared that "Life is now universally regarded as a phenomenon of matter," he meant either

§ 14. Mr. Huxley, in the "Physical Basis of Life,"<sup>20</sup> sets forth the same views. But where Mr. Tyndall uses the word "Matter," he uses "Protoplasm." His theory may be termed the "Chemical" or "Mechanico-Chemical," in contradistinction to the purely "Mechanical" of his friend.

Mr. Huxley's  
"chemical  
Theory of  
life."

§ 15. Mr. Huxley holds that vital action results from "the molecular forces of the protoplasm." Hence he infers that "the thoughts to which I am giving utterance and your thoughts regarding them, are the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life, which is the source of our other vital phenomena."<sup>21</sup> A few pages back he tells us that "even those manifestations of intellect, of feeling and of will, which we rightly name the higher faculties," are known "to everyone but the subject of them" as "transitory changes in the relative positions of the part of the body."<sup>22</sup> Yet he repudiates the accusation of being a Materialist: on the contrary believes Materialism "to involve grave philosophic error." His reasons are truly ingenuous. "For, after all," he adds, in a burst of confidence, "what do we know of this 'terrible' matter, except as the name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness? And what do we know of that 'spirit' over whose threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation is

Mr. Huxley's  
teaching.

that life was always seen manifested in matter, and then he enunciated a truth as old as mankind; or that life was a property or an effect of matter, and then his words are without foundation.

Cf. Some Modern Aspects of the Life-Question, Add. by Prof. Geo. F. Barker, Pres. of American Association for Advancement of Science, Boston, 1880.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Lay Sermons & Addresses.

<sup>21</sup> Phys. Basis of Life, p. 138.

<sup>22</sup> *Ib.*, p. 123.

arising, like that which was heard at the death of Pan. except that it is also a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause or condition of the states of consciousness? In other words, matter and spirit are but names for the imaginary substrata of groups of natural phenomena." <sup>23</sup>

§ 16. In this Huxley shows himself a legitimate disciple of Hume. The logical position is Agnosticism. He further assures us that molecular cerebral changes cause states of consciousness, but sees no evidence that conscious states cause muscular motions.<sup>24</sup> Hence he infers that "mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism," that "the feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of the act." His premise is false. Consciousness testifies that mental changes produce bodily changes, e. g., fear causes pallor of the countenance. Thus Carpenter holds that we have the same evidence for the action of nerve-force on mental states, and for mental states calling forth physical consequences. He concludes that "the correlation between mind-force and nerve-force is shown to be complete both ways, each being able to excite the other." <sup>25</sup>

real value  
of Scientific  
Materialism.

§ 17. Scientific Materialism in the hands of these, its latest defenders, is therefore only an attempt to spiritualize matter. Yet matter can never be anything but matter. It will always retain the characteristic properties which mark it out as distinct from mind. Dialectic sophistry cannot obliterate the barrier between

<sup>23</sup> *Ib.*, p. 143.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. on the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata.

<sup>25</sup> *Mental Physiol.*, §§ 11, 12.

matter and mind by the endeavor to render the definition of matter vague and obscure. The effort fails and is remembered only as a passing phase in the history of the great conflict itself.<sup>26</sup>

## IV.

## DOCTRINE.

§ 18. Materialism teaches that the history and development of the universe is due to the action of natural forces, and that these natural forces can be reduced by Physics to modes of motion. All forces are material forces. The principle is "without matter no force; without force, no matter." (a) inorganic world.

§ 19. Force is a property of matter, matter is a somewhat undefined, ponderable entity occupying space. To the potencies inherent in its ultimate particles can be traced all the phenomena of existence. These potencies or properties are only different modes of motion; and the laws which govern their activity are only those of mechanics. Matter and force are eternal, indestructible and inseparable. Constant transformation takes place without in the least lessening the material mass or diminishing the sum of the forces. There is no repose; but an unending cycle of causes and of effects. The laws of nature are invariable; they are simply the expression of the necessary relations between the forces. Hence, the existence of God is a useless postulate, since the laws of nature are immutable, and admit no possibility of intervention.

§ 20. The principle of motion is inherent in matter. Life is explained by motion; thought is explained by (b) organic world.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. "Modern Phil. Concep. of Life," Address of J. J. Woodward, Pres. of Phil. Soc. of Washington, in Bulletin of Soc., 1882, vol. V, p. 49.

life, hence thought and life are only forms of motion; organic and inorganic forms are only the result of accidental combinations of matter.

(c) mind. § 21. The soul is only a name for the sum of mental activities, and in its ultimate analysis is the product of a certain mode of material organization. It is not, therefore, a real substance, but a series of material phenomena.<sup>27</sup> The mode of combination or organization necessary for the production of thought is difficult to detect. Physiology, Chemistry, Physics, have tried to discover the secret.

Mr. Spencer's attempt. § 22. Mr. Spencer attempts the solution with the principle of the transformation of energy, and the law of equivalence.<sup>28</sup> His analysis reveals physical forces, vital forces and thoughts. The vital forces are the mean, indirect and exact correlation with physical forces on the one side, and on the other they bear the same relation to the thoughts which they produce. The activity of the mind is in exact equivalence to the activity of the oxidation of the brain. Thought is reduced to a movement of matter. Its relation to the electric vibrations of the filaments of the brain is the same as that of color to the vibrations of ether. In like manner the will is only the mechanical expression of the state of the brain as determined by external impressions.<sup>29</sup>

The two schools of Materialism. § 23. Admitting these premises two alternatives are presented: (a) Either reject thought altogether and

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Prof. Bowne, *Some Diff. in Mod. Materialism*.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *The Evolution Philosophy* by M. E. Cazelles, p. 116.

<sup>29</sup> This explanation shows how little Materialism has changed. "The atoms of Democritus are individually without sensation; they combine in obedience to mechanical laws; and not only organic forms but the phenomena of sensation and thought, are the result of their combination." Tyndall Belfast Add.

admit the sole existence of matter and material motion, this is the logical and candid course, and is the position of the consistent Materialists. (b) Or hesitate and admit the existence of thought in name only as an aspect of matter. In this theory the physical series is the objective side, the psychical series is the subjective shadow of the objective physical series. Sensation, they say, is apparently due to a chemical change in the molecule; but in reality the sensation and the chemical change are only two manifestations of the same motion, or ex. gr., Mental activity, i. e., perception, judgment, etc., is the subjective side of the changes in the nervous mechanism of the brain.<sup>30</sup> Thus argue the English advocates of the Double-Aspect theory, e. g., Spencer, Clifford, Bain.<sup>31</sup> Hence we have no such being as mind, or Soul; immortality is a vain dream; with the dissolution of the organism, the individual intelligence and personality melt like smoke or a cloud into the elements of the universe.

## V.

### ARGUMENTS FOR MATERIALISM.

§ 24. Materialists endeavor to strengthen their position with various proofs drawn especially from Physiology. (a) What is called the soul is known only by its connection with matter. Its activities come into play in and through a bodily structure. "It is enough," writes G. H. Lewes<sup>32</sup> "that mind is never manifested except in a living organism to make us seek, in an analysis of organic phenomena, for the

(a) soul  
only known  
in matter.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Prof. Bowne Christian Phil. Quart., Oct., 1881; Art. Some Difficult. in Mod. Materialism.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *infra*.

<sup>32</sup> Physical Basis of Mind, p. 3.



material conditions of every mental fact. Mind is never found separate from a material organization." "Of mind apart from body we have no direct experience and absolutely no knowledge."<sup>33</sup> But what warrant have we to reason from concomitance to identify?

(b) from  
mental  
processes.

§ 25. (b) In company with all our mental processes there is *an unbroken material succession*. Parallel to mental circles of sensation, emotion, thought, language there is an unbroken physical circle of effects in nerve extremities, the afferent nerves, the centres, the cerebral hemispheres, the efferent nerves, etc. "It would be incompatible with everything we know of the cerebral action to suppose that the physical chain ends abruptly in a physical void, occupied by an immaterial substance, which imparts its results to the other edge of the physical break and determines the active response." Hence there is no rupture of nervous continuity. The mental and physical proceed together, as undivided twins. A mental cause is always a *two-sided cause*. When mind operates on body, it is a two-sided phenomenon, one side being body that influences the body; in other words it is body acting upon body.<sup>34</sup>

(c) dependence  
of mind  
on body.

§ 26. (c) The absolute dependence of mind on body, as proved by Physiology and Pathology. This is shown (1) in the growth and development of the child. The mental faculties develop parallel to the growth of the body. They come into action in proportion as

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Bain *Mind and Body*, p. 130.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Bain *Mind and Body*, p. 132; cf. Tyndall's words: "You cannot satisfy the human mind in its demand, for a logical continuity between molecular processes and the phenomena of consciousness. This is the rock on which Materialism must inevitably split whenever it pretends to be a complete philosophy of the human mind." *Scientific Materialism*.

the capacities of the organism unfold. The lower faculties act first, the higher are gradually matured. Hence, the organism has latent capacities for all these actions, and the soul exists only in name.

“For nature crescent does not grow alone  
In thews and bulk; but as this temple waxes,  
The inward service of the mind and soul  
Grows wide withal.”

—[Haml., Act I, Scen. 3.]

(2) The volume weight, convolutions and chemical properties of the brain have a strict relation to the intelligence. Again disease, fatigue, sleep, stimulants, affect our mental operations. Finally, the mind acquires its knowledge of the world through the senses, and is stimulated to activity by the impressions.<sup>35</sup> This objection has weight against the exaggerated spiritualism of Des Cartes, Leibnitz and Malebranche. It cannot be answered by them. Scholastic Philosophy proclaims the interaction of body and mind. It stands for the unity of the human composite. Finally (3) that all mental phenomena have exact equivalents in the specific forms of the nerve-commotion of the brain. This is the position of cerebral Physiology.<sup>36</sup> But the basis of this theory is very slight, and the theory, as proposed, is far in advance of actual facts. Our knowledge of the relations between molecular changes and mental changes is very deficient.<sup>37</sup> No sound argument for Materialism can be drawn from the dependence of the mind on the operations of imagination and sense. The dependence is extrinsic, not intrinsic; i. e., sense and imagination furnish the

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Bain Mind and Body, p. 131.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Prof. James Psychology; Tyndall Scientific Materialism; Bain Mind and Body, p. 42.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Ladd Phys. Psych., p. 592, sq.

material of thought; thought itself is superorganic.<sup>38</sup> Imagination and sense, however, require a nervous system and a nervous center. The brain is an organ for them, not for the intellect which transcends them.<sup>39</sup>

(d) from evolution.

§ 27. (d) It is confirmed by the doctrine of evolution. The universe presents a series of existences, one rising gradually above the other, one preparing the way for another, until the series terminates in man. The lowest forms are brought together in obedience to mechanical laws; higher forms are capable of chemical combinations; still higher, crystals are found; then organized existence from the lowest types up to man. In the grades of animal life we find that the simpler the organization is, the fewer are the instincts and the more limited is the intelligence. The individual, too, in his development, seems to reproduce the history of the development of the species; he passes through the grades of vegetation, animal and conscious existence.<sup>40</sup> But this argument from evolution cannot be substantiated. The law of biogeny is the basis of Haeckel's Monism; it rests upon a false analogy, is disproved by facts, and is rejected by scientific men.

§ 28. From this the conclusion is reached that matter alone exists; that the soul is only a name for the higher material activities or an aspect of them; that with the disintegration of the body the soul vanishes.

## VI.

### CRITICISM.

(a) Materialism is one-sided.

A detailed and minute examination of Materialism will not be given here. Its arguments will be exam-

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Spirituality of the Soul.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Janet Materialism of the Present Day, p. 130, sq.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Porter Human Intellect, p. 21.

ined in the proper place. They touch on many points, and require careful and extensive exposition of the true doctrine. Here and there, in the following pages, as occasion presents, they will be taken up and sifted. Some remarks, however, of general criticism, are not out of place.

§ 29. (a) Materialism is a one-sided and partial view; hence, in its estimation of facts, it lays itself open to the charge of narrowness and exaggeration. It postulates an infinite number of eternal, self-existent atoms in motion.<sup>41</sup> Epicurus tried to account for the movement by the continual descent of the primordial atoms in space; but Cicero calls this "a childish fiction," a "vain invention."<sup>42</sup> In more modern times La Place held that matter was originally in a diffuse, nebulous state; that by the action of gravitation it broke up into spherical masses; that the collision and condensation of these produced heat; that thus the masses were fused and afterwards slowly cooled.

§ 30. But is this motion original and essential, or was it imparted? If the former, how account for the beginning of the process? If the latter, then the condition of matter underwent a change. Furthermore, it assumes that material substance alone has a real existence, and hence that the soul has no reality. This is begging the whole question. Now, a system which is gratuitous, one-sided and partial, cannot claim to be scientific.

§ 31. (b) Materialism confuses things which are, by nature, distinct. Life is not coexistent with all motion; nor is mind coexistent with all life.<sup>43</sup> There are *physi-*

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Arist. Met. Bi., ch. 3 and 4.

<sup>42</sup> De Finibus I, n. 19.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Present Day Tracts, "Modern Materialism," by Rev. W. F. Wilkinson.

*cal, vital and mental* forces. One is not the other. It is true that life is always found connected with matter, and mind with both life and matter, or rather, with living matter. But we cannot reason inversely, and contend that wherever matter is there is life also; or wherever life is, there mind is found. Life is not due to mere material combinations, nor is mind explained by organization. Facts of consciousness are related to the brain and to bodily states; but the brain is not their cause. "The chasm is never bridged over between the last state of the material elements within our reach and the first rise of sensation; and scarce any one will cherish the vain hope that at a higher stage of development science will find a mysterious bridge in a case where it is the impossibility of any sure crossing over that forces itself on us with the most evident distinctness." <sup>44</sup>

(c) method  
not scientific.

§ 32. (c) Its methods are not scientific. It comes to us under the auspices of the physical sciences. The true spirit, however, of the experimental method does not animate its work. Its teaching concerning origins, substances, causes, finds no warrant in true science. Materialism repudiates Metaphysics only to set up a new Metaphysics of its own.<sup>45</sup> It is only necessary to read a few pages of Mill's Logic to comprehend this, and to recognize his patent contradictions. "Materialism," writes Virchow, "is a tendency to explain all that exists by the properties of matter; it goes beyond experience; it is constituted in a system, but systems are rather the results of speculations than the results of experience; they show in us a certain need of perfection which speculation alone can satisfy, for every

<sup>44</sup> Lotz Microcosmos I, 148.

<sup>45</sup> Caro, Le Materialisme.

knowledge which is the result of experience is incomplete and has gaps." <sup>46</sup>

## VII.

### INFLUENCE.

§ 33. Materialism exerted a very great influence over the generation just passed. The physical sciences were thoroughly imbued with its spirit. Under their auspices it flourished and spread. The impression was in some manner made upon the student that its teaching alone fostered independence of mind. Attention was called to the eminence occupied by its scientific defenders. Their great achievements and success were magnified and attributed to honesty of mind and candid love of truth. The empiric tone of English philosophy, with its strong undercurrent to Materialism, made its progress easier. due to physical sciences.  
to empiric tendency of English Philosophy

§ 34. But strong opponents were never wanting. The insufficiency and inconsistency of the Materialistic position were pointed out. The false pretension and unscientific methods of its advocates were unmasked. A reaction set in. <sup>47</sup> We have just heard Lange's lament of the untimely fate of its apostles. Janet's "Materialism of the Present Day" was the death blow to Buchner's "Force and Matter." Ulrici laid bare the sophistry of Strauss; "Old and New Faith," 1873. <sup>48</sup> The scope and limit of true science were set forth by Caro in "Le Materialisme et la Science." influence decreasing.

§ 35. In France the spiritualistic school of Maine de Biran; the influence of Scotch philosophy championed by Royer-Collard, Saisset; the revival of the in France.

<sup>46</sup> Rev. des Cours Scient., 1864, p. 308.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Carus the Soul of Man, p. 380.

<sup>48</sup> Eng. trans. by Dr. Krauth.

in England  
and  
America.

study of Aristotle led by Barthol. de S. Hilare; the Academie des sciences Morales et Politiques, e. g., Leveque, Caro, Bouillier et Janet, broke the wave of Materialism which threatened to submerge everything.<sup>49</sup> Like influences were at work in England and America. We see it in the Catholic Revival led by Cardinal Newman, Cardinal Manning and Dr. Ward,<sup>50</sup> and in our country by Dr. Brownson, Fathers Hecker and Hewitt,<sup>51</sup> in the modern Idealistic school, i. e., Neo. Hegelian or Neo. Kantian represented by Professors Green and Wallace of Oxford; Dr. Lotze and Wundt, Prin. Caird and Prof. Caird, of Glasgow; Prof. Ferrier, of St. Andrews; Dr. H. S. Sterling; Prof. Herbert, Dr. Martineau; in the adherents of the Scotch school Prof. Frazer, of Edinburgh; Prof. Calderwood, Prof. Flint; in the writings and influence of Cardinal Gibbons, of Dr. McCosh, of Princeton; Dr. Porter and Prof. Ladd, of Yale; Prof. Seth, Prof. Bowne in the strong commendation bestowed on Scholastic Philosophy by Pope Leo as the only remedy for the evils of the times, and in the Scholastic writings of Fr. Harper and the Stonyhurst Professors;<sup>52</sup> in the increased respect shown for religion, and in the number of men who are eminent alike for sincere piety and scientific attainments; in the production of such works as the "Foundations of Belief" by Rt. Hon. Balfour, and "Thoughts on Religion," G. R. Romanes, and "A Rebours," by Huysmans.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Cf. "Neo-Christian Movement in France," in Amer. Jour. of Psych., 1892-93, p. 496.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. W. G. Ward and the Catholic revival.

<sup>51</sup> Life of Father Hecker, by Father Elliott.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Encyc. Aeterni Patris.

<sup>53</sup> The names just cited are not disciples of the same school of thought; they do not profess the same religious faith, their

§ 36. Materialism is formulated in the universal negative proposition: nothing but matter exists. This proposition is proved false by establishing the truth of its contradictory, the particular affirmative proposition, viz., that there is an immaterial entity. In the following chapter this is done in proving the existence of the soul as an immaterial principle.

works are not of the same value, nor should they be read without judicious discrimination. They are mentioned with the view to show how men differing in faith, in language, in philosophic principles, in almost everything, yet join in calling attention to the sophistry and insufficiency of Materialism, and in the effort to propose a Theistic Philosophy.



## SIMPLICITY OF THE SOUL.

meaning of  
the terms.

§ 1. By the simplicity of the Soul is understood a simple immaterial unity. Hence the phrase expresses three notions, viz., that the soul is a unity; that it is a simple unity; that it is a simple unity totally different from matter. In the following chapter the meaning and nature of its immateriality will be investigated. Here it is sufficient to state and prove the fact.

### I.

#### UNITY.

its unity is  
a fact.

§ 2. The unity of the *ego* is an indisputable fact. To deny it is to do away altogether with internal experience and to render the facts actually perceived within us absurd. How can there be a sensation without the unity of the subject perceiving? How can I explain the fact that *I* think many thoughts and suffer many affections, if the *I* or *ego* be not a unity? Consciousness, therefore, with undeniable force testifies to this elementary fact.<sup>1</sup>

### II.

#### SIMPLE UNITY.

different  
kinds of  
unity.

§ 3. It is not enough to say that the soul is a unity. The expression, as it stands, is ambiguous. There are different kinds of unity. Hence it is necessary to explain in what way the soul is one. We may distin-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Mivart Truth, p. 386, foll.

guish a *collective* unity, a *potential* unity and a *simple* unity. (a) A *collective* unity is an aggregate of elements actually distinct and separable but united by some common bond. This bond may be *physical*, as, e. g., many links are united to form one chain; or *moral*, as, e. g., many persons are united by the bond of authority, and of obedience to form one society; or *intellectual*, as, e. g., many sentences and paragraphs are united to form one definite treatise.

### 1°. *Collective Unity.*

§ 4. That the soul is a *collective* unity is the teaching of the Associationist school, as represented by Hume, Mill, Spencer and Bain. Hume holds that impressions give rise to ideas; now to account for an idea of Self invariably the same, we should have an impression which continues invariably the same through the whole course of our lives. But, he says, there is no impression constant and invariable; hence ordinary men, except metaphysicians, are "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions succeeding each other rapidly." Thus "all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences."<sup>2</sup> J. S. Mill resolves the mind into "a series of feelings with a background of possibilities of feeling;" but he admits that he cannot explain how this "series is aware of itself as a series."<sup>3</sup> This admission is fatal to the hypothesis.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Spencer maintains that "the substance of mind cannot be known; that Mind as known

Associationists teach that the soul is a collective unity.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Hume Treatise of Human Nature," ch. Personal Identity.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Exam. of Hamilton, p. 247.

<sup>4</sup> Ib., p. 561.

to the possessor of it, is a circumscribed aggregate of activities.”<sup>5</sup> To them adhere Beneke who teaches that the soul is the complex of acquired habits; Hartman, who says that the soul is like a bundle bound together from the activities of the unconscious. Mr. Davis also thinks it better to use the word *mind* to stand merely for “a complement of activities.”<sup>6</sup> Dr. Mandsley maintains that the soul is one by a combination and co-operation of the brain-cells and in fact is composed of essentially different elements which change every moment; hence its unity may be dissolved by the dissolution of the brain-cells; hence it is a fictitious and delusive unity. Prof. Kulpe assures us by consciousness or mind, is meant the sum-total of all these particular phenomena; e. g., subjective processes, facts of consciousness and mental states; he expressly declares that he shall nowhere discuss anything like transcendental consciousness, a substantial soul or an immaterial spirit.<sup>7</sup>

criticism  
of this  
opinion.

§ 5. This opinion is false. The mind is not a collection of units. The mistake of these writers is the legitimate consequence of a wrong conception of substance. If the substance be only a grouping together of activities or qualities, it follows that the mind is such a unity.

§ 6. Now consciousness is aware of itself as a unity. I am conscious that I now write and that I began to write an hour ago. The various states of the mind during that time do not appear as separate, each one

<sup>5</sup> Prin. of Psych. VI, pp. 156, 159.

<sup>6</sup> Elem. of Psych., p. 52; cf. p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Outl. of Psych., p. 3, tr. from Germ. by E. B. Titchener, of Cornell. On self as a unity of synthesis cf. Prof. Dewey, “Some Current Conceptions of Self” in *Mind*, 1890, vol. 15, p. 58; Prof. Seth, “Hegelianism and Personality.”

aware of itself only; but there is a continuity and a persistence throughout. The testimony of consciousness contains two distinct elements: (a) The existence of ever-changing states. (b) The unity of these states. To accept the former alone is to mutilate the testimony, to propose a gratuitous and false explanation. Even while *explicitly* rejecting the latter element I should be compelled to admit it *implicitly*. For how could I be aware of successive states of consciousness, unless I admitted their unity?<sup>8</sup>

## 2°. Potential Unity.

§ 7. That the mind is a potential unity is the contention of Prof. Ladd. The word Potential is not used in its scholastic meaning. St. Thomas teaches that the mind is a potential unity in the sense that although one in essence, it exhibits its activity in many modes or potencies. Prof. Ladd, however, by a potential unity holds that the mind is *in potency* to become one and that its unity is a matter of degrees or of development. Hence the infant is not one, because it has not arrived at self-consciousness; we say it is one, but by this we mean that it will become one; for the mind can be said really to have unitary being only as it acquires and exercises the power to make itself one to itself.<sup>9</sup>

Prof.  
Ladd's  
opinion.

§ 8. How this takes place is set forth farther on, when he says that the real unity of mind depends upon the firmness and comprehensiveness of the grasp of self-consciousness and upon the conscious recognition and control of the mental life as under one purpose

his ex-  
planation.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Lotze cited by Mivart Truth, p. 387.

<sup>9</sup> Hegel held that the mind is nothing actually but all things potentially, i. e., "a unity which has grown up." cf. Wallace's Hegel Proleg., ch. VII. This explains Prof. Ladd's position. Phil. of Mind, p. 202.

or immanent idea.<sup>10</sup> Hence the oneness of being consists in grasping together and binding into a unity of self-conscious remembering and reflecting states according to some fitting and consciously selected plan, all the manifold movements in that flowing stream of psychosis which is called mental life.<sup>11</sup>

criticism.

he con-  
founds the  
fact with  
the con-  
sciousness  
of the fact.

§ 9. The potential, therefore, develops into the collective unity. Ladd seems to confound the fact of personal identity with its conscious recognition. That I am one is not the same as that I am conscious that I am one. The latter supposes the former, does not make it. The infant of a week is as real a unity as the full-grown man. The former is not conscious of its unity, the other is; but the act of consciousness has no influence whatever on the fact, as is shown also in sleep and in delirium. The idea of personal identity is obtained from consciousness, memory and judgment; the act of consciousness containing the perception of the present ego is not erroneous but the absence or perversion of memory can render our judgment erroneous; the idea of the ego is changed or disappears; but the person remains the same. I could not be conscious of my unity, if I were not already one. Hence the fact explains the consciousness, the consciousness does not account for the fact.

### 3°. *The Unity of the Positivists.*

Positivist  
view.

§ 10. Closely akin to the opinions that the ego is a *collective* or a *potential* unity is the contention of Positivists that the ego is a result. They base the proof on scientific data, and throw it into a scientific form. Not so long ago, they assure us, white light, water, etc.,

<sup>10</sup> L. C., p. 203.

<sup>11</sup> *Ib.*, p. 205.

were believed to be simple substances, but no one will now deny that they are composite. Hence what the prism in Physics does for light, what voltaic electricity in chemistry does for water, nervous disease and accident, i. e., Physiology and Pathology will do for the human ego.<sup>12</sup> The ego is nothing more than an extract from internal events and derives from them all its being; detached and isolated it is nothing in itself, hence a metaphysical illusion. The ego is, therefore, a product.<sup>13</sup>

§ 11. This opinion rests upon a fallacy: they con- <sup>a fallacy.</sup>  
found the ego with the states of the ego. The subject *ego* is a cause not a result; it remains always identical. The states of the ego, however, are a result; they constantly change, e. g., in speaking of a mutual friend I can say that he is not the same as he used to be, that he has changed in temperament, in manners, in appearance, in almost everything; yet I do not mean to say that the *subject*, i. e., the man himself is not the same. <sup>confounds the ego with the states of the ego.</sup>  
Therefore, we must distinguish the subject ego, i. e., who has undergone the changes, from the phenomenal ego, i. e., the changes themselves.

§ 12. This distinction enables the reader to estimate the value of their argument based on the distinction between the *normal* and the *hysterical* ego. The same confusion is here found. The *normal* ego signifies not

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Taine "Intelligence;" Ribot "Diseases of Personality;" cf. also Th. Brown Phil. of Human Mind, chap. Mental Identity. To Mr. Taine the ego is a plank on which geometrical figures are marked in chalk. These figures represent its divisions. By an illusion we create an empty substance the ego in itself. Just as the plank is nothing more than the continuous series of its successive divisions; so the ego is nothing more than the continuous web of its successive events. Intelligence pI BIV., ch. III.

<sup>13</sup> B. P. II, B. 3, ch. I.

the subject ego, but the *normal state* of the subject ego. Nor does the *hysterical* ego refer to a *subject* ego, but only to a *hysterical state* of the subject ego. Therefore two states of the same ego succeed each other; there is no double ego.<sup>14</sup>

#### 4°. *Simple Unity.*

§ 13. By simple unity we mean that the soul is an indivisible one having no parts and incapable of being divided into parts. In scholastic phraseology it is said to be *entitative* simplex, i. e., a unity by reason of its very essence. The reasons for this embrace not only the refutation of the views just stated, but also positive facts of our conscious life.

(a) from  
unity of  
conscious-  
ness.

§ 14. (a) The soul has various acts, but it has no parts. Its modes of activity are not the same and it is conscious of their difference; it distinguishes, classifies, names them, e. g., sensation, thought, desire, will; but the same one ego feels, thinks, desires, wills. All these activities have their source and explanation in this unity and are modifications of the same unity. The modifications are the effects, the one same ego is the cause. The grouping together of the effects alone will not explain the unity of the ego. It is the unity of the cause that we seek, a unity which is already supposed in the attempt to group its activities or its thoughts. The fact that there is a unity of consciousness in me can only be explained by admitting the unity of the ego. Lotze contends that "the fact of the unity of consciousness compels us, in the explanation of the intellectual life, to suppose that there is a completely indivisible unity in the subject which exercises the comprehending activities of consciousness."<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Farges *Le Cerveau L'Ame*, p. 114 sq.

<sup>15</sup> *Micro.* I, 72; II, 1, 4.

§ 15. (b) To prove our thesis to a demonstration, let us suppose that the soul is not a simple unity, but has parts. (1) The soul elicits many different acts, but for the sake of the argument, we shall take the simplest mental act, e. g., the idea. I have, ex. gr., an idea of honesty in my mind. Now, if this idea be produced by the activity of an extended substance, i. e., the thinking principle; then either different parts of the idea must pertain to different parts of this substance, or the entire idea must belong to each part of the substance, or the whole idea must be produced by a single part of the substance.

§ 16. But the first hypothesis is absurd. The act of apprehension is indivisible. I cannot divide it; it either is or is not. Its very nature shows that it cannot be an aggregate of units separately produced by an aggregate of agents.<sup>16</sup> The second hypothesis is likewise untenable. For, if the different parts produced the entire idea, then we should have at the same time as many ideas as there are parts in the composite substance; but this is opposed to the testimony of consciousness. In the supposition that the whole idea belongs to a single part, we have two alternatives, either this part is composite or it is a unity; if it is a simple unity, then our thesis is proved; if it is composite, then we shall have to take up the former alternatives, and so on until we are compelled to accept the same conclusion. This argument can be further illustrated in the act of judgment and the act of reasoning.

§ 17. (2) An analysis of the acts of the will leads to the same conclusion. An act of the will always implies a previous act of the intellect. Thus if I resolve to do

(b) ex  
absurdo.

Refutation  
of the  
hypothesis  
from acts  
of mind.

From acts  
of the will.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Stonyhurst Logic, ch. Simple Apprehension.



something, it is only after I have had a conception of the thing to be done, and have weighed the motives which prompt me to action. Then my will tends to the object. Now this act of the intellect and this tendency of the will do not pertain to different parts of the ego, but are concentrated in a unity. Let us suppose that the subject ego is made up of two parts; that the cognition pertains to one, while the inclination springs from the other. In the hypothesis there would be no act of the will; not in the former supposition, for we should have only the act of cognition; not in the latter, for by hypothesis there is no act of cognition, and an act of the will without a previous act of cognition is impossible.<sup>17</sup>

Kant's objection.  
(a) the unity is collective.

§ 18. Kant admits that this argument is very strong, but attempts to show that it is a paralogism.<sup>18</sup> He holds (a) that "the unity of thought, consisting of many representations, is collective," and, therefore, "it would be impossible to establish the necessity of the presupposition of a simple substance."

Criticism of this.

§ 19. But this principle is false. The Unity of thought is not the result of many representations. We have such mental acts as simple apprehension; we have ideas of simplest things, ex. gr., of being.<sup>19</sup> Again in the act of judgment the mind compares two ideas. There is diversity, i. e., the two ideas; but at the bottom of the diversity there is unity, i. e., the relation between the ideas. Hence the act perceiving the relation is one. The same is also true of reasoning. The essence of reasoning is the perception of the relation between judgments. But the act grasping this relation

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Balmes Fundamental Philosophy BIX, ch. XI.

<sup>18</sup> Crit. of Pure Reason, Trans. Dialect BII c1, p. 286 sq.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Stonyhurst Logic "errors on Simple Apprehension."

is one and indivisible. Thus thought is not a collection of representations but a simple indivisible unity perceiving and expressing the relation between the representations, e. g., the thought in which I know the judgment, John is good, is not expressed by the sum of the concepts John and good; it is a something distinct from both, yet expressing the relation existing between both, a something which contains a comparison between diverse things, and yet unites their diversity in the unity of relation.<sup>20</sup>

§ 20. (b) Kant says, "The reason we postulate absolute unity of the subject is because otherwise we could not say of it, I think. But this proposition is a purely subjective condition, a merely logical unity, signifying something in general, and hence simple because undetermined." Hence he concludes "that we cannot hope by means of mere concepts (still less through the mere subjective form of all our concepts, that is, through our consciousness), and without referring these concepts to a possible experience, to extend our knowledge, particularly as even the fundamental concept of a *simple nature* is such that it can never be met with in experience, so that no chance remains of arriving at it as a concept of objective validity."

(b) the  
unity is  
logical  
only.

§ 21. It is true the proposition, I think, is the basis on which we reason to the unity of the subject. Consciousness testifies this fact, and our argument is nothing more than the application of the idea of unity to the fact. The fact of consciousness is a universal fact; it is true of every thinking being; it alone explains the very possibility of thought. The idea of unity is a universal idea, applicable to many particular objects.

criticism  
of this.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Balmes Fund. Phil.

Thus our conclusion cannot be questioned; it is true of every thinking being. Kant errs, therefore, in saying that the proposition, I think, is "subjective (i. e., an ideal form), logical, undetermined." On the contrary it is a fact, it is real, and determined. Our conclusion is not a *transitus* from the ideal to the real. It began with the perception of the true nature of my individual self, and because that nature is common to all thinking beings, I am justified in drawing a conclusion applicable to all.<sup>21</sup>

### III.

#### AN IMMATERIAL SIMPLE UNITY.

simple  
material  
forces.

§ 22. The science of Physics treats of forces, of their relations, and manifestations. It distinguishes forces into compound and simple. These forces are inherent in matter; they are conceived as properties of matter; they can be measured as to velocity and intensity; their relations can be expressed in mathematical formulas. They are, therefore, termed material forces. Hence we can speak of simple forces which are material. A vast difference exists between these forces and the unity of thought. The latter is an immaterial unity.

the  
principle  
of proof.

§ 23. In proving this thesis we shall take as a principle of demonstration the axiom of Aristotle and St. Thomas: That the acts of a being are a manifestation of its nature. This principal is constantly employed in every day experience, e. g., I obtain a knowledge of your character by observing your words and actions. So, too, in the various departments of physical science knowledge increases and discoveries are made according as the properties of beings are disclosed; and this

<sup>21</sup> Cf. St. Thomas Summa Theologiae I. Q. 87, a. i.

takes place by observation of and experimentation upon their activities. In like manner by observing and examining the operations of my mind and will, I can learn something of the nature of that principle which works through them.

§ 24. The line of argument may be briefly stated: The question stated. We know mind and matter in different ways, the former by self-consciousness, the latter by the senses; we know them as possessing different properties. Hence we infer that the soul is a simple immaterial unity.<sup>22</sup>

§ 25. (I°) We know mind and matter in different (I) matter and mind known in different ways. ways. Matter is known through the senses. These faculties are organic. The organs in and by which they act are different parts of the human body. The sense-faculties are limited in the range and the number of their objects. Mind, however, is known by self-consciousness. This faculty is totally different from the organs of sense. It is not organic; its activity is not bound up with a certain part of the body as, ex. gr., the sense of sight is with the eye. By self-consciousness I am aware of my thoughts or volitions, and by the one and same act I know myself as the agent eliciting these thoughts and volitions and as the subject modified by them. Hence I know, and I know that I know. The senses on the contrary cannot attain to this perfection of knowledge. My eye, ex. gr., sees an object but it does not see that it sees. It cannot turn over upon itself and contemplate the very act of seeing. Its organic nature and material object render such an act impossible.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Cf. McCosh *chty* and *Posit*, ch. 4; *Stonyhurst Psych.*, ch. XX, XXI.

<sup>23</sup> *Aug. de Gen. ad lit.* l. vii, n. 24, 26.

§ 26. The senses cannot *reflect*. This act is peculiar to mind alone. I meditate, dream day dreams, examine my conscience, bring up in my own mind a panorama of the past.<sup>24</sup> The faculty which enables me to elicit such acts is not organic, it cannot be classed with material forces. There is no relation of identity or of likeness between an electric force and the activity of my mind reflecting upon that force and measuring its properties.

Mr. Tyndall's words.

§ 27. It is true that molecular action of the brain accompanies the thought, but the passage from one to the other is in Mr. Tyndall's words, unthinkable. "Granted," he writes, "that a definite thought and definition molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously, we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass by a process of reasoning from the one phenomenon to the other. They appear together, but we do not know why. Were our minds and senses so expanded, strengthened and illuminated as to enable us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain; were we capable of following all their motions, all their groupings, all their electric discharges, if such there be, and were we intimately acquainted with the corresponding states of thought and feeling, we should probably be as far as ever from the solution of the problem, How are these physical processes connected with the facts of consciousness? The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would still remain intellectually impassible."<sup>25</sup>

(2) we know mind and matter as possessing different properties.

§ 28. (2°) We know mind and matter as possessing different properties. The science of Physics

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Liberatori*, vol. 2, p. 274.

<sup>25</sup> Add. to *British Assoc. in Frag. of Science*.

enumerates and explains the properties of matter. We know that matter is hard, has definite size, shape and color, is ponderable, occupies space, etc. Not one of these can be applied to mind.<sup>26</sup> This is shown from our ideas. We have conceptions of objects which are, by their very essence, immaterial, e. g., God, angel, soul; we have abstract and universal notions which can be applied to material and immaterial beings, e. g., being, potency, essence, existence, cause, etc.; we have ideas which represent material objects but in an immaterial manner, e. g., the ideas of a triangle in general, the concept of humanity. Let us take as an illustration the idea of virtue. We have the conception of Virtue; we speak of it in glowing words, recount the history of the saints and heroes it has made, set forth its strength and beauty, strive to make it the aim of our own lives, and dwell upon the lustre it will shed about our name. Virtue is something real; the idea I have of it exerts a real influence upon the moulding of my character and life. Yet the idea has not shape, or size, or color, or weight. There is nothing material about it.<sup>27</sup>

§ 29. (2) The same is true of the acts of judgment and reasoning. An act of judgment cannot be measured or weighed. It is an indivisible unity as we have seen. The negative judgment exhibits this more strongly than the positive judgment. There is no uniformity about the ordinary judgments of life; they differ and may be changed. What material force can explain an intricate train of thought, the tracing of an effect to a hidden or remote cause, the solving of a

<sup>26</sup> S. Aug. de quan. An., n. 4, 5, 6.

<sup>27</sup> S. Thomas C. Gentes LII, ch. 49, 50; cf. Aug. de Gen. ad lit. l. vii, n. 27.

problem in mathematics, in philosophy or in history? The perception of different objects, the discovery of their relations, the separation of cause from circumstance and occasion, the just estimate of varying influences, the careful application of experimental methods, the comparison of the universal and the particular with the view of drawing a conclusion, have nothing whatever in common with material activities. "The passage from the physics of the brain," writes Mr. Tyndall, "to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable."<sup>28</sup>

(8) from  
the will.

§ 30. This conclusion is strengthened by a consideration of the acts of the will. The will is a tendency to what is apprehended as good; in actual exercise it may be a tendency to a good not yet possessed, or an avoidance of what is bad, a delight in the possession of good, or sorrow at its loss. These are so many channels of human activity. The love of a mother for her child; the constant strife to lead a noble and holy life; the sorrow for sin; the resolution to do better; the bitter struggle with temptation; the resolve to die for country; or to sacrifice life sooner than violate the law of God; or to suffer a living martyrdom — these, viewed only as phenomena, cannot be measured, or weighed, or converted, as Mr. Bain contends, into heat, motion, or electricity; they belong to a sphere far above material forces or activity.<sup>29</sup>

(4) from  
memory.

§ 31. (4) Memory brings its testimony to give greater strength, if possible, to our conclusion. By memory we are made aware of our abiding personal identity. Now, if the mind were only a series of successive states, as Mr. Mill holds, this knowledge would

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Belfast Address in *Frag. of Science*.

<sup>29</sup> Aug. de An, et ejus origine, l. iv., n. 19.

be impossible; for then there would be a constant flow without a principle grasping and connecting these states into a unity. But this substantial<sup>30</sup> principle cannot be material, e. g., the organism. The bodily elements constantly change; they have no permanency. Hence memory would be impossible; nor could we then account for the conviction as to our abiding personal identity. Therefore, if we refuse to admit a permanent indivisible principle which is at the same time immaterial, the fact of conscious memory remains inexplicable.<sup>31</sup>

§ 32. Finally we refer to the phenomena of deaf-blind mutes.<sup>32</sup> Here are creatures who cannot see, speak, or hear, yet are capable of sublime thoughts, of deep and pure affections. It is impossible to account for the existence of such phenomena by recourse to the senses of touch and of smell, which alone they possess. Much less can we explain them by material agencies. Hence we must admit a principle which is immaterial to account for the unity of their mental life. The story of Laura Bridgeman and of Helen Kellar is a practical proof of our thesis.<sup>33</sup>

(5) from  
deaf-blind-  
mutes.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. ch. on Sub. of Soul.

<sup>31</sup> For a beautiful description of the power of memory cf. S. Augustine Confess. l. X, ch. 8-16.

<sup>32</sup> Mr. Huxley tells us that "man born dumb would be capable of few higher intellectual manifestations than an orang or chimpanzee." cf. Man's Place in Nature, ch. II.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. 16th Annual Report of Perkins Institute for the Blind for the year ending Sept., 1891, Boston, Mass. It is difficult to understand, in the face of this conclusion, what Prof. Ladd means when he says that "a philosophy of mind which has its basis in the actual facts of mental life, makes short work of despatching certain doctrines once held as to the so-called 'simplicity' and 'individuality' of mind." cf. Phil. of Mind, p. 205.



## POSITIVISM.

§ 1. Side by side with Materialism, often viewed as its cause or as its off-shoot, thriving on the same soil and in the same atmosphere, is another intellectual product of the time, *Positivism*.<sup>1</sup> Between both there are many points of contact: They are congenial; they are confined to the world of sense phenomena; they deny the existence of super-sensible entities; there is no God, no angel, no soul; both lay claim to be philosophies. Yet Materialism is wider in its sphere, is more theoretic, is a philosophy only. Positivism, on the contrary, lays special stress upon the methods and limits of the physical sciences, hence its name; aims at the amelioration of society, and is therefore a Sociology; is not merely a theory presenting an intellectual solution of the universe, but a doctrine holding out to the religious aspirations of the human heart the abstract idea of humanity in place of God.

### I.

#### HISTORY.

§ 2. The author of Positivism is A. Compté.<sup>2</sup> His principal works are "Cours de Philosophie Positive" (1842), which sets forth his views on the philosophy of knowledge and the theory of the sciences; and "Système de Politique Positive" (1854), which is purely sociological. As a philosophy or special mode

origin as a  
philosophy.

<sup>1</sup> "The Positivist School is a sect which arises from Materialism, and has neither value nor power unless by Materialism." Lefevre, "Renaiss. du Materialisme," p. 411.

<sup>2</sup> Died 1857.

of thought Positivism is a protest against an artificial *a priori* metaphysics and is a continuation of the empiricism of the eighteenth century; as a system of <sup>as a</sup> sociology it claims kindred with the teaching of St. Simon, the friend and guide of Compté's younger days, who so vigorously combatted the individualism of J. J. Rousseau;<sup>3</sup> as a religion it appears in the borrowed <sup>as a</sup> religion. rites and external forms of the Catholic church.<sup>4</sup> Thus, in philosophy, Compté recognizes as precursors Hume and Kant; in sociology, Condorcet and DeMaistre; in science, Gall. Through these he claimed direct relation to Bacon, Des Cartes and Leibnitz, the real fathers of modern philosophy. He gleans "the grains of truth" scattered throughout their writings, adds thereto the ritual of the Catholic church, which he calls the pure and true form of Christianity, and proclaims this synthesis to be the great philosophy of the nineteenth century and of times to come.<sup>5</sup>

§ 3. The system of Compté is the true Positivism. His orthodox disciples are Lafitte and Robinet. Littré, his greatest disciple, divided the teaching of his master into two parts and laid great stress on the first part, i. e., the philosophy, rejecting the system of worship and of conduct.<sup>6</sup> Yet with Compté it is one connected system of philosophy and polity.<sup>7</sup> By Positivism is understood also the philosophy of J. S. Mill and of Taine, the teaching of Frederick Harrison, of G. W. <sup>Its different forms.</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Flint "Philosophy of History;" Watson "Compté, Mill & Spencer," p. 23.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. "Clothes of Religion," by Wilfred Ward.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. "Modern Theories in Phil. and Relig.," by Principle Tulloch; "Aspects of Positivism in Relation to Christianity," by Canon Westcott in *Contemporary Rev.*, vol. VIII, p. 383.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Compté et la Philos. Positive*, by M. Littré; *M. Littré et le Positivisme*, by M. Caro.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Dr. Bridges' "Unity of Compté's Life and Doctrine."

Lewes, George Eliot,<sup>8</sup> and the Agnosticism of Herbert Spencer, W. Huxley, of Youmans and the Scientific Monthly.<sup>9</sup> In Italy, Ardigò preaches his own Positivism, and says its author must be sought for in Galilee.<sup>10</sup> In Germany, Ernest Laas gives still another version; he considers Comte a parent in name only, the genuine apostle is Pythagoras, not as history usually presents him, but the *true* Pythagoras as delineated by a judicious and enlightened criticism.<sup>11</sup>

## II.

### BASIS.

(a) Positive  
method.

§ 4. The fundamental points of Positivism are (a) the positive method. This maintains that the direct observation of facts alone gives authority to the sciences in general and to philosophy in particular; in other words, we can know only phenomena and their laws. The principle is not new; it is the inductive method of Aristotle, St. Thomas and Bacon. Comte, however, extended and applied it with effect. His vital mistake is in contending that there is but one order of existence, namely, the material; and that beyond the material order there is nothing. He has no warrant for such assertions; they are pure assumptions contradicted by the voice of individual consciousness, by the testimony of history and of sound philosophy. Furthermore, Comte, by "facts," understands "phe-

<sup>8</sup> "What Comte and Spencer have taught in the name of philosophy, Tyndall and Haeckel in the name of science, G. Eliot has applied to life and its problems." G. Eliot, by G. W. Cooke, ch. IX. This teaching is especially found in Daniel Deronda.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Life of Youmans, by John Fiske.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Falckenberg Hist. of Mod. Phil., p. 552.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. "Compte sa vie sa doctrine," by P. Gruber, S. J.

nomena." This interpretation springs from the false theory of "the Relativity of Knowledge" which denies the universal and supposes that our knowledge consists in adding particular to particular.<sup>12</sup>

§ 5. (b) As a result of this method, the supra-sensible and absolute, as, e. g., God, the soul, substance, essence, cause, etc., are once and for all removed from the field of science; they are in reality only chimaeras, the product of the imagination, or the creations of a disordered brain.<sup>13</sup> Thus the way is prepared for his classification of the sciences. Now we do not find fault with the positive method *in se*, i. e., considered as a method of scientific investigation. We protest against the exclusiveness, i. e., that it is the sole method of research, and against its consequences, viz., the denial of other methods and the limitation of knowledge.<sup>14</sup> This exclusiveness, this denial, this limitation, is the very essence of Positive Philosophy. We contend that we have ideas "of being in general," of "law," of "force," of "cause;" that these ideas are not physical, but metaphysical; that they are conceptions of the mind having a basis in real things, and are not simply sensitive phenomena. The conception of "cause" arises from our individual consciousness. We are conscious that there is something within us which exerts power, and has a direct and immediate influence on our thoughts, volitions, and bodily movements. By an act of will I can move my

(b) no  
supra-  
sensible  
truth.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Watson "Compte, Mill and Spencer," p. 38.

<sup>13</sup> "Look carefully about you," is the sarcastic exclamation of Socrates, "and see that none of the profane are present. By these I mean such individuals as have faith in the existence of nothing but what they can grasp with both their hands, and deny the operations of spirit, and the generations of things, and whatever else is invisible." Plato "Theatetus."

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Morell Philosophical Tendencies of the Age, p. 26.

arm, I am conscious of external objects affecting me and producing a change in me; so I infer that external objects act upon one another.<sup>16</sup> Even G. W. Lewes admits, in open opposition to his creed, that "the fundamental ideas of modern science are as transcendental as any of the axioms in the ancient philosophy."<sup>17</sup>

(c) Idea of  
humanity.

§ 6. (c) In place of God, who has been set aside by the positivistic method, the idea of humanity is held up as an object of worship, and as a centre of unity for the followers of the new philosophy.

### III.

#### DOCTRINE.

origin.

§ 7. Comte realized that fixed principles of thought and of conduct were necessary to the well being of the individual and of society; that their absence gave rise to uncertainty and confusion, and ultimately led to every evil in the social and political order. To reorganize society and place it upon a firm basis, his first aim was to put an end to the intellectual anarchy which prevailed about him.<sup>18</sup> He thought society could be regenerated and saved by science alone. In the effort to reconstruct society after the light and the methods of modern science Positivism arose.

The law of  
the Three  
States.

§ 8. Taking the law of evolution as his first principle, Comte affirmed that the fundamental law of history is to be found in the development of the human mind. He claims that he discovered it in the law of historical filiation or law of the Three States. According to this all human theories passed through three successive

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Rickaby "General Metaphysics," ch. Causation; Martineau "Essays," p. 140.

<sup>17</sup> Phil. of Aristotle, ch. IV, §§ 62, 63.

<sup>18</sup> This also was the aim of the Traditionalist School. cf. de Lamennais Ess. sur L'Indifférence.

stages, (a) the theological or imaginative, illustrated in Fetichism, Polytheism and Monotheism; (b) the metaphysical or abstract, which differed from the former in explaining phenomena, not by divine beings but by abstract powers or essences which are behind them; (c) the positive or scientific, where man enlightened perceives that the only realities are not supernatural beings, as, ex. eg., God or angels, nor are they abstractions, as ex. gr., substances or causes, but phenomena and their laws as revealed by science. This law, he maintained, is to Sociology what gravitation is to Astronomy. It proves Sociology a natural science whose phenomena are developed according to invariable natural laws. The different states give rise to and exhibit three different phases of thought or philosophies. The main source of modern intellectual confusion and error is to him the simultaneous use of the three philosophies; whereas the scientific, being the final evolution of intellect, is the most perfect and alone ought to prevail.<sup>19</sup>

bearing of  
the law on  
his pur-  
pose.

§ 9. The positive is what is real, useful, certain, precise, organic, and relative.<sup>20</sup> Hence it makes no mention of a higher will; it rejects first or final causes and abstract entities as ex. gr., principles and essences; it strives only to discover the invariable laws which direct the action of phenomena, to trace out their mutual relations, and to bring them into one organic whole. Whatever escapes experiment is vague and undetermined, and thus unworthy of consideration. He contends that his teaching is only common sense carefully gathered, collated and formed into a system.

meaning of  
Positive.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Lewes *Compte's Philosophy of the Sciences*, sect. I.

<sup>20</sup> *Sys. de Polit. Posit. I*, p. 57. *A Positivist Primer*, by C. G. David, p. 5.

classifica-  
tion of the  
Sciences.

§ 10. The law of historic filiation prepares the way for the classification of the sciences.<sup>21</sup> He draws a distinction between abstract science which deals with the laws, e. g., Chemistry, and concrete science which has for its object phenomena in detail, e. g., Botany. The former are sciences properly so called, with them Positive Philosophy deals. Philosophy is the most universal of the sciences; it takes the methods and results of the other sciences with a view of co-ordinating them under a higher unity. To be clear and exact, this classification should be made according to the degree of dependence among the different orders of phenomena. Hence the law which obtains in the classification is the decreasing generality and increasing complexity; the simplest and most general phenomena forming a basis for the more complicated. Thus we have Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, (Biology) and Social Physics or Sociology. At first he considered Ethics to be a part of Physiology, then of Sociology, and finally classed it a distinct science. Logic and Psychology are not particular sciences; the latter is only a branch of Physiology.<sup>22</sup>

law of the  
classifica-  
tion.

results of  
the classifica-  
tion.

§ 11. This system of sciences enables us to dispose facts for the social welfare and to put social benevolence on a scientific foundation. Thus the sciences lead up to Sociology, i. e., the science of man in society, Compté's final aim, his last and greatest effort.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Lewes l. c., sect. III, IV.

<sup>22</sup> J. S. Mill separates from Compté on this point; he strongly maintains that Psychology is a distinct science. cf. *A Compté & Positivism*, pp. 63-67. For this Littré criticises Mill severely, maintaining that the acts of intellect and will are irreducible phenomena with the same relation to the nervous substance that weight has to matter. cf. Littré Pref. to *Materialism & Spiritualism*, by M. Leblais, p. XX.

In relegating the phenomena of intellect and will to the physical sciences, in the attempt to explain the order and progress of the moral world by social Physics, in denying to Psychology the character of a distinct science, the thoughtful student readily perceives that the system is a disguised form of Materialism.<sup>23</sup>

§ 12. Compte considers man as only the highest product of nature, "the apex of the animal series."<sup>24</sup> His teaching on man. Hence all human phenomena, especially those of the mind, are purely physiological, and can be explained by the action of the environment upon the organism. Thus Physiology embraces the whole science of man. and on the science of man. Consistent with his principles he rejected psychology as taught by the Schoolmen; its method as a science, i. e., introspection he considered vain and absurd. He applied the term "functions" to intellectual and volitional acts; and held that these were to be observed only in their effects. This, he says, can be done in two ways; either by a most exact determination of the organic conditions, on which they depend, or by the direct observation of their succession. The former method is the more scientific and was adopted by Gall. He praises the system of Gall as illustrating how mental and moral phenomena can be treated on a positive scientific basis. He admits that Gall failed by multiplying functions and by the attempt to localize them; yet he contends that we cannot deny the principles, that the fundamental dispositions of mind and of will are innate, and that the particular faculties are essen-

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Lewes l. c., sect. XIV, for the passage from the inorganic to the organic.

<sup>24</sup> Lewes Hist. of Phil., vol. II, p. 72; Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences, sect. XXI.



tially distinct and independent, although many of them often concur in the production of definite acts.<sup>25</sup>

The organic Kingdom.

§ 13. He divided the organic kingdom into vegetative and animal by reason of the nervous system. There is no essential difference between man and brute. Instinct is only fixed reason; reason is only variable instinct. The brain is not an organ but a system of organs.<sup>26</sup> These are found more complicated and perfect in proportion as the animal rises in the graduated scale of life. The organs are the centers of functions, which Phrenology, with the assistance of Anatomy and Physiology, locates. Hence the method of Gall aims at showing the true nature of man and animal.

On supremacy of the Intellect.

§ 14. He denies the supremacy of the intellect taught by the old Psychology and maintains that the intellectual are subordinated to the affective functions.<sup>27</sup>

Unity of the Ego.

He appeals to daily experience for proof that the passions are stronger than reason and that reason is subject to them. He denies the unity of the Ego and holds that the idea of the Ego is nothing more than the general consensus of the whole organism; it is produced by the constant feeling of the animal functions acting in harmony. Not every animal can express this feeling by pronouncing the word I; but each and every one has the idea, in as much as he perceives that he is himself and not another. It may even happen that in some animal the perception of the I is more vivid and the feeling more intense than in man.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *Evolution-Philosophy*, by M. E. Cazelles, in *Pop. Science Library*, ch. VI, VII, VIII.

<sup>26</sup> In like manner Sully holds that we have not a memory but a cluster of memories; hence, it is not "a single faculty." Cf. *Human mind*, vol. I, p. 354.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *Mill on the Floss*, D. Deronda; *Life of G. Eliot*, by G. W. Cooke, ch. X.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Chapter on Personality.

## IV.

## RELATION TO AGNOSTICISM.

§ 15. Huxley claims to have invented the word "Agnostic." He is its open champion and sole authorized exponent. The creed of Agnosticism drawn up by Mr. Laing in reply to Gladstone, he rejects with scorn.<sup>29</sup> He therefore seems best fitted to tell what Agnosticism is. He says it is not a creed but a method, the essence of which lies in the rigorous application of a single principle: in matters of intellect follow the reason as far as it will guide you and not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable.<sup>30</sup> When interpreted according to the letter, this principle looks innocent and harmless. But when understood after Mr. Huxley's own mind, it is very different. With him it means that any reality beyond phenomena and their laws is unknowable. Now this is the main principle of Positivism. Hence Frederick Harrison seems to put the question very clearly when he says that "the point of view" for the Agnostic and Positivist as to the solution of the theological problem is the same; only the Positivists repudiate the word Agnostic.<sup>31</sup> Herbert Spencer indicates the "point of view" when he tells us that the word Agnostic fitly expresses the confessed inability to know or conceive the nature of the power manifested through phenomena.<sup>32</sup>

opinion  
of Huxley.

of F.  
Harrison.

of H.  
Spencer.

§ 16. Littré acknowledges that there is a close kindred ("cousin-germain") and, upon many points, a

of Mr.  
Littré.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Essays upon some contrary questions IX, p. 281.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. ib.

<sup>31</sup> XIX Cent., Mar., 1889.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Nature and Reality of Religion.

perfect harmony between Agnosticism and Positivism; with this difference, however, that the basis of Positivism is in the hierarchy of the sciences, whereas the basis of Agnosticism is in Psychology.<sup>33</sup>

Real relation found in their common source, i. e., Hume.

§ 17. The criticism of Littré is just and throws light on the sources of Positivism. Its influence in England is very great and is due to the power Hume wielded in the formation of English thought. Compté acknowledges Hume as his principal precursor.<sup>34</sup> Hume denied all knowledge of substance, cause, etc., and held that the human mind could know only phenomena and their relations of association.<sup>35</sup> But this is the fundamental principle of the Agnosticism of Mr. Spencer, of the Positivism of M. Compté and of the Associationism of Mr. Mill. This enables us to understand how it is that writers like Mr. Huxley repudiate Positivism; complain that thinkers, whose philosophy had its legitimate parent in Hume or in themselves, were labeled "Compists," in spite of vehement protestations to the contrary; revindicate Hume's property in the so-called "new Philosophy," yet at the same time hold a doctrine which is essentially the Positivism of Compté.<sup>36</sup> Mr. Spencer has been often called a Positivist, because he employs their scientific method and holds many doctrines proposed by Compté, as ex. gr., the existence in nature of invariable laws, the principle of the Relativity of knowledge and the origin of intellect from sense. But he contends that these truths were proposed and de-

<sup>33</sup> Prin. de Phil. Posit., p. 59; Compté and J. S. Mill, p. 9 sq.

<sup>34</sup> Catech. Posit. Pref., p. 7.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Treatise on Human Nature.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Lay Sermons VII, "Physical Basis of Life," and VIII, "Scientific Aspects of Positivism," "Essays upon Some Contra. Questions," Essay IX, "Agnosticism."

fended by philosophers long before Comte set them forth.<sup>37</sup> He also rejects characteristic doctrines of the French philosopher, especially the attempt at reconstruction.<sup>38</sup> Writing later in the XIX Century in reply to Frederick Harrison, he sums up the difference in fewer and more pointed words by saying that the Agnosticism of Comte is negative, whereas his own is positive.<sup>39</sup> Yet Mr. Ribot calls Spencer's First Principles the "Metaphysics of Positivism."<sup>40</sup>

§ 18. Thus Mr. Spencer, Mr. Huxley and Mr. Leslie Stephen claim and with some show of truth that their Positivism or Agnosticism is absolutely independent of the French. Nevertheless Mr. Lewes,<sup>41</sup> M. Littré,<sup>42</sup> and Mr. Harrison<sup>43</sup> are positive and pre-emptory in rejecting their assertion.

## V.

### INFLUENCE.

§ 19. The influence exerted by Positivism for the In general.  
past fifty years has been very great. It has formed a certain atmosphere of thought which has spread over all ranks and classes of society. Coming from the hands of its author, a system of philosophy and of polity, it gradually dropped one characteristic trait after another in the effort to assimilate itself to different minds and different peoples whither it was borne, until at present it is little more than a mode

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Spencer First Principles, p. 137; Mill's Exam. of Hamilton, p. 260.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Reasons for dissenting from Phil. of Comte, 1870, p. 30.

<sup>39</sup> XIX Cent., July, 1884.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. English Psychology by Mr. Ribot, p. 129.

<sup>41</sup> Hist. of Phil. V. II. conclus.

<sup>42</sup> Phil. Posit. XVII, p. 453.

<sup>43</sup> XIX Cent., 1884.

of thought, or a tendency of mind. Its principles are very few and very vague; its forms are indefinitely variable; it cannot be distinguished from Materialism, Agnosticism and Naturalism. Yet in spite of its constant changing and its disposition to change still more if possible, it comes down to us through these years with something of its original spirit still clinging about it. We still discover the same distrust of any claim to absolute truth, the same antagonism to what is beyond the range of sense, the same belief that the complete explanation of a phenomena consists in detecting the relations of succession and of contiguity. Its influence is seen in the tone of society and the conduct of life, in poetry and fiction, in science and speculation. In conformity with the fundamental law of the Three States it seems to reveal a bias for historical studies, especially those departments which most easily exhibit man as a mere animal, to the exclusion of the intellectual and moral nature, e. g., Anthropology, Ethnology.<sup>44</sup>

**In England.** § 20. Dr. Brewster was the first man of scientific attainments to praise Comte, although he condemned his anti-religious tendencies.<sup>45</sup> J. Stuart Mill places the author in the highest rank of European thinkers; he considers "Le Cours de Phil. Positive," the greatest work which the philosophy of the sciences has produced,<sup>46</sup> a veritable encyclopedia; and declares himself an unreserved partisan of Comte's method.<sup>47</sup> He says that Comte attempted to build Positivism into a system, and places him above Leibnitz and Des Cartes

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Prof. Flint, *Phil. of Hist.*

<sup>45</sup> *Edin. Rev.*, Aug., 1838, vol. 67, p. 271; Littré A. Comte, p. 260.

<sup>46</sup> *Letter Oct.*, '41; Bain, *J. S. Mill Mind*, 1879.

<sup>47</sup> *Logic*, pp. 346, 421, 620.

as a pioneer of philosophy.<sup>48</sup> In 1853, Miss Harriett Martineau published in two volumes an abridgment of "Le Cours." Lewes holds that all other philosophies serve as a pedestal for Compté's, and hereafter they will only develop his teaching. While Huxley repudiates Positivism; while Spencer and Mill reject its characteristic teachings, ex. gr., the classification of the sciences and maintain that Psychology is a science; while Bain is silent; the adhesion of Lewes and of Congreve and of Harrison is entire.<sup>50</sup> Positivism also influenced Dr. Maudsley's "Physiol. of Mind," Buckle's "History of Civilization," Leckey's "Rationalism in Europe," the writings of Grote, and of G. Eliot, and more especially Mrs. H. Ward's "Robert Elsmere."

§ 21. In France, Littre has done most to spread <sup>In France.</sup> the philosophy of Compté.<sup>51</sup> Ch. Robin and de Blainville profess themselves his disciples in biology. He has influenced Renan, Vacherot, Taine, Berthelot, C. Bernard, Ribot and the realistic school of Zola. Two reviews have as an object the propagation of his philosophy, e. g., *La Philosophie Positive*, and *"Revue Occidentale."*<sup>52</sup>

§ 22. In Germany it has penetrated indirectly by <sup>In Germany.</sup> English influence rather than by a study of the philosophy of Compté. It has drawn the attention of writers such as Bucholz, Twesten, E. Duhring, Fr. A. Lange, E. Bernheim.

<sup>48</sup> Compté & Positivism.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Dr. Rich Congreve "Catech. of Relig. of Humanity."

<sup>51</sup> A. Compté et la Phil. Posit.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Ravaisson "La Philosophie en France au xix siècle," p. 65 sq.; "Philosophy in France," by Th. Ribot in *Mind*, vol. II, p. 366; Janet "La Philos. Franc. Contemp."

adverse  
criticism.

§ 23. On the other hand Comte and the Positive Philosophy have been severely criticised by able and learned writers. Whewell calls him a shallow pretender in modern science, one whose discoveries are absurdly erroneous.<sup>53</sup> J. Herschell points out glaring errors in Mathematics.<sup>54</sup> Huxley is especially severe. He says that Comte has no eminence as a teacher in mathematics; that he had only an amateur's acquaintance with physical, chemical and biological science; that his works are repulsive for the dull diffuseness of style.<sup>55</sup> He finds in Positive Philosophy little or nothing of scientific value.<sup>56</sup> He says the veins of ore are few and far between and the rock so apt to run to mud that one incurred the risk of being intellectually smothered in the working.<sup>57</sup> He is irritated to find Comte put forward as a representative of scientific thought and accuses him of superficial and second-hand knowledge.<sup>58</sup> He contends that a critical examination of the law of the three states brings out nothing but a series of more or less contradictory statements of an imperfectly apprehended truth, and his classification of the sciences whether regarded historically or logically is absolutely worthless, and cites Spencer as agreeing with him.<sup>59</sup> He refers with approval to Mill's severe criticisms of Comte's Sociology.<sup>60</sup> He sees nothing in Comte's philosophy worthy of attention from a scientific point of view; it

<sup>53</sup> Cf. MacMillan, Mar., 1866.

<sup>54</sup> McCosh, Christianity and Positivism, p. 172.

<sup>55</sup> Essays on some Controverted Questions, p. 291.

<sup>56</sup> Lay Sermons, "Physical Basis of Life," p. 140.

<sup>57</sup> *Ib.*, "Scientific Aspects of Posit.," p. 147.

<sup>58</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 150, 164.

<sup>59</sup> *Ib.*, p. 156, cf. Spencer "Genesis of Science."

<sup>60</sup> *Ib.*, p. 153; A. Comte and Positivism, by J. S. Mill, p. 67 sq.

is the reverse of true science, a tissue of contradictions, a heap of absurdities.<sup>61</sup>

## VI.

## CRITICISM.

§ 24. (a) The fundamental law of Positivism is the law of historic filiation; it supposes the successive existence of the three states: Theological, Metaphysical and Positive. But this law is a hasty, superficial generalization. What he calls states are mere aspects of things; nor does one give way to the other in gradated succession; they exist simultaneously. His system therefore rests upon a basis which lacks verification; nay even which is shown to be false. (a) its fundamental law is false.

§ 25. (b) Positivism is not a philosophy; on the contrary it is a strong attempt to destroy philosophy.<sup>62</sup> (b) not a philosophy. Philosophy deals with causes; its aim is to set forth the first principles of knowledge, to throw light upon the problems of existence. These questions are forced upon the mind and demand an answer. Positivism resolutely pushes them aside. To preserve a strained neutrality, it is compelled to deny God, the soul, essence, first or final causes. The existence of metaphysics as a science and of necessary truth is a standing refutation of Positivism.<sup>63</sup> Thus we find leading philosophers complain that Compté has neglected the fundamental problem of human knowledge; that his system is a philosophic-nihilism.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Lay Sermons VIII, p. 147, sq.; Essay upon Some Contr. Quest., IX, "Agnosticism."

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Morell Philosophical Tenden. of the Age, p. 27.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Father Harper "Metaphysics of the Schools;" W. G. Ward "Philosophy of Theism;" McCosh "Fundamental Truth."



(c) his  
doctrine  
of man is  
false.

§ 26. (c) His contention that man is only the first of the animal series and that Physiology is the complete science of man, is false. The only proof alleged is the assumption itself with the wise remark that they who refuse to accept it are immature in intelligence. As a logical consequence, some writers contend that Psychology is only a department of Physiology.<sup>64</sup>

§ 27. To them thought and the soul are functions of the brain, and therefore a chapter in the sciences which studies the functions of organs. But there are two distinct orders of phenomena, psychical and physiological. The functions which Physiology studies are organic, and can be localized; Psychology investigates inorganic acts, e. g., thought. Again the methods of investigation differ. The facts of Physiology are known through the senses; those of Psychology through introspection or self-consciousness. So great is the difference between the two orders of facts that while some men have denied the existence of things outside of our representations, e. g., Berkeley; the most determined sceptics, e. g., Hume, never questioned the validity of our actual psychic experience.<sup>65</sup>

(d) his  
proofs are  
assump-  
tions.

§ 28. (d) M. Comte seems not to lack presumption. In this way he supplies what is wanting from a scien-

<sup>64</sup> Mr. Hodgson, Mr. James "Prin. of Psychology" I, ch. i, 6, 7, hold that there can be no science of Psychology except a cerebral Psychology; Dr. Maudsley rejects the method of introspection; he maintains that Psychology should be studied objectively, i. e., physiologically; that Physiology has done away with the old Psychology. cf. McCosh, Christianity and Positivism, p. 193.

<sup>65</sup> On the validity of Introspection as the Psychological method, cf. Stonyhurst "Psychology," ch. 11; W. G. Ward "Philosophy of Theism;" Dr. Martineau "Essays, cerebral Psychology."

tific point of view. He takes immediate observation of the senses as the test of truth. But what proof does immediate observation furnish for the initial point of his system, viz., the law of the Three States? Or for the fundamental principle of his theory of knowledge, viz., that the supra-sensible order is altogether inaccessible to our minds? Or for the denial of the higher faculties in man, and as a consequence the rejection of the spiritual and social development and the relegation of history and sociology to the level of the physical sciences?

§ 29. (e) Finally, Compté's philosophy is positive in name only. It leads to uncertainty, doubt and unbelief. He proclaimed the fundamental maxim of contemporary infidel science: that exact observation by the senses is the only method of knowledge; what it gives we should accept; what it cannot verify, we should reject as of no value. He rigorously applied this principle to all branches of science and to all departments of human life. Now there are certain great verities in human life, ex. gr., God, soul, first principles of reason, the moral law, the capability of the mind to obtain truth,—not grasped by sense which stand out as bright lights, giving us our bearings and guiding the mind to the harbor of safety and rest. Positivism blots these out of sight and leaves the mind, who trusts in it for guidance, like a vessel tossed to and fro adrift of its moorings. A philosophy that ignores the higher questionings of the mind and the higher aspirations of the heart cannot claim to be the guide of human life. Man is conscious that he is more than a brute. He is made to look upwards, not to grovel on the earth; he is to be uplifted, not depressed; he seeks

(e) Positive Philosophy a misnomer.

more light, not shadows and darkness. To one, whose faith has been undermined and shattered by the poison of false philosophical principles, Positivism may seem like a beacon in the gloom. Feeling that God and things divine are out of reach, by an instinctive nobility of nature he reaches out to his fellow-man. He is filled with the spirit of the "Grand Etre," he longs to devote himself to the service of Humanity. But this is only a temporary exaltation, a passing feeling, which yields to a deeper and more hopeless dejection.<sup>66</sup> The object of our eager and enthusiastic search was not to be found. The shadow lured, not the substance. As a philosophy Positivism could not be lasting.<sup>67</sup> Its author never seemed to have a true conception of man's nature and dignity. Human nature rises up in protest against false and partial views of man.

## VII.

### CONCLUSION.

§ 30. The attempt of Comte to found a philosophy has failed. His work is not Philosophy; and often erroneous and ridiculous from the scientific point of view. Nevertheless he is not without merit. He has left a philosophical theory of the sciences and of their methods which has value; he had great power of thought and of sympathetic conception; he has shown independence and impartiality in his judgments on the

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Robert Elsmere, by Mrs. H. Ward.

<sup>67</sup> A reaction has set in as shown by the revolt against the realistic school of fiction, by the publication of "Foundations of Belief," and by the signs of a religious awakening, e. g., acceptance of Christianity by Romanes.

Catholic church, on Protestantism, Liberalism and the Spiritual power.<sup>68</sup>

§ 31. Positivism denies the existence of any supersensible entity. This is a universal negative proposition. To prove that it is false according to Logical principles we must show that its contradictory, i. e., the particular affirmative proposition is true. This is done in the following chapter by establishing the existence of the human soul as a spiritual principle.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. P. Gruber S. J. "Compte, sa vie, sa doctrine."

## THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL.

import of  
the title.

§ 1. It is not enough to state and prove the fact that the human soul is an immaterial substance. Scholastic philosophy teaches that the soul of brutes is immaterial. Now an essential difference separates the soul of the brute from that of man.<sup>1</sup> The difference consists in the element of spirituality which belongs to the human soul alone, and is expressed in the statement that the soul is a spirit. Hence the phrase employed in our manuals of philosophy, current in Catholic thought, which is the title of the present chapter.

### I.

#### EXPLANATION OF TERMS.

§ 2. To prevent any misconceptions which might arise either from an exaggerated use of the words, or from false imputations respecting their meaning, it is necessary to set forth the clear and exact import of the notions.

(1) spirit.

§ 3. (1°) A *spirit* is an immaterial substance which is independent of matter in being and in act. It is essential to and characteristic of a spirit to exist and to exert its activity independent of matter. This separates it from all other existences, especially from simple immaterial entities. Thus, ex. gr., God is a spirit. But God is a *pure spirit* in the highest signification of the word; hence it is absolutely repugnant that He should ever be or become a soul. With good reason, therefore, Christian Theodicy rejects the contention of the Stoic philosophers that God is the soul

pure  
spirits  
ex. gr.

<sup>1</sup> S. Augustine De Lib. Arb. II, n. 18; de Trin. XV, n. 1.

of the world. Below God there may be, as philosophy infers, and are, as faith teaches, other spirits, e. g., angels. They are pure spirits created by God to exist and act independently of any connection with matter. Thus it is *conditionally*, i. e., by reason of their creation, repugnant that they should ever be or become souls. God.  
angel.

§ 4. But the concepts of spirit and of soul, viewed in themselves, are not mutually exclusive or repugnant. A spirit may be at the same time a soul. For this it is necessary and requisite that it have an intrinsic and natural tendency to vivify and actuate a body. Under one aspect it is a spirit; under another aspect it is a soul. In this case we have a spiritual soul, such as, ex. gr., the human soul. The human soul is a spirit because it exerts its activities of thought and of will independently of the body; it is soul, i. e., *anima*, in as much as it vivifies and animates a body.<sup>2</sup> spirit and  
soul.

§ 5. (2°) The question for solution is not the *possibility* of such substances, but the fact; are there such actually existing? In answer we point to our soul, which is the principle of vegetative, sensitive and intellectual life. (2) the  
question  
to be  
solved.

§ 6. (3°) A spiritual soul is, therefore, a possibility and a fact. The error of Des Cartes and of his followers is in confounding the concepts. They require different definitions and are differently realized in different things, e. g., an angel is a spirit but not a soul; man has a soul which is also a spirit; the brute has a soul, which is not a spirit. (3) The  
concepts of  
spirit and  
of soul  
are dis-  
tinct.

§ 7. (4°) It is of the essence of the soul to vivify and actuate a body, ex. gr., "*anima*" (soul) comes from the verb *animare*, i. e., to animate. The term, soul, is connotative. It signifies a thing not absolutely, but as (4) soul.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Aug. de an. et ejus origine, l. VI, n. 37.

may be  
immaterial  
or spiritual.

having a relation to something else; viz., the body animated; just as the term *father* signifies a man having a relation to another who is his son. To animate a body it is necessary that the soul be simple and immaterial. A spiritual substance is immaterial, but an immaterial substance is not on that account spiritual. The concept of immateriality is distinct from that of spirituality; the latter implies the former with some element in addition. To be spiritual a substance **must** be able to perform some acts without an intrinsic dependence on the body which it animates. The co-operation of a bodily organ is not required for spiritual acts; thus, ex. gr., we think abstract truths which cannot be embodied in matter. Thought is a spiritual act; the brain is not its organ in the same way as the eye is the organ of sight. Spiritual, therefore, is another word for super-organic.<sup>3</sup>

(5) The  
question  
stated.

§ 8. (5°) It is not the purpose to prove that all the acts of the human soul are super-organic. This is not true. The vegetative acts of digestion, ex. gr., and of assimilation, the sensitive acts of sight, of hearing, etc., are performed with the intrinsic co-operation of the bodily organs, and are strictly speaking organic. The aim is to show that certain acts of the soul are super-organic; that these very acts are characteristic of man; and that as a logical consequence since the nature of a being is revealed in and known from its acts, the human soul does not depend for its existence on the intrinsic co-operation of the body. It is a fact that the soul and body united form one human composite; it is a fact that certain acts of the soul are performed with the intrinsic co-operation of the body so that they

<sup>3</sup> By spirit "proprie dici non universam animam sed aliquid ipsius." Aug. de an. et ejus orig. l. IV, c. 22, n. 36 sq.

belong more properly to the body and are called bodily acts; but it is also a fact that some acts of the soul are of a higher nature than these latter; and are, therefore, termed acts of the mind and of the will. We admit all this: At present, however, we are concerned only with the last statement, and on this our argument is based.<sup>4</sup>

## II.

### THE ARGUMENT.

§ 9. The reasoning rests upon data furnished by the individual consciousness. The reader need but examine his own inner life to find phenomena which are not the outcome of sense and cannot be explained by sense. <sup>(1) From intelligence.</sup>

#### 1°. *Let Us Analyze the Facts of Intelligence.*

§ 10. (a) We have notions in the mind which are immaterial and cannot be referred to any bodily organ. They move on a plain above sense and belong to an order of entities which have nothing in common with the objects of sense. Our minds have the conception of God; we discourse of his infinity, of his mercy and loving kindness; with awe we contemplate his majesty and spotless holiness; our will is strengthened in a resolution to avoid vice and sin, and to practice virtue; we look forward to the future with courage and hope. Yet these notions are the product of a bodily organ. They elude the grasp of sense and cannot be confined within its limits. I cannot see them with the eye, nor hear them with the ear, nor feel them with the hand. I may strive to picture them upon the imagination and confine them to color and to form, but <sup>(a) from super-organic notions.</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Cf. St. Thomas I. Q. 75.



like a bird they are away on the wings of thought far up into the deep empirion of mind and I sink back in failure. I may speak of them, but I do not exhaust their meaning; and to those who hear, the spoken word gives an insight into the mind's possibilities.<sup>5</sup>

from the  
abstract  
sciences.

§ 11. We study Logic which treats of the laws of the mind, of the forms and modes of thought; Psychology, which investigates the nature of the soul, of mind and of will; Metaphysics, which sets forth necessary truths, the fundamental notions and principles on which the whole universe is constructed; Ethics, which contains the notions of right and wrong, and deals with the laws and relations of man in his individual, domestic and social life; Mathematics, which based on a few abstract truths rises into a structure of magnificent proportions, the pride and glory of intelligence;<sup>6</sup> Theodicy, which soars aloft to God and discourses on the nature of the divine attributes. We move in worlds beyond sensitive experience. The acts which we elicit are not the product of an organ; they are super-organic and spiritual. We may therefore legitimately infer that their principle is also super-organic and spiritual.<sup>7</sup>

(b) from  
the man-  
ner of  
conceiving  
material  
objects.

§ 12. (b) It is not true to hold that the intellect knows only abstract truths and immaterial entities. Material things and objects of sense form part of its knowledge. The manner in which it apprehends these objects furnishes a strong proof of its inorganic nature.<sup>8</sup> The sense, e. g., of sight perceives only the

<sup>5</sup> C. Gent. BII, ch. 49; Augustine de quan. an., n. 7, 8, 9, 22.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. S. Augustine De Lib. Arb. l. ii, n. 22, 23, 24.

<sup>7</sup> Aug. de an. et ejus origine l. iv, n. 31; C. Gent. BII, ch 66; McCosh Christianity and Positivism, p. 208 sq. S. Augustine shows that the brute has not science. De quant. An., n. 49, 50, 54.

<sup>8</sup> Aug. de Gen. ad Lit XII, n. 49, 50.

concrete, the particular, the object limited by the material determinations of color, size and form. The intellect grasps the very nature, which it conceives as abstracted from all concrete limitations, and as applicable to all individuals of the same class.<sup>9</sup> This immaterial abstract universal conception furnishes the basis for the intellectual process of classification. Hence, the distinction of genus, of species, of properties and of accidents, which are employed not only in the descriptive sciences, ex. gr., the classifications of Botany, of Zoology, but also in the ordinary conversation of daily life, ex. gr., we speak of a class of honest men, thus grouping individuals under the abstract conception of honesty. So, also, analysis, synthesis, comparison, inference, are intellectual processes which reveal in material objects relations utterly impervious to organs of sense. In fine, the masterpieces of art, the great sciences of nature appeal primarily to mind.<sup>10</sup>

§ 13. I stand on the sea-shore and look out over its heaving waves; my mind is filled with the thought of its mighty power and its trackless wastes. Or I turn my eyes upwards to the heavens studded with stars; in

<sup>9</sup> On difference between "sensation" and "thought" cf. S. Aug. de quant. An., n. 56, 57.

<sup>10</sup> "One of the most important functions of physical science, considered as a discipline of the mind, is to enable us by means of the tangible processes of Nature to apprehend the intangible. The tangible processes give *direction* to the line of thought; but this once given, the length of the line is not limited by the boundaries of the senses. Indeed, the Domain of the senses, in Nature, is almost infinitely small in comparison with the vast region accessible to thought which lies beyond them. From a few observations of a comet, when it comes within the range of his telescope, an astronomer can calculate its path in regions which no telescope can reach, and in like manner, by means of data furnished in the narrow world of the senses, we make ourselves at home in other and wider worlds, which can be traversed by the intellect alone." Tyndall "on Radiant Heat" in *Frisoni's Science*.

thought I pass beyond the horizon into the boundless reach of azure blue, and am filled with the notion of infinity. I listen with delight to a symphony of Beethoven, or to a masterpiece of Shakespeare; I gaze with pleasure upon a Raphael or a Murillo; I look with admiration at the grand and noble proportions of an ancient Cathedral. In thought I go out with reverence to the creative mind whose glory shines around and through them; I am conscious of strong sympathy for the genius of the worker; and the pleasure I feel is purely intellectual—the result of the influence of mind upon mind.<sup>11</sup>

§ 14. Finally it is mind which enables me to read your thoughts, to divine your feelings, to pierce stone walls, to gather up into a connected whole the experience of a lifetime or the labors of centuries, to pass beyond the confines of the present with a view to predict and plan for the future. In the light of this what basis can there be for Mr. Bain's contention that thought consists in organic movement?<sup>12</sup>

(c) self-  
conscious-  
ness.

§ 15. (c) The strongest and most convincing proof that the mind is not an organic faculty is drawn from the phenomena of self-consciousness.<sup>13</sup> Consciousness is a sensitive act, e. g., a dog can feel pain. Self-consciousness, however, transcends sense; it is not

<sup>11</sup> St. Thomas I q. 75 a. 2; I. Q. 84 A. I. "Natura animae praestantior est quam natura corporis, excellit multum; res spiritualis est, res incorporea est, vicina est substantiae Dei. Invisibile quidem est, regit corpus, novet membra, dirigit sensus, praeparat cogitationes, exserit actiones, capit rerum infinitarum imagines." Aug. in Ps. 145, n. 4.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Present Day Tracts, n. 42. "Points of Contact between Revelation and Natural Science," by Sir. J. W. Dawson.

<sup>13</sup> An interesting criticism of Tyndall's views on consciousness is given by Mallock in "Is Life Worth Living," p. 221 sq.

only an act by which I am aware of the facts affecting me, but it is a faculty by which I can reflect upon my own acts and know myself to be their source and their subject. Hence I not only know, but I know that I know; in some wonderful manner the subject knowing and the object known are one and the same, e. g., I myself know myself to do so and so. This power of reflection which is characteristic of self-consciousness cannot take place by the intrinsic co-operation of a bodily organ.<sup>14</sup>

§ 16. Self-consciousness may be considered as an act distinct from : or as a state. As an act it is a judgment of the intellect; as a state it is a train of reflective thoughts upon self.<sup>15</sup> Matter is not capable of an act of reflection, organic matter. nor can it make itself the object of its own activity. The senses also, by reason of their organic nature, are immersed in matter and cannot have their acts as objects. Thus the eye sees, but it cannot see that it sees; the ear hears, but cannot hear that it hears; and so on for the rest. The mind, on the contrary, knows and knows that it knows. This reflection is a certain self-penetrating, self-acting power; it is a certain self-possession.

§ 17. Physiology and Biology teach that after seven years the atoms of the human body undergo a complete change; hence an old man differs physically and materially from what he was when a boy. Self-consciousness with memory, however, show his identity. The optical reflection of Physics, the reflection of Acoustics, e. g., the echo, differ essentially from the reflection of consciousness. Here the *ego* is at one pure matter. and the same time reflecting and reflected, active and

<sup>14</sup>Cf. St. Thomas I Q. 14. a 2.

<sup>15</sup> St. Thomas I., q. 14, a1.

passive; it is a self-penetration and a self-possession, whereas in physics there is a real separation. In Physics we have matter in motion, subject to the laws of mechanics; the reflection of the ego may be compared to motion, but is by no means mechanical; there is an analogy, but no identity. Self-consciousness has been called a "circular motion," a "wave." But circular motion is only a return to the same point in space; it is not a reflection upon itself; nor is a "wave" different in kind from physical motion. "No body," writes the Angelic Doctor, "possesses an activity capable of reflecting upon the same body acting," and again, "a material body is set in motion only by parts."<sup>16</sup>

§ 18. Furthermore, a material entity or a sense-organ cannot divide itself into two parts, so that they may be identical with the whole; yet in self-consciousness the *ego* reflecting is distinguished from the *ego* reflected upon, but so that both parts possess each other; for this reason St. Thomas calls the act "a complete return upon itself, 'reditio completa.'"<sup>17</sup> The phenomena of self-consciousness are the rock upon which Physics and Physiology have been shattered in the effort to explain away the higher nature of men. Mr. Huxley, for example, has tried to explain them dynamically, i. e., by cerebration. He holds that cerebral molecules, animated with energy, produce them. Tyndall also contends that atoms, individually without sensation, combine in obedience to mechanical laws, with the result that organic forms, sensations and thought are due to their combinations.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> C. Gent. BII, ch. 49.

<sup>17</sup> De. Ver. qI.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Belfast Address.

How unfounded and arbitrary is this assertion, is evident from a careful analysis of the nature of the act. Leibnitz long ago set the attempt convincingly aside.<sup>19</sup>

## 2°. *The Phenomena of Will.*

§ 19. Another series of considerations tending with <sup>(2) from the will.</sup> cumulative force to prove the inorganic nature of the soul, is drawn from the phenomena of the will.<sup>20</sup> There is in man not only a tendency to objects which belong to the order of sensitive experience; there is also a higher, a rational tendency to good as apprehended by the intelligence.

§ 20. The train of reasoning is, therefore, based <sup>from rational will.</sup> upon the existence of a *Rational* will. Consciousness testifies that every act of rational will presupposes a previous act of knowledge. "Ignoti nulla cupido" is a truth of individual experience. Now the will desires and acquiesces in spiritual goods; hence, the act of the intellect which antecedes this desire must be spiritual. Viewed in this aspect an additional argument is had for the spiritual nature of the mental act. The direct and obvious proof, however, is drawn from the nature of the tendency itself.

§ 21. (a) A tendency which, in its exercise is bound <sup>(a) a tendency to an abstract classification.</sup> up with the body or a part of the body, is limited to what is particular and concrete. It cannot go out to the universal or embrace a class of individual objects. Nevertheless, I know from my own conscious experience, that I can hate not only a bad man, but also the class of bad men; that I can love not only a good man, but also the class of good men; that I can shun the

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Monology, § 17.

<sup>20</sup> St. Thomas I, 2, q. 22 sq.

company of thieves, murderers or robbers, and seek the fellowship of the good, the wise, the just. The tendency to an abstract classification, as proposed by the intellect, has nothing in common with an inclination whose exercise is bound up with an organ of sense.<sup>21</sup>

(b) to superorganic objects.

§ 22. (b) An organic tendency cannot be directed to objects which transcend the bounds of sensible experience. It is as evident that sense cannot grasp what is beyond sense, as that my arm cannot reach out to what is beyond its reach. Now, individual experience shows that there is in us a tendency to objects which are purely immaterial. Thus, I love truth; I strive after Christian virtue; I am inflamed with patriotism; I hate sin; I esteem integrity; I prize honor; I practice honesty; I strive to reproduce in my own life the great Christian virtues of humility, charity, self-denial, self-sacrifice, etc. This tendency cannot be organic because of the spiritual nature of its objects. It is, therefore, inorganic. and we legitimately infer that the principle from which it springs, viz., the will, is inorganic also.<sup>22</sup>

(c) from conscience

§ 23. (c) Another consideration is drawn from conscience, which reveals the existence of a moral law binding upon the will. There is in every man, by virtue of his rational nature, a participation of a certain eternal and immutable law, which is none other than the light of intelligence implanted in us by God, with a view to guide us in the knowledge of what we should do and what we should avoid. By its assistance we decide with certainty and without hesitation that certain things are good, that others are bad, that

<sup>21</sup> C. Gent. BII, ch. 60; "adhuc intellectus, etc." Sum-Theol. I, q. 80, a. 1.

<sup>22</sup> C. Gent. BII, c. 82.

we should avoid all evil acts, and that we should perform those good acts which conduce to the maintenance of order. If I act according to the dictates of this law within me, the still small voice of conscience praises, and I feel a new accession of strength, whence I know not. But if I act in opposition to its behests, I am conscious of shame, of blame, of sorrow, of remorse.

§ 24. Its sanction is clear, definite and unfailing. Though in the silence of my room, secure from the sight of another, I should commit an act which is wrong, I carry within me a witness, a judge, an avenger, who exacts the last farthing of punishment. Again confident and strong in the approbation of conscience I strive for what is right and just, holding as of little value the idle comments of those around me. Conscience has made heroes in the past and conscience enlightened by Christian faith has made saints and can make saints of us all.<sup>23</sup> Now the basis and law of this binding force cannot be sought for in an organic faculty; it is absolute, universal and transcends all sensitive experience. We must conclude, therefore, that it is inorganic and spiritual.<sup>24</sup>

§ 24. (d) Finally we appeal to the phenomena of <sup>(d) free-</sup>free-will. That we are free is here an assumed fact; it is proved at length elsewhere.<sup>25</sup> Liberty of will is the crowning perfection of man's volitional nature, just as self-consciousness is the climax of intellectual development. It means the power of self-determination.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *The Great Enigma* by W. S. Lilly, p. 21.

<sup>24</sup> St. Thomas I2, q. 21, a1; q. 91, a2 ad 2; Rickaby, ch. IV; Newman *Gram. of Assent*, p. 106.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Rickaby; Fongreave "*Le Libre Arbitre*;" Dr. Ward "*Philosophy of Theism*."



Matter not  
free.

§ 25. Matter has no such power, ex. gr., physical activity can be considered as (a) velocity, which depends on intensity of impulse and the mass (b) direction, hence the law of the parallelogram of the forces (c) mechanical work, hence the law of the conservation of energy and the value of living force. Underlying and ruling these forms of activity there is the law of inertia. Now inertia implies complete passive indifference, but liberty means activity in the highest sense — the power of self-determination; inertia contains the element of necessitation in its very concept, liberty excludes external compulsion and internal determination. Thus inertia as an essential property of manner and liberty as an essential property of will are contradictory.<sup>26</sup>

Organic  
matter  
not free.

§ 26. An organic act is under the control of physical forces and of external agents. The senses necessarily receive impressions; ex. gr., I cannot help seeing with my open eye, or hearing with my ear. On the contrary the will can select some motives presented by the intellect and set aside others, can choose some objects and reject others, it can despise a motive; abstain from acting, or deliberately choose the opposite. Moreover modern Physiology teaches the law of

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Janet "Traite Elementaire de Philosophie," vol. 1, p. 337. "After having admitted first, the notion of ponderable matter, then that of ether, later the notion of actual movement, and then that of potential movement, contemporary science is compelled to recognize still another force, a soul-power, in order to satisfactorily understand the observed and observable facts. Experimental Physics demonstrates that morality is possible, that duty and free-will can be affirmed, and consequently, that men can escape from the mechanical determinism without upsetting the order of the universe." Conclusion of a lecture delivered at Paris, 1893, by M. Pictet, now Prof. of Physics in Berlin; cit. in Amer. Jour. of Psych., 1892-93, p. 511.

the specific energy of the senses, i. e., the organs of sense each in its own specific way respond to an external stimulus, e. g., an electric current to the eye is a spark, to the ear a sound, to the taste something bitter. Finally the existence of Psycho-Physics, which is the result of efforts made to formulate a law between the stimulus and the sensation, show the dependence of the organs on material impulses, and prove that they are not free.

§ 27. Not so the acts of the will. I have the power to resist a strong inclination, and to chose a weaker one; a short message announcing a death may cause in my will emotions altogether out of proportion to the stimulus; I feel no necessity, nor do the same things always affect my will in the same manner. I may chose to-day what I despised yesterday; and from many diverse objects I am at liberty to select here and now whatsoever I please. It follows that the will cannot be an organic force, else we should be necessitated to act according to impressions, and these impressions would be the determining cause of human action. Consciousness and common sense testify to the contrary. Hence, we speak of a person who is apt to be guided by impressions as a man who lacks discrimination and good judgment.<sup>27</sup>

### 3°. *Human Speech.*

§ 28. Besides the endowment of spiritual faculties man possesses the gift of human speech. This is the instrument and expression of thought and volition. By language I hold converse with the greatest minds in all ages; I know their thoughts, aims and desires;

<sup>27</sup> St. Thomas Sum. Theol. i, q. 115, a. 4.

or I communicate with those about me in the various occupations of daily life, in school, at business, in the professions, in the family, in discharging the obligations of friendship. The power of speech is characteristic of the human race.<sup>28</sup> It is an insurmountable barrier between man and beast. Some scholars, forgetful of the higher nature of man, go to excess in holding that language is the only difference which marks mankind distinct from the animal kingdom.<sup>29</sup>

from roots  
of lan-  
guage.

§ 29. During the present century the science of Comparative Philology has sprung into existence. It is based upon the analysis of language. In every language are found certain roots or phonetic types which are regarded as ultimate elements. From these roots language has developed. The laws of the growth are phonetic decay and dialectic regeneration.<sup>30</sup> Now, an examination of the roots or the ultimate elements of speech shows that their formation requires a mind capable of abstraction, and of forming universal concepts.<sup>31</sup> The roots signify something proper, peculiar and characteristic of an object, and are, therefore, always abstract and universal.<sup>32</sup> From the very structure of language, therefore, we infer the existence of a mind which is super-organic and spiritual.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Mivart Truth, p. 351 sq., 224 sq., 279.

<sup>29</sup> Muller Science of Language II, p. 372.

<sup>30</sup> Muller Science of Language, vol. I.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Mivart Truth, p. 232; Tyler Primitive Culture vol. i, p. 216; Muller Science of Thought, ch. IV.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Whitney Language and Study of Language, ch. VII.

<sup>33</sup> The power of expressing his thoughts by articulate sounds has ever been considered as the distinctive character of man; the absence of articulate language in animals is not explained on merely anatomical grounds; again some animals, ex. gr., parrot, are capable of uttering articulate sounds. cf. Dr. Th. Bischoff on Difference Between Man and Brutes in Anthropol. Rev. of London Society, vol. I, p. 54.

## SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL AND MODERN SCIENCE.

§ 1. The spirituality of the soul has been bitterly assailed. The modern school of Materialism and of cerebral Physiology have made this thesis a point of attack. They have employed every means to show that the soul is material or at least organic. The reasons alleged in support of their contention are so specious that they deserve a special consideration.

### I.

#### CORRELATION OF THOUGHT TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRAIN.

§ 2. Our adversaries contend that there is a strict mathematical proportion and correlation between the perfection of the brain and the degrees of intelligence. As a consequence they infer that the knowledge of the one is an infallible indication of the other. This contention is a logical consequence of their principles. Their whole argument is based upon a fallacy. From the *union* of thought and of brain they infer the *identity*. We hold that there is a union of thought and brain, as there is a union of soul and body, nevertheless that they are essentially distinct.

The objection.

general criticism.

§ 3. The proofs they present are insufficient and fallacious.

Their proofs.

#### 1°. *From Quantity of Brain-Matter.*

(a) They appeal to the quantity of brain matter; hence the greater is the quantity of cerebral matter, the more intelligent is the being. To ascertain the quantity, they employ various criteria; either directly, by tak-

From quantity of brain-matter.

ing the volume of the cerebral mass; or indirectly by measuring the capacity of the empty skull. In the former case the brain is weighed immediately after death. In the latter case the skulls of all peoples, both ancient and modern, contribute to the questionings of science. The tombs of ancient Egypt, the ruins of excavated cities furnish materials for study. Topinard and Broca have adopted this method, because more universal and apparently more scientific. By appealing to archaeology, ethnology, etc., they hoped to prove that in proportion as peoples advanced in civilization, the volume of the brain likewise increased.

(a) from weight.

§ 4. (a) If the criterion of weight were valid it should apply to all living creatures. But facts prove conclusively that it is not of any value. Thus, ex. gr., the brain of an

(1) absolute weight.

Elephant weighs 3,000 grammes.

Dolphin weighs 1,800 gr.

Whale weighs 1,500 gr.

Man weighs 1,300-1,400 gr.

Horse weighs 600 gr.

Ox weighs 500 gr.

Monkey weighs 400-600 gr.

Donkey weighs 360 gr.

Dog weighs 80 gr.

Cat weighs 30 gr.

Now, in the hypothesis the elephant and whale should be more intelligent than man; the ox more intelligent than a monkey; while the dog and cat should show signs of the least intelligence. Experience shows that this is not true. Hence the hypothesis must be abandoned.

(2) relative weight.

§ 5. (2) Recourse was then had to the method of *relative* weight, i. e., the weight of the brain should be

considered not absolutely but in proportion to the weight of the individual body. But the results have been just as unsatisfactory. In this case the infant should be four times superior in intelligence to the fully developed man; the monkey would be superior to man; while the dog would be inferior to the bat, the horse to the donkey and man to the canary.<sup>1</sup>

§ 6. (3) Driven from this position they sought refuge in proposing as a criterion the weight of the brain compared to the encephalon, i. e., rest of the head, e. g., the medulla oblongata and cerebellum. In this case man would be placed almost on a level with the duck or the crow. <sup>(3) to the encephalon.</sup>

§ 7. (4) Finally, an attempt was made to weigh the nervous system as a whole. But this is impossible; the nerves and fibres are too delicate and complex to permit its successful accomplishment. As a fact many men of great intelligence possessed a small, or frail and sickly body, ex gr., Alexander Pope. Moreover, even if successful, we could not admit that the process is scientific, because the organs and nerves of the body have not all the same functions, or importance or dignity.<sup>2</sup> <sup>(4) to the nervous system.</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Tiedeman says that at birth the proportion of brain to body is 1 to 5.85 in the male; but this diminishes with years, e. g., at 10 years, 1 to 14; at 20 years, 1 to 30, and later on, 1 to 36. Bischoff says that in man the relative weight of Brain to the body is 1:35; in whale, 1:3300; in elephant, 1:500; in ox, 1:900; in horse, 1:550; in dog, 1:250. Yet he tells us that the law is not general, ex. gr., in canary and greenfinch, 1:14; in some apes, 1:13, i. e., sajou, and in the Sanniri, 1:24. cf. Dr. Th. Bischoff on Difference Between Man and Brutes in *Anthrop. Rev. of London*, vol. I, p. 54.

<sup>2</sup> Among the Magyars short individuals had heaviest, and middle-sized, the lightest brain. cf. *Weight Proport. of Brains of Austrian Peoples* by Dr. Weisbach in *Anthropol. Rev.*, vol. VII, p. 92.

(5) restricted to human species.

§ 8. (5) The failure of these attempts was attributed to the fact that the application was extended to all species, whereas, it should be confined within the limits of one only. Let us admit the truth of the complaint, and continue the experiment. We take the human species because the objection is aimed at destroying the higher nature of man.

brain of woman.

§ 9. Now, it is a fact that the brain of woman weighs less than man. Broca and Topinard show that between the ages of twenty and sixty years the weight of a woman's brain is from 125 to 164 grams less than that of man. Nevertheless, woman is not inferior to man in intelligence. She is capable of thoughts as sublime, of deeds as heroic, of efforts as admirable. In history, in science, in philosophy, in letters, she has left productions not inferior to man's; even in theology we have St. Catherine of Alexandria and St. Teresa.

§ 10. It is false to maintain a natural mental inferiority in women. She differs from man anatomically and physiologically; the nervous system is more delicate and sensitive; the whole organization conspires to make her fit for her duties of motherhood. This has an influence upon the moulding of character, and hence, indirectly upon the mental qualities; but it by no means makes her inferior.

brains different races.

§ 11. If we pass to a comparison of the brains of different races, the facts we meet cannot be reconciled with their hypothesis. Mr. David gives, as a result of careful study, the following table:<sup>3</sup>

Ancient Britains . . . . .	52.54 ounces
English . . . . .	50.28 ounces

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Contributions towards determining weight of brain in different races of man, by J. B. David, in Phil. Transact. of Royal Soc. of London, 1868, vol. 158, p. 505 sq.

Irish. . . . .	49.62 ounces
Merovingians. . . . .	50.28 ounces
French. . . . .	47.21 ounces
Italians. . . . .	48.24 ounces
Lapps. . . . .	47.65 ounces
Finns. . . . .	48.31 ounces
Hindus. . . . .	44.22 ounces
Dahomans. . . . .	46.63 ounces
Kafirs. . . . .	49.04 ounces
Esquimaux. . . . .	49.25 ounces
Malays. . . . .	50.13 ounces
Dayaks. . . . .	44.80 ounces
New Caledonians. . . . .	47.14 ounces
New Hebrides. . . . .	44.66 ounces
Maoris. . . . .	45.19 ounces
Kanakas. . . . .	47.89 ounces

According to Dr. Hunt the American negroes in slavery had the same brain capacity with the Hindu, who are a metaphysical race, ex. gr., weight of male Hindu 44.22 ounces, average weight of negro 46.96, or, according to Dr. Peacock, 44.34. Hence we find a high intellectual development in a nation remarkable for small brain.<sup>4</sup>

§ 12. Finally, let us examine the individual. That the weight is by no means proportionate to the intelligence is evident from the following table:<sup>5</sup> of different  
individ-  
uals.

Cuvier. . . . .	64.5 ounces
Abercrombie. . . . .	63. ounces
Schiller. . . . .	63. ounces
Goodsir. . . . .	57.5 ounces

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Anthrop. Rev.*, vol. VII, p. 190; cf. also "Elements d'Anthropologie," par Topinard, ch. XVI.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Bastian *Brain as Organ of Mind*, p. 369.



Spurzeim. . . . .	55.06 ounces
Jas. Simpson. . . . .	54. ounces
Dirichlet. . . . .	53.6 ounces
De Morny. . . . .	53.6 ounces
D. Webster. . . . .	53.5 ounces
Campbell, Lord Chancellor. . . . .	53.5 ounces
Agassiz. . . . .	53.3 ounces
Dr. Chalmers. . . . .	53. ounces
Fuchs. . . . .	52.9 ounces
De Morgan. . . . .	52.75 ounces
Gauss. . . . .	52.6 ounces
Judge Jeffry. . . . .	51.8 ounces
Dupuytreu. . . . .	50.7 ounces
Grote. . . . .	49.75 ounces
Whewell. . . . .	49. ounces
Herman (Philol.). . . . .	47.9 ounces
Hughes Bennett. . . . .	47. ounces
Tiedman. . . . .	44.2 ounces
Hausmann. . . . .	43.2 ounces

Thus Cuvier's brain weighed 1,830 grams, Broca's 1,484, Hausmann's 1,226, Gambetta's 1,160, whereas the average weight of the European brain varies between 1,350 and 1,360 grains. The heaviest brain measured, according to Bastian, is that of an illiterate Sussex bricklayer, which weighed 67 ounces, 14½ ounces heavier than that of Dan. Webster. Turner cites women with brains of 50 ounces, and no evidence of high mental power.<sup>6</sup> The weight of the brain of Laura Bridgeman was about 1,200 gr., its volume about 1,160 c. c.; but the mean weight of the European female brain is, according to Bischoff, 1,244.5 gr., to Tiedman 1,275, to Huschke 1272, to Schwalbe

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Turner Anatomy, vol. I, p. 297.

1,245.<sup>7</sup> Hence, Bastian concludes that there is "no necessary or invariable relation between degree of intelligence of human beings and mere size or weight of the brain. Demented persons may have large brains; ordinary people have large brains; men of ability have average or small brains."<sup>8</sup>

§ 13. If the degree of intelligence corresponds to the weight of the brain, the growth of the organ should be proportionate to the development of the mental faculties. But the facts are contrary.<sup>9</sup> In childhood the growth of the organ is very great, whereas the development of intelligence is very small, e. g., six months after birth the weight has doubled, at three years it has trebled, at seven years the growth becomes much retarded; nevertheless, the intelligence then only begins to develop. Again the maximum of cerebral development is had between the ages of fourteen and twenty; from twenty-five to forty the weight increases still more slowly; then diminishes. But reason and wisdom do not follow the same law in their development. Hence, we have the remarkable fact proved beyond question that reason, judgment and wisdom increase, whilst the weight diminishes.<sup>10</sup>

§ 14. Pathology of the brain presents facts which cannot be explained by the criterion of weight; ex. gr.,

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Brain of Laura Bridgeman by H. Donaldson, in Amer. Jour. of Psych., vol III, Sept., 1890.

<sup>8</sup> Bastian Brain as Organ of Mind, p. 369; cf. Quartrefages The Human Species, p. 410; Calderwood Brain and Mind, pp. 20, 503.

<sup>9</sup> S. Augustine considers this objection, and shows that the soul develops without any corresponding development of the body. cf. de quant An., n. 27, 28, 29.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Dr. Body's Table of Weight of Human Body in Phil. Trans. of Royal Soc. of London, vol. CLI, year 1861, p. 241; Weight Proportions of Austrian Peoples by Dr. Weisbach, in Anthr. Rev., vol. VII, p. 92; Gray's Anatomy, p. 707.

the human brain is composed of two hemispheres; nevertheless, we know instances where intelligent men, e. g., Broca, who possessed an average brain, and have carried on their mental labors with only one hemisphere, and gave no sign of lack of intellect.<sup>11</sup> "It is impossible," writes Mr. Donaldson, "to judge by the scales alone about the intellectual capacity of a given person, or even whether he was healthy, criminal or insane."<sup>12</sup>

§ 15. (b) *Measurement*: This method is considered more scientific than that of weight; it can be applied to the skulls of past ages. Therefore, more stress is laid upon it. The facts are as follows:<sup>13</sup>

6	in the age of polished stone.....	1606 c. c.
24	Gauls. . . . .	1592 c. c.
21	Egyptians of 4th dynasty.....	1532 c. c.
12	Egyptians of 11th dynasty.....	1443 c. c.
9	Egyptians of 18th dynasty.....	1464 c. c.
84	Merovingians. . . . .	1504 c. c.
67	Parisians of 12th cent.....	1531 c. c.
77	Parisians of 19th cent.....	1559 c. c.
74	Italians of 19th cent.....	1467 c. c.
7	Maoris. . . . .	1446 c. c.
85	Negroes of W. Africa.....	1430 c. c.
146	Ancient Britons. . . . .	1524 c. c.
116	Kanakas. . . . .	1470 c. c.
9	Esquimaux. . . . .	1535 c. c.
36	Anglo-Saxons . . . . .	1412 c. c.
9	Lapps. . . . .	1440 c. c.
12	Dahoman Negroes. . . . .	1452 c. c.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Calderwood *Brain and Mind*, p. 317; Ferrier *Functions of the Brain*, § 80.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Growth of the Brain*.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Elements D'anthropologie* by Topinard, ch. XVII; *Anthropology* of Topinard tr. by R. Bartley.

These facts show that savages and ancient races have a skull capacity equal and even superior to modern and civilized peoples. If this criterion were our guide, we should then be compelled to conclude that the Esquimaux are equal to the Parisians of the present day, and superior to the Europeans; that the Anglo-Saxon is inferior to the Dahomen Negro, and is almost at the lowest scale of humanity.

§ 16. 2°. *From quality of brain*:<sup>15</sup> An examination of <sup>2° From quality.</sup> the *quality* of brain-matter leads to the same irrefutable conclusion. We may distinguish *chemical* and *physical* qualities. Neither one nor the other, nor both combined, can explain the fact or the degree of intelligence.

§ 17. (a) The chemical theory of life and of thought is based upon the chemical discoveries of digestion, etc. These discoveries are good; they mark an advance, and contribute much to the maintenance of the health of the individual. The mistake is made in extending their influence beyond just limits. Because chemical elements are found in the organism, it does not follow that they can explain life and thought. <sup>(a) chemical theory of life and of thought</sup>

§ 18. As a result of the introduction of the synthetic method, chemists have produced in the laboratory organic substances or certain compound substances which are found only in living beings, e. g., urine, formic acid, lactic acid. Hence they infer that life is due to ordinary chemical forces alone. They maintain that all living powers are cognate; that all living forms are fundamentally of one character; and that protop-

<sup>15</sup> Physiologists of to-day have been compelled to abandon the hypothesis of quantity. The present position is that thought is explained by *quality* of the brain, i. e., by the convolutions and the grey matter. Cf. Gray's Anatomy, p. 707; McClellan's Regional Anatomy, vol. I, p. 25.

lasm is the formal basis of all life. This protoplasm contains the four elements, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen; these, when brought together under certain conditions, give rise to protoplasm, which exhibits the phenomena of life. The inference is obvious that "all vital action may be said to be the result of the molecular forces of the protoplasm which displays it. And if so, it must be true, in the same sense and to the same extent, that the thoughts to which I am now giving utterance and your thoughts regarding them, are the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena."<sup>16</sup>

organic  
sub-  
stances.

§ 19. The animal or plant is an organism. It takes in certain materials from the outside world, and by a certain process forms therefrom organic substances which are immediately assimilated into tissue, etc., for its own nourishment. Again certain material in the organism which has been used and no longer contributes to its nourishment, is insensibly detached and gradually expelled into the outside world. Some of these waste substances are inorganic and others are organic, e. g., urine, formic acid. The mineral substances which enter the organism and the inorganic matter which has been expelled, belongs to inorganic chemistry and are under the sway of its laws. The organic waste substances, however, pertain to organic chemistry. Now chemists have succeeded in producing organic waste substances. But can chemistry artificially produce true organic substances — substances fit to be immediately assimilated by the organism?

§ 20. Pasteur has proved by experiments that these organic substances in the organism possess properties

<sup>16</sup> Huxley, Lay Sermon. "Physical Basis of Life."

which the artificially produced substances lack. Moreover, chemistry is unable to produce an organ. Much <sup>organ.</sup> less can it hope to produce an organism. It is powerless to explain why the materials so combine that life results. The products of chemistry always want the properties and characteristic of life, e. g., growth, <sup>organism.</sup> nutrition, propagation. The persistence of these acts, their concentrated action, the fixity of the specific type, the permanence of the individual throughout the stages of its growth, the transmission of life by generation are characteristics of the living organism which science is utterly unable to imitate.<sup>17</sup> The chemists may analyze and combine, but cannot produce the living being. The germ of life is wanting.

§ 21. Mr. Tyndall admits that the chemist can produce organic substances, but says that life can come only from demonstrable antecedent life.<sup>18</sup> What makes, asks Mr. Preyer, the materials of a seed or of an egg so combine that life results from their activity? In vain does chemistry grope for an answer.<sup>19</sup> Mr. Haeckel bids us look to carbon for the cause, but does not tell *how* it is.<sup>20</sup>

§ 22. Again the methods of chemistry and the meth- <sup>methods of</sup> <sup>chemistry</sup> <sup>and of life.</sup> ods of life are totally different. Chemistry employs electric currents and excessive heat to obtain certain results. Life employs gentle means and an ordinary temperature; nothing seems forced and the activities maintain a normal mode.

§ 23. If chemical qualities cannot explain life, with <sup>conclusion.</sup> greater reason they are powerless to solve the problem

<sup>17</sup> D'Hulst Melang. Philos., p. 170 sq.

<sup>18</sup> Belfast Add. Prof. Tulloch Modern Theories in Philosophy and Religion, p. 157.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Lange History of Materialism, vol. III, p. 61, note.

<sup>20</sup> Ib., p. 56.

of mind. The attempt, however, has been made. Molleschott, ex. gr., held that "without phosphorus, there is no thought." Feuerbach adopted this; and Tyndall cites it in *Fragments of Science*.<sup>21</sup> But why phosphorus? No reason is given. It is an arbitrary assumption. Furthermore, the brains of the two animals proverbially stupid, ex. gr., sheep and goose, show the most phosphorus.

(b) Physical qualities.

§ 24. (b) But may not *physical* qualities of the brain supply the explanation we seek? By physical qualities are understood the number, depth and variety of the convolutions. Of this theory M. Topinard is the most eloquent exponent. The convolutions contain the grey substances, on the amount of which intelligence depends, hence he says the more numerous are the convolutions, the more grey matter is had.

criticism.

§ 25. If intelligence depend on the convolutions, experiments would be in its favor. Nevertheless some animals possess remarkable instinct who have smooth skulls, e. g., squirrel, rat, mouse, beaver. On the other hand the ox and cow have many convolutions in the skull, yet are by no means remarkable for intelligence. According to this criterion the elephant should be more highly gifted than man; the ass and sheep should be the equal of the elephant and superior to the dog; and the woman should be the inferior of man. Again the brain of man and of the chimpanzee are very much alike in structure; yet there is a vast difference in intelligence.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, there are examples of men who were highly gifted in mental powers, yet whose brains were not more complex than the ordinary brain, and, on the contrary, instances of

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Scient. Materialism*.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Quatrefazes "Human Species."

brains remarkable for convolutions without any sign of great endowments.<sup>23</sup>

§ 26. Finally regularity is by no means a necessary condition. Bichet, who held this opinion, is said to have had one hemisphere smaller than the other. Experience shows that intelligence is compatible with small, unsymmetrical and badly formed skulls. There may be exceptions to our reasoning. Let us grant that there are. We contend that Materialism should not base a theory upon exceptions. It is not scientific. Furthermore, their conclusion should have the force of a physical universality. If not, it falls to the ground; for they contend to establish a physical law.<sup>24</sup>

§ 27. Science, therefore, is powerless to prove the strict correlation of intelligence to the size or structure of the brain. As a final resource they appeal to occult qualities. Thus Ferrier writes "There is in the head an Unknown which science has not yet been able to determine." But how bitterly have they ridiculed such a position in endeavoring to explain the source of life!<sup>25</sup> They are compelled to make the admission because there is in the human brain something which is not matter, but is independent of matter in existence and action, viz., a spiritual soul or mind.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Calderwood *Relations of Brain and Mind*, pp. 24, 503.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. P. Janet "*Le Cerveau et la Pense.*"

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Huxley "*Physical Basis of Life*" in *Lay Sermons*, p. 137.

<sup>27</sup> "The alleged scientific principle," writes Prof. Ladd, "of psycho-physical parallelism, is far from being the self-evident conclusion of modern psycho-physical research which it is so often and so rashly assumed to be. Even the simplest relations between the phenomena of the lowest order of consciousness and the concomitant cerebral activities, are far too fluctuating, complicated and changeable to be subsumed under this principle. Of parallelism in space we cannot speak appropriately in this connection. Of parallelism in time there



## II.

*The Localization of Function.*

objection  
stated.

§ 28. A strong objection to the Spirituality of the soul is drawn from the attempt to fix the basis of our activities in different parts of the brain, i. e., from localization of function. The aim is to show that the soul is not one principle, but a collection of many principles; and that in its existence and action it is bound up completely with the organs, and hence organic, not inorganic. The contention appears the stronger and the more specious because it contains an element of truth. A careful analysis will unfold its full meaning and enable us to estimate its true force.

not a new  
conviction.

§ 29. The conviction that certain activities of the soul are organic or connected in some special manner with particular parts of the human body is no discovery of recent times, but is as old and widespread as human nature, and is revealed in the phrases of every language. Thus we say that the eye sees, that the brain thinks, that the heart feels. In the present century, however, the attempt was made to investigate this line of thought and to throw the conclusions into scientific form.

Gall.

§ 30. Gall based his protests against the ultra spiritualistic school of Des Cartes on physiological grounds. He set forth his system in a work of four volumes.<sup>27a</sup> In it are contained the two principles

is only an incomplete and broken analogy. And when one tries to think out clearly the conception of a complete qualitative parallelism, one finds the principle soon ending in inadequacy, and finally becoming unintelligible and absurd." Ladd Phil. of Mind, p. 344.

<sup>27a</sup> "Anatomy and Physiology of the Nervous System and of the Brain," 1810-1817.

characteristic of his system. (a) The human brain is the instrument of all the higher powers in man, and each faculty is located in a very circumscribed portion. (b) The outer form and shape of the skull exactly corresponds to the inner form and shape of the brain, so that by an examination of the protuberances we may infer the inclinations and degrees of the faculties. Gall marked out twenty-six and Spurzheim thirty-five portions of the skull which were considered the organs of distinct propensities, as, ex. gr., murder, theft, wit, secretiveness, etc.<sup>28</sup>

§ 31. This theory is unscientific, is based on arbitrary assumptions and has been completely discredited by Physiology and Anatomy.<sup>29</sup> His classification of the faculties is of no value whatever; the method is unscientific and he confounds sense with intellect. The assignment of the faculties to so many different areas of the skull is purely imaginary, is false and is held up to ridicule by contemporary science. The second principle has been likewise discarded. Experiment has shown that the badger, the fox and dog have brains almost identical, yet how unlike are their skulls! Again in man the skull varies in thickness, and a membrane may be found between skull and brain, thus destroying the similarity of conformation.<sup>30</sup> Gall criticised.

§ 32. The theory of Gall has failed, but interest in the study of the human brain has steadily increased. The peculiar shape of the head, its complexity, the different lobes, etc., naturally excite the curiosity of the student and lead to experiments as to the functions of the parts and their mutual relations. The methods interest in brain study.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Dr. Bastian "the Brain as an organ of mind," ch. X.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Sully The Human Mind I, p. 50.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Surbled Le Cerveau.

pursued in the investigation are more scientific and the conclusions are carefully tested. Hence the department of cerebral Physiology, which is the product of our own times.<sup>31</sup> The results obtained by these investigations are very interesting, and at first sight may seem to be a strong objection to the doctrine set forth in the preceding chapter. To make the criticism more exact, it is necessary to classify the facts.<sup>32</sup>

(1°) Sensation.

§ 33. (1°) *Sensation*: M. Broca, in 1861, obtained the first scientific result by localizing the centre of articulate speech in the third frontal convolution near the fissure of Sylvius and the island of Reil.<sup>33</sup> The way was opened to some important discoveries.<sup>34</sup> Thus, ex. gr., (a) The phenomena of *Aphasia* have been connected with an injury to this convolution. These pathological facts are complex and are like the phenomena observed in acquiring a language.<sup>35</sup> Sometimes complete aphasia is found, as in fever; after recovery speech may return, ex. gr., Card. Messofanti, or it must be again learned.<sup>36</sup> More frequently, however, it is

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Encyc. Brittan. art. Physiology.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Six Lectures on Cerebral Localization delivered by Prof. Donaldson before the Boston Medico-Psychological Society Feb. and March, 1891, and found in Amer. Jour. of Psych., vol. 4, 1891-92, p. 113 sq.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Broca's Convolution as told by himself in Bulletin de la Soc. Anthropol. de Paris, 1861, p. 326; La circonvolution de Broca, par G. Herve, Paris, 1888.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Sully The Human Mind, vol. I, 312, 354; James Psych., vol. I, p. 30 sq.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Ribot Diseases of the Memory.

<sup>36</sup> "A case is recorded by Dr. Hun, of Albany, the sufferer being a blacksmith, thirty-five years of age, who, after a long walk under a burning sun, was seized with symptoms of congestion of the brain, and for several days lay in a state of stupor. When he recovered from this state he understood what was said to him, but had great difficulty in expressing his desires in words, on account of which he resorted to signs to convey his meaning. If the name of a thing he wished was uttered in his hearing, he would say "Yes, that

partial; at times some words are retained, e. g., "no doubt," an oath, etc.; again certain letters or figures are lost; or technical words only are remembered; or a class of words cannot be recalled, e. g., nouns; or the person affected cannot speak, but can sing, and vice versa.<sup>37</sup>

§ 34. (b) Writing memory, i. e., **agraphy**, has been localized at the basis of the second frontal convolution of the left hemisphere. A lesion here causes the loss of writing movements. The phenomena are varied also and very strange, e. g., the person affected can write music only, or can write his name, or a few words only. (c) Auditory Aphasia or Verbal Deafness is located in the first and second temporal convolution of the left hemisphere along the fissure of Sylvius. In this case the word is heard as a noise or sound, not as a sign of language.<sup>38</sup> Verbal deafness is complete or partial, e. g., a student cannot understand French, or a certain number of words or musical sounds.<sup>39</sup>

is it," but he still continued unable to name it. After fruitless attempts to repeat a word, Dr. Hun wrote it for him, and then he would begin to spell it letter by letter, and after a few trials was able to pronounce it. If the writing were now taken from him he could no longer pronounce it, but after long study of the written word and frequent repetitions, he would learn it so as to retain it, and afterwards use it. He kept a slate on which the words he required most were written, and to this he referred when he wished to express himself. He gradually learned these words, and extended his vocabulary so that after a time he was able to dispense with his slate." In Dublin Quart. Journal, p. 53, Feb., 1891, cit. by Calderwood *Mind and Brain*, p. 392.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Ferrier "The Functions of the Brain," § 99; cf. W. A. Hammond *Treatise on the Diseases of the Nervous System*, ch. VII; Dr. Bateman "Aphasia."

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Carpenter *Mental Physiology*, p. 437 sq.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *Mind* III, p. 157; Sully *The Human Mind*, vol. I, p. III; Dr. Allen Starr "The Pathology of Sensory Aphasia" *Brain*, July, 1889.

(d) verbal  
blindness.

§ 35. (d) Finally *verbal blindness* has been traced to a lesion of the second parietal convolution in the left hemisphere a little above the organ of verbal memory. In this case the person sees the writing, but cannot read it, like a child who has not yet learned the letters; it is a foreign language to him; there is no connection between the sign and the idea signified. Instances of partial verbal blindness are very singular, e. g., for words, but not for syllables; or for syllables, not for letters; or for letters, not for figures; or for Arabic, not for Roman figures. The localization of these sensitive activities is placed beyond doubt. Contemporary science admits their truth.<sup>40</sup>

2° nervous  
movement.

§ 36. (2°) *Nervous Movement*: The localization of motor centres was proposed in 1861 by Mr. Hughlings Jackson. In 1870 Fritsch and Hitzig found that by touching certain parts of the brain with an electric current, muscular action in the body was the result. Ferrier, Duret, de Carville continued the experiments on the same line.<sup>41</sup> It was found that the principal

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Dict. of Psych. Medecine by H. Tuke under "Memory;" Annales de Phil. Cretienne Avril, '87; Farges "Le Cerveau L'ame," p. 181 foll.; Transactions of Congress of American Physicians and Surgeons, 1888, vol. 1, p. 278. Ferrier and Munk attempted to localize the sense of sight, touch, smell and hearing, but they do not agree in the results obtained. Goltz says that the hypothesis which teaches that circumscribed centers subserve special functions in the cerebral cortex is untenable. cf. Mind, April, 1882. And G. Croom Robertson, influenced by the data presented, inclines to Goltz's opinion in preference to Ferriers'. Ib. cf. also, James Prin. of Psychology I, p. 31; Mind, vol. V, p. 89; vol. VII, p. 299.

<sup>41</sup> Hitzig's and Ferrier's results were confirmed by the N. Y. Society of Neurology. cf. N. Y. Med. Jour., March, 1875; also Localization of Function in Jour. of Anat. and Physiol. V. XII; Boston Med. and Surgical Jour. V, 91; Calderwood Brain and Mind, ch. IV; Psychological Review, 1895, vol. 2, p. 33.

groups of voluntary muscles could be put into action by exciting the parietal or the posterior half of the frontal lobe, hence the so-called "motor zone," i. e., the convolutions about the fissure of Rolando. Again a paralysis of these muscles was superinduced by removing the corticle coating of the same lobes. Yet functions, impeded by an operation on the cerebral cortex, are found to be restored by the vicarious action on the part of the centres surrounding the lost part.<sup>42</sup> These discoveries have been utilized in surgery. Thus successful operations, e. g., for epilepsy, contractures, paralysis have been performed.<sup>43</sup>

§ 37. (3°) *Reason*: Made confident by the success in <sup>3° Reason.</sup> localizing the centres of sensation and of nervous activity, Physiologists claim that certain parts of the brain are the areas of the rational faculties. Adopting the same method as in the preceding cases, they have exerted all their ingenuity to locate these centres. That a faculty be localized it is necessary, that (a) it should be isolated from all other activities; (b) that an organic lesion suppresses the activity connected with it; (c) that by the cure of the lesion the act is restored. Can these conditions be verified for the higher acts of the soul, e. g., the abstract idea, the judgment, reasoning, free choice, hatred, love, etc.?

§ 38. Science in vain seeks a favorable answer. The very nature of these activities so opposite to sense and motor acts show the futility of the attempt. The confessed inability of experimentators to map out the areas of thought shows that they are dealing with a problem which eludes the blade of the scalpel and lies

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Ravisson *Rapport sur la Philos. du XIX Siecle*, p. 189.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Dr. Ferrier "The Functions of the Brain," ch. IX, § 72; Mr. Hersley in *Phil. Trans.* V. 179, p. 205.

beyond the reach of the electric current. There is no ground to assign the intellectual powers to the "silent parts of the brain." These parts may be the seat of inhibitory powers controlling the nervous system. Hence we conclude that intelligence has its seat nowhere in particular but has relation to all parts of the brain.<sup>44</sup>

conclusion.

§ 39. The examination and classification of the efforts made by scientists to localize the activities of the soul in certain portions of the cerebral cortex places the objection in its full and true light. Far from weakening, it only strengthens our line of reasoning. To prove the spirituality of the soul it is not necessary nor is it the aim to show that all its activities are independent of the bodily organs.<sup>45</sup> The purpose is to show that the higher faculties — those distinctive and characteristic of man, are inorganic. The arguments presented to substantiate this position were strong, and when taken together have an overwhelming force. The failure to localize the higher faculties must be considered as an additional argument in favor of the thesis.

Our thesis  
strengthened by :

failure to  
localize  
higher  
faculties.

by success  
in localiz-  
ing sense  
and motor-  
activities

§ 40. In like manner the success obtained in localizing nervous and sense-activity only strengthens our position. In proving the spirituality of the soul a distinction was drawn between the organic and the inorganic faculties. The organic activities are not independent of the body; on the contrary, they require the intrinsic co-operation of parts of the body. If I see with my eye, hear with my ear, speak with my mouth, it is only natural that Physiologists should attempt to trace the optic and auditory nerves and the vocal

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Ferrier, ch. VII; James Psych. I, p. 64, n; Dr. Surbled *Le Cerveau*, p. 165; Calderwood *Brain and Mind*, p. 316; Farges *Le Cerveau L'ame*.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. chapter on Spirituality of the Soul.

chords to certain parts of the brain and that they should do it successfully. All this is within their legitimate sphere. In localizing motor-centres and sensitive acts, they have done no more than what was from the beginning admitted they might do. Thus their very success as well as their failure prove the spirituality of the human soul.<sup>46</sup>

### III.

#### PSYCHO-PHYSICS.

§ 41. The efforts made especially in Germany <sup>Psycho-Physics.</sup> during late years to bring the methods of the physical sciences to bear upon the investigations in psychology have given rise to the department of Psycho-Physics. By an abundant use of mathematical formulas this new branch of study lays claim to the name of a science. Its object is the measurement of Psychic acts; its real aim and influence are materialis-

<sup>46</sup> The distinction of intellect from sense and nerve-movements; the impossibility of localizing the former; the localization of the two latter, is held by Lotze. Cf. *Outlines of Psychology*, ed. by Prof. Ladd, pp. 138-142. "One clear result is," writes Mr. Calderwood, "in all known living organisms Brain is the chief organ of Sensori-motor activity. \* \* \* Accordingly, the leading demands upon the organ are these: To supply nerve energy adequate to keep the whole sensori-motor apparatus in condition for functional activity; to provide for transmission of impulse, whether occasioned by external impact, or by visceral or other internal excitation; and to secure co-ordination of all sensory and muscular activity according to the requirements of animal life. These are the functions common to the brain, as a grand centre of a nervous system. The marvellously complex forms of sensibility and activity natural to the higher orders of animals are all dependent on the nerve-system, and all the multifarious combinations requisite within the unity of animal life are provided for by action within the great central body—the Brain." L. c., p. 196. Yet he shows that sensori-motor activity is the antithesis of intelligent action. *Ib.*, p. 203.



tic; and its existence as a science is to Materialists the one direct proof of their position.

its basis

§ 42. It is a fact that sensations differ in *quality*, thus, ex. gr., sound differs from sight. It is a fact also that they differ in quantity, i. e., in intensity, in duration, in extension. By intensity is meant the vividness or strength; by duration is understood the time taken up in the production; by extension reference is made to the bodily surface affected.

Weber and Fechner.

§ 43. To explain the fact that sensations differ in intensity and duration, Weber, of Leipsic (1840), spent twenty years of experiment. He inferred a law that sensation grows with equal increments, when the excitation grows with relatively equal increments. This furnished a basis for the studies of Fechner. In 1860 he published in two volumes the "Elements of Psycho-Physics." By psycho-physics he understood an exact theory of the relations of soul and body, of the physical and psychical world. In this work he attempted to formulate a law ruling the exact quantitative measurement of all mental acts. He hoped to obtain indirectly what Herbert failed to get directly.<sup>47</sup> Thus a new department of study was opened, which was eagerly taken up and developed by Helmholtz, Donders, Delboeuf, Wundt, Markel and Hall.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Falckenburg Hist. of Phil., p. 603.

<sup>48</sup> Prof. Jastrow makes a distinction between Weber and Fechner; he says that the Psycho-physical methods are applicable only to such experiments as can be utilized for establishing Weber's law, that Fechner's law can be deduced from Weber's experiments only by the use of a series of assumptions hardly one of which is even probably justifiable; that the function and value of Weber's law depends on "its furnishing (it may be within limits) a means of comparing the sensibility of different incommensurate senses." He makes this distinction with the object "to clear the way for a more rational system of Psycho-physics, by directing future experi-

§ 44. (a) *Intensity*: Fechner thought that he could <sup>(a) intensity.</sup> explain the intensity of the sensation by discovering the relation which existed between it and the external stimulus. His aim was to estimate the intensity of the effect from the intensity of the cause. He found that the intensity of the sensation was not proportionate to the intensity of the stimulus; but was augmented as the logarithm of the stimulus. He took as the unit of measurement the smallest perceptible difference in sensations. Thus he found that a constant ratio, different however for the kind of sensation, prevails between the production of a sensation consciously distinguishable from a previous mental state and the quantity of the stimulus required. Hence the famous law of Fechner: "To increase the intensity in arithmetical progression the stimulus must be increased in geometrical progression;" thus, ex. gr., that the sensation be one, two or three times stronger, the stimulus must be increased from ten to 100 to 1,000.<sup>49</sup>

§ 45. (1) It is not a universal or a rigorous law. <sup>criticism</sup>  
Wundt admits, "For sound the concordance is most <sup>(1) not</sup> precise; for sight, pressure and motion, it has a more <sup>universal</sup> restricted value; for temperature and taste it is abso- <sup>or rigor-</sup>lutely uncertain; for smell and general sensibility there are no experiments." Hence, he concludes, that "the law of Weber has not a universal value; it is applied only to certain sensorial domains, and agrees approximately with most of them only within certain limits."<sup>50</sup>

mentation into that path in which it is most promising of results, and thus preventing the employment of the *many uncritical and unanalyzed processes now current.*" Cf. A Critic of Psycho-Physic Methods in Amer. Jour. of Psych., vol. I, Feb., 1888.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Ladd Elements of Physiological Psychology.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. James "Psychology, vol. I, p. 533 sq., where he criticises the practical importance and the theoretic interpretation

Hering, of Prague, holds that the law is of value when applied to normal stimulation and to a very narrow range above and below, which he calls the "range of sensibility."<sup>51</sup> Thus, when the stimulus has been increased to a certain strength, the sensation shows no appreciable gain, ex. gr., a very powerful sound; the difference between the central and peripheral portions of the sun's disk is not noticeable; a prolonged stimulation produces dullness, fatigue, monotony.

(8) limited  
in range.

§ 46. (2) It is not applicable to the whole range of mental life. Thought cannot be reduced to the category of material quantity. When we say that one desire is stronger than another, or that one spiritual being is greater than another, we mean not material but virtual quantity, which in Scholastic phraseology is another term for the greater or less perfection of a being. Furthermore, the process of measurement is based on the unit of sensation. This unit is found to vary for different sensations. But how may we hope to obtain units for the higher powers? Hence the higher spiritual life of thought and of volition cannot be subjected to quantitative measurement.

(8) even  
then ques-  
tioned:

(a) sensa-  
tion not a  
mere  
impulse.

§ 47. (3) Even when restricted within the sphere of sensation, its statements are questioned. (a) Sensation is not simply an external impulse; its total and adequate cause includes a subjective element, i. e., the excitability of the sensitive organ; in other words, the actual power of reaction possessed by the organ and derived from the soul which informs it. In overlooking the subjective element, they have neglected the prin-

of Weber's law. cf. also, vol. I, p. 616; Sully Human Mind, vol. I, pp. 88, 89; "A New Instrument for Weber's Law," by J. Leuba, in Amer. Jour. of Psych., 1892-93, vol. 5, p. 370.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. German Psychology, Ribot, ch. V.

cipal cause of the sensitive act. The subjective conditions of age, of temperament, of present attention, etc., cause variations in sensation. This explains how it is that two equal impulses can produce different sensations and vice versa.

§ 48. (b) Again they seem to assume that the *quality* <sup>(b) quality varies.</sup> of the sensation does not vary. Consciousness testifies that the quality of sensations is not always preserved intact. Thus, ex. gr., a notable increase in intensity of the sensations of light, of sound, etc., causes change also in the quality, ex. gr., the beautiful and the sublime.<sup>52</sup> Fechner supposes that sensations are multiples. He says the unit of intensity is the least perceptible difference between two sensations, and thus by considering sensations as multiples of this unit he could quantify them. But a sensation as such is indivisible. And the character of the unit is very questionable.<sup>53</sup> (c) Most recent writers contend that the law is not *psychological*, but only *physiological*, i. e., they attribute to properties of the nerve-structures the necessity of greater stimulus in order to effect an appreciable change in the sensation.<sup>54</sup> Prof. Tichener, of Cornell, gives to Weber's law a purely physiological interpretation; on the nature of mind he is content with psycho-physical parallelism and leaves the question to metaphysics, holding that it does not pertain to Psychology.<sup>55</sup>

§ 49. (b) *In duration*: To this study the title Psychometry has been given. Its leaders are Helmholtz, Donders, Exner, Hermann, Wundt, etc. A mental <sup>(b) duration.</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Ladd Phys. Psych., p. II c5.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Sully Human Mind, vol. I, p. 89; Davis Elements of Psych., p. 435.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. James Psychology I, p. 548; Sully "Human Mind" I, p. 89.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Outlines of Psychology by E. B. Tichener.

operation can be measured in time, (1) if it is composed of many successive acts, e. g., syllogistic reasoning, etc., the estimation of motives preparatory to a deliberate choice; (2) or if the same act be prolonged, e. g., the contemplation of beautiful landscape, the study of the work of art; (3) or if the act be produced gradually so that a certain time elapse in the production.

§ 50. A spiritual operation, e. g., an act of thought or of will, may have duration in the first two cases and can therefore be measured; but not in the third way. By virtue of its very nature it passes from potency to act, i. e., is produced instantaneously. Consciousness assures us of this fact. On the contrary, a sensation or organic act may have duration in all three ways, e. g., we may have a train of sensations, or the same sensation may be prolonged, or it may be produced successively, e. g., from thumb, to hand, to whole arm.

§ 51. Thus, ex. gr., the time of the transmission of a neural action through a definite nerve length has been ascertained by experiment<sup>56</sup> to be about 111 feet a second. The interval between a shock on one hand and the response with the other has been found to be 0.15 of a second; this is called reaction time. The reaction time varies according to the expectation of the patient, the degree of his attention, the intensity of the stimulus, and the "personal equation," i. e., the natural quickness and habits of the person. In like manner, by the automatic registration of a galvanic chronoscope the time taken to distinguish one of two sensations, e. g., colors, called discernment time, varies from 0.1 to 0.03

<sup>56</sup> The mechanical instruments employed to measure the reaction time are Ludwig's Kyniograph, Marcy's Chronograph and Exner's Psychodometer. Cf. James Psychology, vol. I, p. 87.

of a second.<sup>57</sup> These results present no difficulty. The data for calculation are too inaccurate for use, as Wundt admits,<sup>58</sup> and Mr. James expresses "doubts as to the strict psychologic worth of any of these measurements," (vol. I, p. 524, n.). Our thesis concerns only inorganic acts. The higher powers of mind are beyond the reach of these experiments;<sup>59</sup> and again, "The proper psychological outcome of the new department of Psycho-Physics is just nothing."<sup>60</sup>

§ 52. (c) That sensations are extended is a fact of individual experience, e. g., in the sense of touch, a scald on the arm is greater in extension than the prick of a needle. The efforts made to find the discriminative sensibility of different parts of the body, lie within the limits of Physiology.<sup>61</sup> in the prolongation of a sensation.

§ 53. The objection drawn from Psycho-Physics is not so formidable when closely examined. It does not even touch the position we hold. Its leading defenders candidly confess its limitations. The conclusion, therefore, is obvious. Each objection analyzed and explained is in reality an indirect argument for the higher nature of our soul. Science, sifted of all imaginations and assumptions, vindicates the contention of sound philosophy and proclaims the true dignity of man.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Science, Sept. 10, 1886; Mind XI, p. 377.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. James L. c., p. 89.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. James L. c., p. 94; Ribot's German Psychology, ch. VIII.

<sup>60</sup> Mr. James Psychology V. I, p. 534.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Ladd Elements of Phys. Psych., p. 405; Sully Human Mind, vol. I, p. 106.

## PANTHEISM.

§ 1. The objections against the spirituality of the soul, which were examined in the preceding chapter, have been proposed in the name of science. They are of recent origin and carry to the mind of the reader a conviction which ordinarily accompanies the carefully selected data, the exact methods, the rigid reasonings of modern science. In this case, however, the strength was in appearance only; under the severe test of logic and of fact the idle boastings have been shattered.

difficulties  
of Philoso-  
phy.

§ 2. Philosophy also has its difficulties. They call for a solution as clear and as convincing. Under new forms they constantly reappear in the history of the human mind. The words, the phrases, the considerations in their favor, the principles from which they spring, may clothe them in the vigor of youth; yet when freed from the circumstances of time and place, they stand forth as passing phases of errors as ancient as the records of human speculation.

What Pan-  
theism is.

§ 3. A false system of philosophy which seems to have a fascination for the speculative mind is Pantheism. As has been shown, Materialism and Positivism attack the very existence of the soul; Pantheism denies its true nature. The former contend that matter only exists; that everything can be ultimately resolved into material elements; that a super-organic or spiritual world is a non-entity; that God, the soul, etc., are illusions. The latter holds that every existing being is a manifestation of or an evolution from some primordial essence, which pervades creation; that particular things have the same common nature; that as a consequence *one* being alone exists, which is all in all.

## I.

## MODERN PANTHEISM.

§ 4. We pass by the Pantheism of the Eleatic school represented by Xenophanes, Parmenides and Melissus; that of the Neo-Platonists, Plotinus and Proclus; or its phases as proposed by Erigena and Avicennes in the middle ages. These forms have an interest to the student of history. Modern Pantheism requires careful examination; its influence has been wide and profound; its teachers have held a leading place as thinkers and as men of letters; it has been boldy and persistently proposed as a system of thought, which alone answers the problems of existence, and satisfies the highest, noblest aspirations of the heart. <sup>modern pantheism.</sup>

1°. *Spinoza* (1632-1677).

§ 5. Spinoza may be considered the father of modern Pantheism. An ardent disciple of Des Cartes, he found himself in full sympathy with the reactionary movement against the philosophy of Aristotle and the Schoolmen. Unfortunately he pushed the principles of his master to an extreme. <sup>Spinoza.</sup>

§ 6. Des Cartes defined substance to be that which exists of itself so that it needs no other thing for its existence. From this Spinoza inferred that one substance alone existed; that it was infinite and was what is called God. He taught that this substance by a power of self-determination expresses itself in matter and in thought. The world of matter and of thought are, therefore, revelations of the absolute truth. They are both real, but independent of each other; hence we cannot conceive of body acting on mind or of mind acting on body. But matter and thought exist as two parallel <sup>teaching.</sup>



series; the more perfect is the body, the more perfect is the mind. Thus my mind is only a part of God's mind; my body is part of His embodied substance. "I declare," he writes, "the human mind to be a part of nature, namely, because I hold that in nature there exists an infinite power of thinking, which power, so far as it is infinite, contains ideally the whole of nature, in such wise that its thoughts proceed in the same fashion as nature herself, being, in fact, the ideal mirror thereof. Hence follows that I hold the human mind to be simply the same power, not so far as it is infinite and perceives the whole of nature, but so far as it perceives alone the human body; and thus I hold our human mind to be part of this infinite intellect."<sup>1</sup>

influence.

§ 7. The influence of Spinoza upon modern thought has been very great. His fundamental principle, e. g., that the one substance has two attributes, matter and thought, especially underlies the attempt of contemporary English Psychologists to explain the union of soul and of body, i. e., the Double-Aspect Theory. His ethics was the constant companion of Goethe; his Pantheism was by Shelling harmonized with Idealism; the "Absolute" of the latter was the "*natura naturans*" of Spinoza.<sup>2</sup> But he had no great disciple to propose his theory in whole or in part; nor can he be said to have formed a school, whose position and number are clearly and sharply defined.<sup>3</sup>

## 2°. *German Pantheism.*

teaching  
of Kant.

§ 8. Kant cannot be accused of Pantheism. His principle, however, as developed by his followers, led

<sup>1</sup> Spinoza Ep. XXXII.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Essays by E. Caird, vol. I, "Goethe."

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Essays in Literat. and Philos., by E. Caird, vol. II, p. 332.

immediately and directly to a Pantheistic doctrine which in one form or another has profoundly moved the German mind for the past hundred years. Kant held that the mind perceives not objects as they really exist independent of us, but the appearances only as they are in the mind; hence the word *phenomenon* with him is something ideal not real. The object itself is unknown. The speculative reason, therefore, gave *subjective* truth, i. e., the truth of its ideal appearance, as covered over with the forms of thought, not *objective* truth, i. e., the truth of the object itself as independent of the mind.<sup>4</sup>

§ 9. He recognized, however, that we need objective truth; hence he invented the *practical* reason in order to pass from the subjective to the objective. This method was critically examined by his successors and rejected as insufficient and imaginary.<sup>5</sup>

§ 10. Another method was sought and believed to be found in identifying the subject thinking and the object thought. The absolute unity of substance, which is at the same time the ego and non-ego, the subject and object, the ideal and the real, seemed to be a legitimate solution of the difficulty. It follows from this that one substance alone exists. In proposing this explanation, however, and in setting forth its true nature its defenders separate into widely diverging camps.

### *Fichte* (1762-1814).

§ 11. Fichte maintained that things unknown are to us as nothing; the only real thing, therefore, is the *Ego*.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Critic of Pure Reason Transc. Aesth., p. 34, Muller's trans.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Essays in Literature and Philos., by E. Caird, vol. II, p. 431.

(a) The external world is the projection of the Ego, the product of my unconscious act; hence the world about me has existence only as a manifestation of spirit. Inasmuch as the Ego by its activity produces external things, they have a reality only in the mind which by thinking creates them; thus when the mind ceases to think, they cease to exist.

“We are no other than a moving row  
Of magic shadow-shapes that come and go.”<sup>6</sup>

(b) the  
relation of  
the ego to  
the deeper  
self.

§ 12. (b) He then attempted to explain the relation of my conscious self to the deeper Self. The solution he proposes is that there is only one Spirit — the spirit of nature; that the conscious self is the transient expression of the one Spirit or the deeper Self; that the private thought is the passing shadow of the divine universal thought. With Fichte, therefore, the *ego* is the only reality. His system, as justly been termed, Transcendental Egoism.

### *Schelling.*

teaching.

§ 13. Schelling (1775-1854), at first the disciple, became afterwards the critic of Fichte. His teaching is the exact reverse of his early master. Schelling held that one being alone has real existence; this being he called the *Absolute*. By its own essential activity the Absolute evolves and manifests itself; the manifestation results in the world of nature and of man. Hence his great division of Nature Philosophy and of Transcendental Philosophy. The world around us shows the struggle of this one divine spirit to manifest itself in countless varying forms until in man it attains the

<sup>6</sup> Omar Khayyam in Rubaiya.

consciousness of itself; this is the end and the crown of the whole evolution. The double manifestation of nature and of spirit reaches unity in the *Ego*, which embraces both subject and object in its concept.

§ 14. With Fichte the *ego* was real; was the creator; the subject. With Schelling, on the contrary, the *Absolute* was real; it was the universal mind, in which subject and object were identified; the finite mind being only a phase in the manifestation of the infinite mind. To Schelling reason is a faculty transcending all finite experience, hence, he says, it is not personal; it is the all-seeing eye confronting itself, gazing upon eternal realities; my own deeper, truer self is nature, the one great life permeating and vivifying all, the one, divine, absolute spirit. The system of Schelling has been rightly called "Objective Idealism" or the "Philosophy of the Absolute."

how different from Fichte.

§ 15. Schopenhauer is considered an off-shoot of Schelling; he puts the "will" in place of the "Absolute." His Pessimism is drawn from a study of Buddhism.<sup>7</sup> Hartman endeavored to reconcile Schopenhauer and Hegel. He retains the Pessimism of the former, and the evolution of the latter. His "Unconscious" is another term for the "will" and the "Idea." In literature Schelling is considered as having given rise to the Romantic School, ex. gr., the Schlegels, Novalis, etc. Through Coleridge, Schelling exerted great influence on the English and the American mind during the first half of the present century. Thus we account for its traces in Emerson, Parker and Alcott.<sup>8</sup>

influence of Schelling.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Caro "Le Pessimisme."

<sup>8</sup> In 1850 a French translation of Schelling appeared; the main source was Coldridge.

*Hegel.*

teaching :  
the con-  
cept of (a)  
pure being.

§ 16. The culmination in the development of Kant is reached in Hegel.<sup>9</sup> His system seems to be kind of compromise between Fichte and Schelling. (a) Hegel starts with the concept of pure and undetermined being. He says that the mind conceives of being as necessary or contingent, as eternal or temporal, as spiritual or material, as finite or infinite; that these are limitations of being and mutually exclusive of each other, e. g., the necessary excludes the contingent; hence an analysis of these reveals another concept which is outside of these limitations and yet contains them, i. e., the concept of pure being or of being viewed without determination or modes.

(b) not  
being.

§ 17. (b) He contends that the idea of pure being supposes the idea of not-being, for the mind cannot conceive the one without conceiving the other at the same time; and that the idea of pure being does not differ from the idea of not-being; hence he derives the concept of *no-being*. (c) This last concept he distinguishes from the concept of absolute nothing, for it is a medium between existing being and absolute nothing. Hegel calls this concept *To fieri*, i. e., *what is to be* or the *becoming*.<sup>10</sup>

(c) the  
*to fieri*.

The evolu-  
tion of the  
idea.

§ 18. All existing things are a manifestation and evolution of the *To fieri*. This evolution is seen (a) in abstract and metaphysical notions, hence the department of Logic; (b) in real existences and material phenomena, hence nature; (c) finally the idea rises to consciousness and manifests itself in the phenomena

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Wallace's Hegel Proleg., ch. VI.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Introd. to Hegel's Phil., by W. T. Harris; Hegel's Logic, by W. Harris.

of human thought, hence the world of man — the highest and most perfect of its manifestations.<sup>11</sup>

§ 19. *Criticism:* (a) The Idea of Hegel is nothing more than possible being; it is, therefore, abstract not real in itself; its evolution is an abstract evolution. Yet he assumes it to be real; just as he assumes thought and reality to be identical. The very basis, therefore, of his system is an assumption. (a) basis an assumption. (b) He denies the fundamental principles of reason, e. g., the principle of contradiction; ex. gr., according to him the *to fieri* is and is not at the same time. In fact, he holds that his theory cannot stand without assuming the falsity of this principle.<sup>12</sup> (b) contrary to principles of reason. (c) From its consequences. His system was at first favored by the German government and thus became the philosophy of the state. Soon, however, its assumptions and errors were discovered and exposed; his disciples thereupon separated into three schools. Strauss' "Life of Jesus" caused a division; hence the old and young Hegelians. With Strauss stand Fuerbach and Schmidt. Between is a third party, ex. gr., Rosenkrantz and Michelet. With Strauss, Philosophy of religion becomes a historical criticism of the Bible and Theology, hence the Mythical school of Biblical interpretation.<sup>13</sup> Strauss developed into Materialism and Atheism in "Old and New Faith," 1872, where he holds that culture is incompatible with Christianity, which is a religion of poverty; that the process of life is eternal, hence no need of a Creator; that the new religion is a cult of genius, which consists in sympathy (c) consequence.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Liberatore*, vol. II, pp. 19, 20.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Fr. Hecker, *Aspirations of Nature*, ch. X.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Strauss' "Life of Jesus," in which the Son of God is ideal Humanity, and "Christian Dogmatics."

with the highest efforts of humanity, hence his Positivism. Feuerbach ran more directly into Materialism. He holds that man is the sole subject of Philosophy; that Philosophy is opposed to religion as health is to disease; that religion arises from man objectifying his own essence; hence in opposition to Hegel he taught that self-consciousness is the *absolute* and in his God man knows himself.<sup>14</sup> The teaching of Strauss and Feuerbach reaches Sensualistic Egoism in Schmidt "Individual and his Property."<sup>15</sup>

influence.

§ 20. The influence of Hegel was, however, greater than that of Fichte or of Schelling. His philosophy spread into other countries and was modified by them. At present he divides with Kant the Pre-eminence in Idealistic philosophy. The leading Idealistic trend of thought in England and in America is either Neo-Kantian or Neo-Hegelian.<sup>16</sup>

### 3°. *The Vedanta.*

The Upanishads:

§ 21. Another source of modern Pantheism must be sought for in a land which in manner of life and in habits of thought is the direct antithesis of our Western civilization. The Hindus are a nation of philosophers. From the earliest times they have set the mind to solve the great problems of existence. Their attempts are found in the Upanishads, a collection of philosophical writings dating back to the sixth century, B. C., and in the various commentaries upon them, especially that of Sankara.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Fr. Hecker, *Aspirations of Nature*, ch. X; *Life of G. Eliot*, by G. W. Cooke, ch. IX.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Falckenberg *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, ch. XVI; *Philos. in Germany*, by W. Wundt, in *Mind*, vol. II, p. 493.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *Phil. of Relig.* Caird, pp. 229-241; *Present Day Tracts* No. 38 "F. Bauer," by Rev. A. B. Bruce.

§ 22. Schopenhauer says that the study of these <sup>their value.</sup> works has been the solace of his life;<sup>17</sup> Sir William Jones thinks that "Pythagoras and Plato derived their sublime theories from the same fountain as the sages of India;" Cousin sees "in this cradle of the human race the native land of the highest philosophy;" and Fred. Schelegel holds that "the loftiest philosophy of Europeans or the Idealism of the Greeks, in comparison with Oriental Idealism, is a feeble spark."<sup>18</sup>

§ 23. The problem of the Upanishads, is to explain <sup>The problem.</sup> the true nature of the soul and its relation to Brahma. The soul is called *Atman*, i. e., self; *Givatman*, i. e., living self; and after its substantial unity with Brahma had been discovered *Parama-Atman*, i. e., the highest self.<sup>19</sup> To Sankara the self, i. e., the *Atman*, is not what is commonly meant by the Ego, but lies far beyond. The Ego is our character and is made up of nationality, prejudices, language, body, senses, etc. These form only the involucra of the self.

§ 24. The higher knowledge is to know one's self as <sup>nature of the soul.</sup> identical with the Highest Self; this is called *Atman-Vidya*, i. e., the knowledge of one's self.<sup>20</sup> The true nature of the soul is the one's self; individuality is only a fiction, or rather an illusion;<sup>21</sup> what is real and true in the individual is the Self within and invisible, infinite divine, all-pervading.<sup>22</sup> Hence external things are only appearances; my own spirit is the one spirit; that

<sup>17</sup> Cf. S. B. E., vol. I, p. LVII.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Vedanta Philosophy, p. 8, by Max Muller.

<sup>19</sup> *Atman* in the Vedas, is a pronoun, e. g., *ipse, I*; afterwards it was used to express the ipseitas, i. e., the self. cf. Muller l. c. p. 21.

<sup>20</sup> S. B. E., vol. I, p. XXV.

<sup>21</sup> S. B. E., vol. XV, p. XXXVI.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Katha Upanished.



which alone exists, is the universally present impersonal Self.<sup>23</sup>

**Brahman.**

§ 25. The great principle of the Vedanta is that there can be only one Brahman. The soul is not a part of the divine Self; not a modification of the Divine Self; not different from the Divine Self; hence the Divine Self and the Human Self are one and the same substance. The fetters of Upadhis, i. e., the senses, cause the Highest Self to appear as conditioned and blinds us as to the substantial oneness of both. When this nescience of illusion is destroyed by Vidya, i. e., true knowledge, we can perceive that the soul is God: Tat Tvam Asi, i. e., Thou art It. "Thou canst not see the seer of the sight; thou canst not hear that, that hears the sound; thou canst not think the thinker of the thought; thou canst not know the knower of all knowledge. This is thy Self that is in all things that are."<sup>24</sup>

**Its influence.**

§ 26. This teaching is pure Pantheism. It has exerted wide influence in Europe and America. Schopenhauer, especially, is indebted to its doctrine. His Will corresponds to Brahman the subject of the world, the only true reality, the highest Self; his *Vorstellung* to the phenomenal world seen by us objectively, and recognized as unreal.<sup>25</sup>

## II.

### INFLUENCE.

**Influence in England.**

§ 27. From these three sources modern Pantheism has taken rise and has spread. We shall now briefly

<sup>23</sup> Williams' Buddhism, p. 105.

<sup>24</sup> Brih. Upan. III, 4.2; Mund. Upan. III, 1. 8; cf. especially the Katha Upanishad.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Colebrooke Essays; Prof. Gough, Phil. of the Upanishads; A Rational Refutation of Indian Phil. Systems by Dr. Hall.

trace its influence upon contemporary thought. From Germany the new teaching passed into England. German literature, e. g., Goethe, Richter, Novalis, was even more powerful than philosophy in spreading its tenets. Coleridge was a student and admirer of Schelling. He explained his master and thus introduced his system to English and American thinkers. Carlyle, by his translations of Goethe, e. g., Wilhelm Meister made thousands of readers familiar with that gifted mind. Coleridge was the theologian and philosopher, Carlyle the preacher and man of letters in the new intellectual awakening. The Ethical Idealism of Mr. Arnold can be traced to the same source.<sup>26</sup> Wordsworth, the Poet of Nature, also came under the influence. We find traces of its mystic thought, of the one spirit that speaks in man and in nature, breathing out of his poetry.<sup>27</sup>

Coleridge.

Carlyle.

Arnold.

Wordsworth.

“ For I have learned  
 To look on Nature, not as in the hour  
 Of thoughtless youth, but hearing oftentimes  
 The still sad music of humanity,  
 Nor harsh nor grating, though of ample power  
 To chasten and subdue. And I have felt  
 A presence that disturbs me with a joy  
 Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime  
 Of something far more deeply interfused,  
 Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,  
 And the sound ocean and the living air,  
 And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;  
 A motion and a spirit that impels  
 All thinking things, all objects of all thought,  
 And rolls through all things.”<sup>28</sup>

But Coleridge gave way to the theological reaction of the Oxford School and became eventually the parent of the Broad Church party, e. g., Maurice;

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Pfeiderer Devel of Theol., p. 330.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. E. Caird Essays, vol. I, Wordsworth.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Excursion.

Wordsworth made room for Tennyson, who became the poet of skepticism of his age; and the spirit of idealism was replaced by the empiricism of J. S. Mill. The English mind is too practical to remain long under the sway of Transcendental thought.

**In America.** § 28. The influence of these writers, however, spread to their American contemporaries. Transcendental philosophy found a foothold in New England. While its main source was German, through Coleridge and Carlyle, in reality it was eclectic. Cousin was widely read,<sup>29</sup> and traces of the Vedanta philosophy are found in Emerson. In New England, Transcendentalism spread through every sphere of life. Theology was platonic and mystic; it found its source in Fichte and Jacobi, in Herder and Schleiermacher. The attempt at the reform of society is illustrated in Brook Farm.<sup>30</sup> Leading men as Theo. Parker, Prof. Walker, W. H. Channing, Mr. Ripley, Mr. Brownson, in Boston Quarterly, Bronson Alcott became its propagators. Emerson, however, was the highest product and master-mind of the movement.<sup>31</sup>

**Emerson.** § 29. To Emerson the soul was supreme. By the soul he understood "the background of our being, an immensity not possessed and that cannot be possessed." The soul or mind is eternal, one, immanent and Self manifesting. It is within man so that the "Act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object are one." He writes

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *Specimens of For. Stand. Literature*, ed. by Geo. Ripley, 1838; *Brownson's Quarterly*, vol. I, p. 6; F. Hecker's *The Church and the Age*, ch. XII.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *Transcendentalism in New England*, by Frothingham, p. 158; *Brownson's Quart. Rev.*, vol. III, p. 409 sq.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *Brownson's Quarterly*, vol. III, p. 273; vol. IV, p. 421 sq.

that "the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; that I am part and parcel of God;" or that "man and the world are incarnations, projections of God." To him man is an infinite soul; and everything real is self-existent. "We see the world piece by piece," he tells us, "as the sun, the moon, the animal, the tree; but the whole, of which these are the shining parts, is the soul," or "the web of events is the flowing robe in which the soul is clothed;" and "through all persons appears this identical impersonal nature, which is God."<sup>32</sup> The same trend of thought is shown in his poetry.

"Onward and on the eternal Pan,  
Who layeth the world's incessant plan,  
Halteth never in one shape,  
But forever doth escape,  
Like wave or flame, into new forms  
Of germ and air, of plants and worms.  
I that to-day am a pine,  
Yesterday was a bundle of grass."

In the hymn to Brahma, Mr. Emerson puts into verse thoughts found in the *Katha Upanishad*.

If the red slayer thinks he slays,  
Or if the slain thinks he is slain  
They know not well the subtle ways  
I keep, and pass and turn again.

Far or forget to me is near;  
Shadow and sunlight are the same;  
The vanished gods to me appear;  
And one to me are shame and fame.

They reckon ill who leave me out;  
When me they fly, I am the wings;  
I am the doubter and the doubt,  
And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Nature*; *Over Soul*; *Spirit*; *Add. to Div. Students*, July 15, 1838; the *Transcendentalist*.

His Pan-  
theism.

§ 30. Emerson does not defend himself against the charge of Pantheism. That such is the trend of his teaching cannot be gainsaid. That a character of such singular sweetness, a mind of such delicacy and richness, should be brought under the sway of this teaching is in part due to the intellectual atmosphere of the time; for Transcendentalism was in its earliest stages, a reaction of the whole man from the narrow and Puritanical sensism which prevailed in New England. A deeper and more cogent reason is found in the man's mind. Emerson was not a consecutive thinker. He saw beautiful things and he saw deeply; but what he presented were only fragments. He never showed the least desire to connect these parts into a consecutive whole. Hence the strange disconnectedness which is seen in the sequence of his sentences.<sup>34</sup>

Dr. Royce. § 31. Transcendental philosophy in America has passed its meridian. It has died a natural death. Yet Emerson has left an influence behind him in his writings. Its best modern representative is Dr. Royce.<sup>35</sup> Dr. Royce proclaims himself an idealist, and holds that "the whole choir of heaven and earth" is nothing for any of us but a system of ideas which governs our belief and conduct; hence we never get beyond our own ideas, because all minds are in essence one; thus the whole world of ideas is essentially *one* world and so it is essentially the world of one's self and *That art Thou*.

§ 32. Dr. Royce has the spirit of Fichte, but not his teaching; he is an improvement on Fichte; he starts from an experimental basis and appeals for

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Azarias Phases of Thought and Criticism, ch. 3.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Spirit of Modern Philosophy, ch. XI.

proof to Berkeley. But Fichte and Berkeley are fundamentally opposed. Fichte is a pantheist, Berkeley a Christian; to Fichte all things are projections of the Ego; to Berkeley external objects have a reality in the mind of God. Hence he is an idealist with Berkeley, yet not a true disciple; he avoids the vagaries of Fichte, yet retains his Pantheism. The teaching of Dr. Royce is most properly termed a syncretism of the best elements of Idealistic Pantheism put into the most natural and strongest form. He admits a universal mind with Schelling; in setting forth the relation of our minds to the universal mind, he is a Vedantist and a disciple of Sankara, without however the spectre of transmigration. Unlike Hegel, he contends that the higher self is personal and conscious; nor does he fall into the strange contradictions of that philosopher. In the definition of matter as a "permanent possibility of sensation," he is a phenomenal Idealist with J. S. Mill.

§ 33. Such is a brief sketch of Transcendentalism in our own country. The influence and trend of thought was pantheistic; although not all those who came under its sway can be charged with Pantheism. Its antagonists were strong and powerful. Dr. Porter, of Yale, set forth the best of Trendelenberg, who in Germany led a reaction to Aristotle in the effort to reconstruct German philosophy demoralized by the failure of Hegel. Prof. Ladd is the disciple of Lotze, the last of the German metaphysicians; Prof. James is of the materialistic school; and Dr. McCosh, of Princeton, was the last and most consistent thinker of the Scottish School which for a century in England, in France and in America, withstood the philosophy of Sensism.

Its oppo-  
nents.

## III.

## THE NEO-HEGELIAN SCHOOL.

Origin.

§ 34. A sketch of modern Pantheism would not be complete without a reference to the Neo-Kantian or Neo-Hegelian school. The cry, "Back to Kant," raised by Beneke, Zeller and Fisher in Germany, was taken up in England and America.<sup>36</sup> The aim was to stem the tide of scientific materialism and agnosticism. In England, J. H. Sterling was the pioneer in his "Secret of Hegel," 1865. He was followed by J. Caird, "Introd. to Philosophy of Religion," 1880; Ed. Caird, "Crit. Philosophy of Kant," 2 vols., 1889; "Evolution of Religion," 1893; Green, "Prolegom. to Ethics," 1887; "Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion," by A. Sabatier, 1897; by Wallace, Bradley and Adamson.<sup>37</sup> In America the movement is carried on by W. T. Harris, U. S. Com. of Education; C. Everett, G. Morris, G. Howison, Stanley Hall, J. Watson.<sup>38</sup> In Germany the Neo-Kantian influence is seen in the Ritschlin school; the Neo-Hegelian in Pfleiderer. The distinctive mark of the latter is the theory of development, the *To fieri* of Hegel. In England and America the line of demarkation is not drawn; hence we have a school which is by different writers called now by one, again by the other title.<sup>39</sup>

Green its  
levelling  
representa-  
tive.

§ 35. The Neo-Hegelian school is called an Idealistic reaction. It has been charged, and with good reason,

<sup>36</sup> Cf. F. E. Beneke, by Francis Brandt.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Courtney Studies in Phil., ch. IX.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Phil. in United States, by S. Hall, in Mind, vol. IV, p. 89.

<sup>39</sup> Ed. Caird's "Crit. Phil. of Kant," is considered "a transliteration of Kant, as seen in the light of Hegelianism," cf. Scottish Review, 1890, vol. XVI, pp. 68, 91.

with Pantheism. The leader of the movement is Mr. T. H. Green. A criticism of his teaching will furnish a conception of the new doctrine and of its tendency. Prof. Green draws from both Kant and Hegel. His fundamental position and claim on his followers is his transformation of Kant's theory of knowledge into a metaphysic of existence.<sup>40</sup> Green identifies the self which the theory of knowledge reveals — the single, active, self-conscious principle — with the universal or divine self-consciousness, the one, eternal, divine subject to which the universe is relative. Hence consciousness has a double character, unity and manifold; as a unity it is eternal, all-conditioning, an end realizing itself in and through the manifold; as manifold it is subject to change, conditioned and is a means to an end. The eternal consciousness is manifested in the individual as a "forecasting idea."<sup>41</sup>

§ 36. *Criticism:* The teaching of Mr. Green is an Panthe-  
istic. idealistic Pantheism based on Kant and Hegel. He takes the notion of knowledge for the real Knower. Since the form of knowledge is one, he infers that one subject alone sustains the world and is the real Knower. This knower is manifested in human consciousness. Hence consciousness, human and divine, is unified in one self. With justice, therefore, Prof. Seth and Mr. A. Balfour contend that Prof. Green's teaching is a thorough-going Pantheism.<sup>42</sup> Prof. Seth holds that the reaction to Hegel is only transitory, that it is not

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *Philos. of T. Green*, by W. Fairbrother, p. 157.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *Green Proleg.* 182, *Burt Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, vol. II, S. 166.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *Prof. Seth Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 215; A. Balfour in *Mind*, Jan., 1884, Oct., 1893; nevertheless Prof. Seth is not free from criticism; for his peculiar Pantheism cf. *Some Current Conceptions of Self*, by Prof. John Dewey, in *Mind*, 1890, vol. XV.



satisfying.<sup>43</sup> Mr. Balfour says the English mind can never be the home of such a philosophy.<sup>44</sup> Hence we have an explanation of the efforts, also unsatisfactory, at a speculative Theism, as illustrated by Mr. Balfour in "Foundations of Belief," by Martineau in "Study of Religion."<sup>45</sup>

## IV.

## CRITICISM.

§ 34. It is not necessary to take up and refute one after another the different forms of Pantheism. In all forms it is essentially the same whether it be Spinoza's *Substance*, or Fichte's *Ego*, or Schelling's *Absolute*, Hegel's *Idea*, Schopenhauer's *Will*, Hartmann's *Unconscious*. They have one element in common — the denial of the true nature of the soul. In this point they are a standing objection to our line of thought.

(a) criticism from human personality.

§ 35. (a) In Pantheism human individuality is destroyed. But the testimony of consciousness is explicit and irrefutable. It tells me that I am myself and not another. There is an abyss between you and me; no fiction of the imagination can make us one and the same. Again consciousness bears witness to our personality. This incontrovertible and elementary fact of human experience lies at the basis of our individual and social life. I am not only an individual, but I am *sui juris*: the responsible agent of my actions.

(b) from the first principles of reason.

§ 36. (b) Pantheism controverts the first principles of reason. The Principle of contradiction affirms that

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *ib.*, p. 349.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *Foundations of Belief*, p. 2, ch. 2.

<sup>45</sup> Falckenberg concludes his *History of Phil.* with these words: "The revival of Fichto-Hegelian Idealism by means of a method which shall do justice to the demands of the time by a closer adherence to experience, by making general use of both the material and the mental sciences, and by an exact and cautious mode of argument seems to us to be the task of the future," p. 632.

the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time. With Pantheists, however, we must hold that being is one and absolute, yet constantly changing; that it is and yet not is. It is one so long as it is a potency to become all things; in becoming all things its unity disappears. It is one while it remains vague and indefinite; in becoming definite and concrete, it is no longer one, but many.

§ 37. (c) This one being of Pantheists is either material or immaterial, not the former, for my soul is immaterial, otherwise Psychology would not be a distinct science; not the latter, for my body is material, otherwise I should be compelled to deny Physiology and the Physical sciences: it cannot be both, because the properties of the material and of the immaterial are contradictory. <sup>(c) ad hominem.</sup>

§ 38. (d) Pantheism saps the foundations of morality. The principles of morality suppose a subordination of persons for the existence and efficacy of a law. Hence the superior commanding; the inferior obeying; the bonds of intelligence and of free-will, the sanction upon its proper fulfillment — all conducive to the formation of a sound social organism, whether it be of the family, of the state, or of the church. But Pantheism makes subordination a fiction, denies liberty of will and responsibility. Again according to Pantheism, every thought and action springs from and is a manifestation of the eternal Divine energy; in this case, how make a distinction between good and evil? The acts of the thief and murderer, as well as those of the wise and good, are divine. <sup>(d) its results.</sup>

§ 39. Finally it is repugnant to common sense to suppose that I am one and the same being with the brute, the tree, the stone. <sup>(e) repugnant to good sense.</sup>

## SOUL AND BODY.

existence  
of soul a  
fact.

§ 1. The existence of the soul was proved to a certainty by the voice of consciousness. The method followed was experimental. We dealt with a fact, through the medium of testimony. Then by a process of reasoning from data the nature of the soul as a spiritual being was set forth. In its essence and in its activities the soul of man is totally different from matter.<sup>1</sup>

existence  
of body a  
fact.

§ 2. It is a fact also, the knowledge of which comes through consciousness, that we have a material body. Science has shown that the material elements of our body are of the same nature as the elements found in the world about us. These elements enter into our intimate constitution and form a part of our human nature.<sup>2</sup>

the prob-  
lem.

§ 3. The problem that now faces us is a most difficult one. How explain the existence in man of soul and body so diverse and apparently antagonistic, and at the same time account for the harmony of action and the unity of the organism? This unity in diversity lies at the basis of our conscious existence. It antecedes all experience. It is evident to the unlearned; the young child not yet attained the use of reason, supposes it; the thoughtful student pauses before it as one of the deepest questions of human life.

§ 4. The greatest philosophers of history have attempted to elucidate this question. Various are the

<sup>1</sup> S. Aug. de quant. an. n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> August serm. 150, n. 5.

solutions proposed. We shall now classify and subject them to a brief criticism. That hypothesis or explanation shall be considered the best which shall best account for the following facts: (1) the real existence of the soul; (2) the real existence of the body; (3) their opposition and mutual dependence.

## I.

## THEORY OF EXAGGERATED SPIRITUALISM.

§ 5. Led on by a mistaken zeal to render the spirituality of the soul secure against the assaults of Materialism, some philosophers denied the possibility of body acting on spirit or of spirit acting on body, and, therefore, there is no *real* but only an *apparent* union of soul and body. The reasons alleged in support of this theory are purely *a priori*. From the known properties of spirit and matter so antagonistic to each other, they infer that there is no possible union between them. Theory stated.

1°. *Des Cartes.*

§ 6. (1°) The opinion was first proposed by Des Des Cartes. Cartes. He taught that body and soul are both complete and perfect substances. This is the basis of his reasoning, and is drawn from Plato.<sup>3</sup> Des Cartes, however, goes much farther. He maintained that the essence of the entire man was the soul alone;<sup>4</sup> that the soul was by its nature spiritual, and as such completely independent of the body. But how account for the belief that the soul exerts an influence upon the body and vice versa? This influence, he says, of one upon the other, is not real; it appears so to us; therefore,

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Alcibiades and Phaedo.

<sup>4</sup> Man is a unit, formed of both body and soul; cf. Augustine de Immort. An. c. 15; de Mor. Ecc. I, c. 4.

Divine assistance.

deceived by appearance, we believe in its reality. The true explanation he finds in God. Thus, when I have an idea in my mind, e. g., to move my arm, God interferes and directly moves the arm. The act of the will, i. e., to move the arm, is, therefore, not the real cause of the bodily movement, but only the occasion. God is the sole, immediate, and direct cause of all my bodily movements. His activity is exerted upon the occasion of ideas or of resolves in my mind. The same is true of the influence of body upon the soul. The influence is only apparent. The act of the body is the occasion, not the cause. God alone is the cause. This theory is called the theory of "Divine Assistance," or of "Occasional Causes," and is proposed by Des Cartes in his *Medit.*, VI, § 8.

### 2°. *Malebranche.*

occasional cause.

§ 7. Malebranche developed more fully the doctrine of Des Cartes. He denies that the will can move a member of the body, because there is no relation between things so different. The will is powerless of itself to influence any bodily movements; but it can determine the will of God, who thereupon produces the effect. He denies that we can have a clear conception of a causal influence of soul and body or vice versa. Thus, therefore, reason and reflection show that the belief cannot be held.<sup>5</sup> To this opinion Mr. Reid seems to incline. Mr. Stewart expressly proposes it.<sup>6</sup>

### 3°. *Leibnitz.*

Pre-established.  
Harmony.

Leibnitz started from the principle of Des Cartes that no interaction can take place between matter and

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Malebranche *Recherche de la Verite*, l. 6, p. 2, c. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Hamilton *Metaphys.*, L. XVI.

spirit. To account for what was called the apparent union of body and soul, he developed a theory which has become famous under the title of "Pre-established Harmony." He reproached Des Cartes for degrading God by comparing Him to a watchmaker who, having made a clock, is still obliged to turn the hands. A skillful workman, he says, would make it so that it could work itself without assistance. He holds that the soul and the body are entirely separated; that the soul's acts succeed one another and form a series; that the acts of the body form another series; that between these two series there is no interaction. But God in the beginning foresaw what the actions would be, and established a harmony between the one and the other. Thus the soul and body can be compared to two watches, which were regulated and wound up. In both the minute and the hour hands point to the same identical place; but one watch goes entirely independent of the other; the spring which gives motion to one is not the same as that which gives motion to the other.<sup>7</sup>

§ 8. The fundamental error on which these various expositions have been raised is the doctrine of occasional causes. That we have a true and real causal influence on limbs of our body and on external objects is evident from consciousness and from daily experience. I am conscious of the influence of will on my body, e. g., that I walk, speak, write, etc. So, too, I am conscious that external agents affect me as causes, ex. gr., a blow from another, etc. The notion of cause is real. If I deny the true conception of causality, I should do violence to the voice of consciousness. This

Criticism  
(1) from  
nature of  
cause.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Leibnitz *Monadol.* s. 50, *Theod.*, s. 62; Wolff *Psych. Rationalis* s. 3, s. 13.

conception of cause is at the basis of all experimentation in the physical sciences. I reason from effect to cause, from properties to substance, with a view to obtain and formulate the laws which rule the interaction of physical agents.<sup>8</sup> If, therefore, there is a real causal efficiency in created things, I have no basis for the theory of Occasional Causes. It, therefore, becomes a gratuitous hypothesis.

(2) his basis is an assumption.

§ 9. Again, Des Cartes argues *a priori*. Because spirit and matter have contradictory properties he infers that there can be no union between them. But this position is contrary to fact. The union of body and of soul is a fact. Thus, his starting point was an ideal difficulty.

(3) from its consequences.

§ 10. Finally, the attempt to save the spirituality of the soul by exaggerating the concept of spirit met with disastrous failure. The very opposite was the result. The explanation was artificial and mechanical; it was adverse to the testimony of consciousness, to the dictates of common sense. Therefore, time only was needed for its downfall. The protest came in the form of a Materialistic philosophy which spread and prevailed in France during the eighteenth century.<sup>9</sup> It was in aim a vindication of our bodily existence and activities, but erred by reacting to an extreme.

## II.

### THEORY OF ACCIDENTAL UNION.

§ 11. Plato is considered the parent of this theory. He maintained that the soul was in the body after the same manner as a pilot was in a ship or a man was on

<sup>8</sup> Cf. St. Thomas C. Gent. L. III, c. 69; Rickaby General Metaphysics, chap. Causation.

<sup>9</sup> E. g. D'Holbach, De la Mettrie.

a horse.<sup>10</sup> Thus, the soul, by using the body, was united to it. The union, therefore, consisted in the mutual action of body upon soul, and of soul upon body. To him the body is a prison in which the soul is confined for some crime committed in a state of existence prior to the present. Thus, his theory of the union of body and soul supposes the false and abandoned doctrine of the pre-existence of souls.<sup>11</sup>

2°. *Locke.*

§ 12. The opinion of Plato was proposed by Locke <sup>Locke.</sup> in his essay on the Human Understanding.<sup>12</sup> With Plato he held that the body and the soul were two complete and perfect substances; that they were united into one human composite by the mutual influence of one upon the other. The soul possesses the power of thinking and of motion, and by acting upon the body determines the movements of the body. So, likewise, body, by acting upon the soul, determines it to perceive external objects. Hence, a physical efficiency of one upon the other whence resulted their union. In our own time this opinion prevails among those who champion a spiritualistic philosophy against the pernicious doctrines of a materialistic science.

3°. *Lotze.*

§ 13. Lotze rejects the contention that a *bond* is nec- <sup>Lotze.</sup> essary to explain the reciprocal action of body and

<sup>10</sup> Dr. E. Hamilton, professor of Mental Philosophy in Hamilton College, says that "the soul is in the body like a diver incased in strange armor." Cf. his *Mental Science*, p. 48.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Alcibiades and Phaedo; St. Thomas C. Gentes, l. 2, c. 57; *Summa Theol.*, 1 q. 76, a. 3. c.

<sup>12</sup> BII. ch. 23, n. 28, 29.



soul. Bonds, he says, are needed to unite things which do not of themselves act on each other. The bond has its binding power because its parts are attached to each other. We cannot be always explaining this fact by postulating new bonds, but in the last analysis must admit an immediate reciprocal action of the elements. Hence "the definite forms in which the body would act on the soul, and the soul on it, would by no means proceed from the bare conception of the aforesaid bond, but only from the specific natures of the two elements bound together, and of their obligation to reciprocal action." He concludes as follows: "Instead of *one* such vain bond, we assert that the two are connected by very many peculiarly constituted bonds; each reciprocal action to which they are by their natures necessitated, is such a bond which holds them together."<sup>13</sup>

#### 4°. *Ladd.*

Ladd.

§ 14. Prof. Ladd also holds that the relations of mind and body are those of causation. It is true, as he proceeds to explain, that our first perception of the true nature of causation springs from the inner experience of mind acting upon body. Nevertheless, we hold that their union does not consist in causation; rather causation is the result of their union.<sup>14</sup>

#### 5°. *Rosmini.*

Rosmini.

§ 15. Closely akin to the doctrine of physical interaction is that proposed by Rosmini. He maintains that body and soul are united by the mutual action of

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Lotze Elements of Psychology, ed. by Prof. Ladd, pp. 101, 102; Microcos, vol. I, b. 3, c. 4.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Ladd Philosophy of Mind, p. 258.

one upon the other, but explains the nature of the action after a different manner. The soul, he says, is both sensitive and rational. The sensitive soul is united to the body by the fact that it feels the body through a certain fundamental sense. Thus the union consists in this fundamental feeling, which is considered as a subjective modification. The rational soul is united to the body because it has an intellectual perception of this feeling. This perception is innate and enduring and thus forms the medium by which body and soul are united.

§ 16. The theory of mutual interaction is much more Criticism. plausible than that of exaggerated spiritualism. It admits the distinction of the two substances and maintains the action of one upon the other. But it is not a satisfactory explanation. It states a fact simply, but makes no attempt to account for the fact. The fact that soul acts on body is not the cause of their union. the statement of a fact, not its explanation. It is rather the effect. How can reciprocal action explain the growth and development of the organism, the gradual putting forth of mental powers? Why, in this hypothesis, should not the intelligence be keen and alert in infancy? Why should the powers of the soul gradually manifest themselves as the body becomes stronger? Mere reciprocal action cannot explain these patent facts. Furthermore reciprocal action cannot explain the close intimate union of soul and body. There is, so to say, a certain result in one substantial composite. The fact that the one acts upon the other is not an explanation of that intimate union. Reciprocal action cannot hold them together. It is a fact, evident from individual experience that the soul striveth against the body and the body against the soul. Why in that case should they not separate? If

reciprocal action be the only bond of union, they would certainly part company. Hence we must admit a closer and more intimate union than reciprocal action, a union by which one substantial composite is found, and which makes reciprocal action possible.

### III.

#### ● THE MONISTIC THEORY.

Dualism  
and mon-  
ism.

§ 17. The theories proposed considered the soul and body as two distinct substances. They differed only in the attempt to explain their union. Hence we may call them different presentations of Dualism. Others, however, deny the duality of substances. Among these some contend that the physical series can account for the mental; to them mind is but a function of the brain, ex. gr., Materialists with Huxley. Others hold that mind is the only substance; thus to Berkeley external things are the product of the imagination; to Schopenhauer the world is a representation.

materialis-  
tic and  
Idealistic  
monism.

Scientific  
monism.

§ 18. Finally others deny these suppositions. To them the mental and physical are manifestations or different "aspects," or "phases," or "sides," or "faces" of the same reality. This is called the Double-Aspect theory. Its influence to-day is very great, its defenders are learned and powerful, and therefore calls for special consideration.

its history  
and de-  
fenders.

§ 19. The Double-Aspect theory can be traced to Spinoza. It is the logical consequence of his doctrine. Spinoza held that there was only one Substance, which was infinite and self-determined. This one substance manifests itself in two known ways: the world of matter and the world of thought. Thus two parallel orders exist, mutually independent, yet expressions of

the one substance which is God.<sup>15</sup> Now if, in place of God, we put the "unknowable" of Mr. Spencer, or the "Inexplicable" of Mr. Romanes, we have the modern form of Spinoza's Pantheism which has pervaded current English thought. Its teachers are Mr. Spencer,<sup>16</sup> Bain,<sup>17</sup> G. Lewes,<sup>18</sup> Prof. Clifford,<sup>19</sup> Ferrier,<sup>20</sup> Hoffding,<sup>21</sup> Fechner,<sup>22</sup> Huxley.<sup>23</sup>

§ 20. The reason given for this theory is the supposed impossibility of mind acting on body or of body acting on mind. Mr. Romanes dismisses with contempt the hypothesis of causality acting from nervous structure to mental processes. He says that it does violence to our faculty of reason and to our very idea of causation; that in this case there is no perceived equivalency between causes and effect. To him also mental changes cannot cause physical changes; such a hypothesis is contrary to the law of the conservation of energy. Therefore there is no interaction.<sup>24</sup>

Its reasons

(1) no interaction of mind and body.

§ 21. At the same time they were forced to explain the testimony of consciousness that there are two classes of facts, viz., mental and physical.<sup>25</sup> The solu-

(2) the fact that there are two classes of phenomena.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Spinoza, p. XXXII.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. First Principles, Psychology.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Mind and Body.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Physical Basis of Life, p. 341; Problems of Life and Mind.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Seeing and Thinking.

<sup>20</sup> Functions of the brain, § 88.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Outlines of Psychology.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, p. 262.

<sup>23</sup> "On Hypothesis that animals are automata."

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Romanes "Fallacies of Materialism," Contemp. Rev., vol. XII; cf. Hoffding Outlines of Psychology, p. 64; Bain, Mind and Body, p. 160; for opposite view cf. Ladd in Physiol. Psychology. In the following chapter the objection drawn from the law of the conservation of energy will be answered.

<sup>25</sup> For distinction of the two orders, physical and mental, cf. Clifford "Seeing and Thinking," p. 87; "Lectures and Essays," II, p. 35; Huxley "Science and Culture," p. 260.

The theory  
is an at-  
tempt at  
reconcilia-  
tion.

tion adopted was an attempt at conciliation. They admitted the distinction of the mental and physical only as aspects of one unknown substance. Hence there are two corresponding sets of phenomena which are simultaneously unfolded each according to its own laws. Hence there is a *parallelism* and a *proportionality* between mind and the cerebral motions of the brain. But this supposes an identity at the bottom. The differences, we are conscious of, show that this one principle has found expression in a double form. Thus what inner experience reveals as thought or feeling, is represented in the material world by certain cerebral activities. It is the expression of the same thing in two languages. In this explanation they hold that the law of conservation of energy would remain intact; for it would be applied to and would rule the cerebral processes.<sup>26</sup>

### *Different Forms.*

Its differ-  
ent forms.  
(1°) Prof.  
Clifford.

"mind-  
stuff."

§ 22. This theory has been proposed in different forms. We shall briefly present the most important. (1°) Prof. Clifford is an authoritative exponent of the "Mind Dust" theory.<sup>27</sup> Prof. Clifford holds that what we perceive as matter is in reality mind-stuff. Every molecule of inorganic matter possesses an atom of mind-stuff. In its separated elementary condition there is no mind or consciousness. The combination of molecules causes a combination in the elements of mind-stuff, which first appears in the faint beginnings of sentience. When this combination results in the complex structure of the brain and nervous-system,

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Hoffding *Outlines of Psychol.*, p. 66.

<sup>27</sup> This theory was proposed by Fick, 1862, is held by Taine "Intelligence" BIII; cf. Clifford *Lectures and Essays* II, 71; Prince, *Nature of Mind and Human Automatism*.

the elements of mind-stuff combine into conscious thought and volition. Prof. Clifford, therefore, is an evolutionist. He postulates "mind-dust" as a certain property of matter, and explains the evolution of intelligence from lower to higher forms by the increasing complexity in which the material elements are combined.<sup>28</sup>

§ 23. (1) What is this "mind-stuff?" It is not conscious in its ultimate analysis, as Prof. Clifford admits. Then it must be unconscious. Lewes holds that the nerve-process considered in its most general form of irritability, is everywhere conscious. This is the position of Bain,<sup>29</sup> and in a modified form, of Wundt. Others contend that a given degree of development is necessary before consciousness is found at all; this is the theory of Maudsley, James and Ferrier, and is generally accepted. "Those nervous actions," writes Mr. Bastian,<sup>30</sup> "attended by conscious states, constitute in reality only a very small fraction of the sum total of nervous states or actions."<sup>31</sup> Mr. Morgan considers man as "the self-conscious outcome of an activity, selective and synthetic, which is neither energy nor consciousness; which has not been evolved, but through the action of which evolution has been ren-

Criticism  
(1) from  
analysis of  
mind-stuff.

<sup>28</sup> "Consciousness is only the flowering of mind, and below consciousness there is an unconscious mind-substance out of which consciousness is evolved. In its higher forms this unconscious mind-substance is correlative with nerve-force, and below nerve-force it still exists correlated with other forms of force. Hence matter is everywhere correlated with atoms of mind-substance, having laws exactly parallel to and the counterparts of material laws. Mind and Matter, a double-faced unity," Thomson Psychology, vol. II, p. 186 sq.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Emotions and Will appendix A.

<sup>30</sup> In Brain as Organ of Mind, p. 145.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Baldwin Handbook of Psychology PIII, ch. II, § 1.

dered possible, which is neither subject nor object, but underlies and is common to both.”<sup>32</sup> But conscious mental life cannot evolve out of unconscious elements. The mistake of Prof. Clifford is to assume that our mental states are compounds. This is unwarranted and controverted by conscious experience. Impressions should not be confounded with sensations. There may be a combination of impressions or “shocks,” but there is no compound in the sensation produced. It may have different sensations, but we cannot say that one sensation as such is made up of different elements. In like manner the “notion” or the “judgment” are indivisible; they are not compounds of elementary units.<sup>33</sup>

(2) *ab  
absurdo.*

§ 24. (2) If the “mind-dust” be conscious, why is not intelligence manifested in all material objects? In this case stone, grass, tree, etc., all should show signs of mind.<sup>34</sup>

(3) *criti-  
cism of  
Romanes.*

§ 25. (3) M. Romanes rejects this explanation. He considers it inadequate to explain the fundamental antithesis between subject and object. If by “subject,” he means mind in one sense of the term, and by “object” he understands matter; we can readily perceive that the “mind-dust” theory would obliterate the fundamental antithesis of matter and mind.<sup>35</sup>

2° *Bain.*

§ 26. (2°) Mr. Bain says that “a sentient animal has two sides or aspects of its being—the one all matter, the other all mind; that the doctrine of two substances, one material the other immaterial, is now in course of

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Introd. to Comp. Psych.*, p. 332.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Calderwood “*Relations of Mind and Brain*,” p. 294, *fol.*; Guthrie Spencer’s *Unification of Knowledge*, p. 231.

<sup>34</sup> On Double-Aspect Theory as Hylozoic Materialism, cf. Prof. Bowne *Introduction to Psychological Theory*, p. 21 sq.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *Contem. Rev.*, vol. XII.

being modified at the instance of modern physiology; that, in company with all our mental processes, there is an unbroken material succession; hence no rupture of nervous continuity. He infers that the only tenable supposition is that mental and physical proceed together as "undivided twins." Thus he speaks of a "two-sided cause," a "two-sided phenomenon," of "not mind causing body and body causing mind, but mind-body giving birth to mind-body," of "the proper physical fact being a single, one-sided objective fact;" of "the mental fact being a two-sided fact."<sup>36</sup>

§ 27. We deny that matter and mind are two "sides" Criticism. or "aspects" of the same one thing, if by this is meant the denial of the distinct substances. The reasons for the distinction of the substances are too strong to be obliterated after this fashion.<sup>37</sup> Modern Physiology has given no proofs, as Mr. Bain and Lewes contend, which have modified the doctrine held from "the time of Thomas Aquinas to the present day." If by an "unbroken material succession" he understands the physical law of the conservation of energy, the reader is referred to the following chapter where proof is given that the law remains intact. The phrases "undivided turns" and "two-sided cause" denote strange confusion of thought. Or rather, they are terms invented to cover, under an apparently scientific form, the difficulties which cannot honestly be met. It seems strange that intelligent men would go to such lengths rather than admit the real existence of a soul, which "seems to me," writes Mr. James,<sup>38</sup> "the line of least logical resistance, so far as we have yet attained."

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Bain *Mind and Body*, ch. VI.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Prof. Bowne *Introduction to Psychological Theory*, p. 36.

<sup>38</sup> *Psych.*, vol. I, p. 182.



8° Spencer. § 28. (3°) Mr. Spencer speaks of nervous changes which have "subjective aspects" and "objective aspects," of "feelings as the subjective sides of nervous changes,"<sup>39</sup> of "mind and nervous action as the subjective and objective faces of the same thing."<sup>40</sup> His inference is: "This brings us to the true conclusion implied throughout the foregoing pages—the conclusion that it is the one and the same ultimate Reality which is manifested to us subjectively and objectively."<sup>41</sup>

Criticism. § 29. Mr. Spencer champions the evolutionary theory of mind. He explains mind by the correlation of mechanical forces. Elsewhere this theory is put to the test of criticism. At present his views on the relations of mind and of matter demand our attention.

(1) not consistent. § 30. Mr. Spencer speaks of "feelings as subjective sides of nervous changes;" nevertheless, a little farther on he says that "the distinction of subject and object is itself the consciousness of a difference transcending all other differences," that "a unit of feeling has nothing in common with a unit of motion becomes more than ever manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition."<sup>42</sup>

§ 31. Again, why should we not hold that all phenomena have these subjective and objective sides. Finally, there "two faces" are phenomena; as such they are two facts or two things; they cannot, therefore, be merged into one. Thus, the difficulty is not solved by calling the material and mental "two faces;" it is only hidden under an obscure phraseology.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Prin. of Psych., vol. I, ch. VI.

<sup>40</sup> *Ib.*, ch. VII, § 56.

<sup>41</sup> Vol. I, § 273. Sully speaks of the "subjective" and "objective" sides of attention, cf. *Human mind*, vol. I, pp. 147, 151.

<sup>42</sup> *Ib.*, vol. I, § 62.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Herbert *Modern Realism Examined*, § 12; Mr.

*Its Arguments.*

§ 32. The principal arguments which are advanced in support of the "Double-Aspect" theory, are: <sup>(a) from Physiol-ogy.</sup>

(a) Physiology shows that physical and mental facts are parallel. It is assumed that there is a reciprocal correspondence between a mental state and a neural process. But this is not and cannot be proved. Even if we grant that it is so, we would have no ground to infer that the mental state is merely a concomitant or appendage of the neural changes.

§ 33. (b) Physics shows, through the law of the conservation of energy, that there is no reciprocal action of mind upon body; therefore, this hypothesis seems better fitted to answer the facts. But, we answer that the law of the conservation of energy remains intact. Reciprocal action of body upon mind does not interfere with this law, as we shall see. Moreover, individual experience testifies that body acts upon mind and mind upon body. <sup>(b) from Physics.</sup>

§ 34. (c) The hypothesis of evolution necessitates this explanation. The answer is made that the theory of evolution cannot be sustained. Evolution supposes a gradual passage from inorganic nature to living beings who feel and think. But science is powerless to solve the origin of life. "The influence of animal or vegetable life on matter is infinitely beyond the range of any scientific inquiry hitherto entered on. Its power of directing the motions of moving particles, in the demonstrated daily miracle of our human free-will, and in the growth of generation after generation of plants from a single seed, are infinitely different from any possible results of the fortuitous concourse of atoms. <sup>(c) from theory of evolution.</sup>

Tyndall's vacillating position is stated by Mallock, *Is Life Worth Living*, p. 228.

The real phenomena of life infinitely transcend human science.<sup>44</sup> If, therefore, evolution is powerless to solve the problem of life, how can it expect to account for thought?

*Consequences.*

a) destructive of knowledge

§ 35. (a) According to this theory bodily changes and mental states go on in parallel series; there is no interaction. The result is that I am unable to learn your state of mind from your actions. The flush of shame, the heat of anger, the tears of sorrow give me no clue to your feelings. Moreover I do not know that you have a mind, for how can I infer its existence from your acts, if there be no reciprocal influence? But this is against consciousness and common sense.

(b) renders history absurd.

§ 36. (b) What can be said of the achievements of mind in the past? Mind has nothing to do with the progress of civilization, of the fine arts, or of literature. Man's activity consists in physical or neural changes. Therefore, if the original elements were given, the course of history could be antecedently determined. The mind is only the subjective aspect of these changes, not anything distinct in itself.<sup>45</sup>

#### IV.

##### SCHOLASTIC THEORY.

existence of matter and force attested by ordinary observation.

§ 37. It is a truth of physical science that there is no matter without force, and no force without matter. This is a simple fact attested by ordinary observation, and confirmed by scientific experiment. It is a truth

<sup>44</sup> Lord Kelvin, Fort. Review, Mar., 1892.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. St. Thomas S. Th. I, q. 85, a7; 3. q. 69, a. 8, ad. 3; i. q. 50, a. 4, ad. 2; Prof. Bowne "Metaphysics, a Study of First Principles," pp. 358, 376 sq. Herbert, Modern Realism Examined, § 18.

which obtains throughout the visible universe from the smallest particle of inorganic matter to the highest forms of organized existence. Materialism is based on this truth; but it errs in giving to the formula "no matter without force" universal and necessary value, and affirming that all forces are of a material nature. As a logical consequence it denies a higher world of beings than the material, and destroys the difference in nature of the forces which enter into play in the visible world about us. Scholastic philosophy avoids either extreme. It takes the existence of matter and of force as facts, but draws no necessary law therefrom; it affirms that all forces are not of the same nature, that we must make a distinction between physical, vital, mental forces.

§ 38. The fact that there is no matter without force in the visible universe is not a truth known only from ordinary observation. Approved results in all the departments of descriptive science affirm it. Physics formulates the law of inertia and of the conservation of matter. At the same time it teaches as a fact, verified by experimental investigation, that forces are transformed, ex. gr., mechanical work into heat, etc., and enunciates the law of the conservation and dissipation of energy. Every day progress is made in the acquisition of facts which illustrate the working of these laws. The same duality is revealed in Chemistry. This is seen in the decomposition of chemical compounds. Thus by voltaic electricity water is separated into its component parts of oxygen and hydrogen, e. g., the weight is the same whether the elements be considered as decomposed or in their compound state.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>46</sup> New Chemistry, by Cooke, Lect. V.

Nevertheless the specific properties are different. In the words of Mr. Cooke "water and the two gases, hydrogen and oxygen, are the same matter under different forms." This fact is the basis of the laws of chemical affinities and of multiple proportions. In crystallization we must admit a force which arranges the material atoms in various forms.

a duality in every substance.

§ 39. In every material substance, therefore, are found two series of properties which are antagonistic in nature and point to a duality in the composition of the substance itself. Thus ex. gr., we find *quantity* and *quality*, *permanence* and *change*, *inertia* and *energy*. The inference, therefore, is made that a substance is a compound whole, constituted by the intimate union of *first matter* and of *form*. The *first matter* is the source of quantity, of permanence and of inertia; the form is the source of quality, of change and of energy. The *first matter* is the same throughout the visible universe; the *form* is specifically different and by its union with first matter constitutes a specific type of existence with its specific qualities or energies.<sup>47</sup>

this duality is the basis of the Theory of Matter and Form.

Theory illustrated from analogy.

§ 40. We here speak of the ultimate constitution of bodies. Experimentation, therefore, cannot give any direct evidence. The theory of first matter and form is based on ordinary and scientific inference. Illustrations, however, can be drawn from analogy. Thus, ex. gr., a rough block of marble may be compared to first

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Fr. Harper S. J. *Metaphysics of the Schools*, vol. II, b. 5, c. 2, § 4; Abbe Farges "Matiere et Forme" "L'acte et Potencie." "No one," writes Mr. Cooke, "who has followed modern physical discussions can doubt that the tendency of physical thought is to refer the differences of substances to a dynamical cause," and confesses himself rather drawn to that view of nature which refers the qualities of substances to the affections of the one substratum modified by the varying play of forces." *New Chemistry*, pp. 118, 117.

matter; the chisel of the sculptor may *form* it into a statue of Washington. The statue in its completed state may be considered as composed of marble and of the specific form which constitutes it in the likeness of our country's hero. So, too, wood may be likened to first-matter, the form of a table to form. But in the examples of the statue and of the table the forms are only accidental. In these cases the word "shape" would be more exact. Nevertheless we never perceive a material object which has not some definite shape. What these shapes are to material objects, the substantial form is to substance itself; it constitutes the substance in a concrete existence.<sup>48</sup>

§ 41. The concepts of "first-matter" and of "substantial form" are abstractions. But that is not to say that they are figments of the mind. The warrant we have for making these abstractions is had in the descriptive sciences and in daily observation. First-matter does not exist as a concrete entity; in combination with form only it exists in the concrete. The union of both is physical. We say substance is composed of first-matter and form. Hence, the union is a composition. It is not a mixture as, ex. gr., water is a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen. But it can be compared to the union of potency and act; the first-matter is a pure potency, receptive of any form; the substantial form actuates, determines and perfects it into a complete concrete existence. The result is one substance essentially composed.<sup>49</sup>

Concepts of matter and form are abstractions, but have a basis in reality.

<sup>48</sup> The term "first-matter" is used in contradistinction to "second-matter," or matter as it comes under the activity of our senses, i. e., concrete matter or matter simply.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Aug. Confess., L. 12, c. 6; L. 13, c. 29; de Gen ad Lit. LI, c. 15; Aristotle's Psychology, by E. Wallace, BII, ch. I; St. Thomas C. Gentes L. 2, c. 56, 57, 71; L. 4, c. 81; Summa Theologiae I. q. 44, a. 2; I. q. 66, a. i; I. q. 76.

hierarchy  
of beings  
and of  
forms.

§ 42. But all beings are not of the same nature. A gradated series of existences in the world about us meets the eye. There are entities purely material, then living beings, ex. gr., the vegetable world, then animals, and finally man, the crown of God's work, the apex of creation.<sup>50</sup> The same law of duality persists throughout. Each substance has its material and its formal element. With this difference, that the material element is the same. The laws of quantity, of inertia and of the conservation of matter, are as true of the material particles which go to make up the human body as of those which enter into the formation of a crystal or a stone. A remarkable fact, however, is that the forces are different in nature. The laws which govern the material and chemical forces are not the same as those which prevail in the living world. Again, the laws of vegetative growth differ in kind from the laws of sensation, just as these in turn differ from the laws of mental life. These facts point to a difference in nature of the formal element. Thus, we have material, living, sensitive, intellectual energies; and as a natural inference material, living, sensitive and intellectual forms. These forms, therefore, so different in nature, joined in intimate substantial union with first-matter, constitute the hierarchy of beings we see about us.

based on  
fact.

§ 43. The inference is logical, and is based on facts. Thus, we have the sciences of Chemistry and Physics which deal with material forces, Biology and Physiology, which explain the phenomena of life, Psychology, which investigates the nature and processes of sensation and of thought. Chemistry and Physics differ from Biology and Psychology because the former deal with forces which differ from the latter. From the

<sup>50</sup> S. Thomas C. Gentes, liv, cap. 11.

difference of these forces we infer a difference in the nature of the beings. This difference is caused by a difference in the formal element.

§ 44. Let us now apply this line of thought to man. Duality in man.  
Each of us has in his own organism two series of properties which are antagonistic to each other. Thus, ex. gr., my organism is a certain *quantity* possessing different *qualities*; it is composed of *matter* and of certain activities or *forces*; the law of the conservation of matter remains intact at the dissolution of the body, and the material elements preserve their inertia. Therefore, I infer the forces in my body spring from a formal element, and the material properties have their source in first-matter. But the forces in my organism differ specifically from the forces which have play in the lower existences. Therefore, I infer a specific difference in the form. The investigation of the specific nature of the form which actuates the body is the subject-matter of this essay. The activities which are manifested as thought and will are in nature superorganic and spiritual.<sup>51</sup> Hence, their principle, i. e., the form of the body, is superorganic and spiritual. This principle or form is called the soul, because it is a principle of life, and by its union with the body constitutes a living organism. This union, is intrinsic, natural and substantial.<sup>52</sup>

§ 45. There is no more difficulty in explaining the constitution of the human organism than there is in accounting for the constitution of the inorganic molecule. In both cases we have a union of first-matter and of substantial form. With this difference, how- Hence union of body and of soul.

<sup>51</sup> S. Thomas C. Gentes, l. ii, cap. 69.

<sup>52</sup> S. Thomas C. Gentes, l. ii, cap. 71; Sum. Theol. I q. 76, a. 1, ad. 4.



ever, that the substantial form of the human organism is of a spiritual nature, and can subsist by itself after its dissolution from the body. Thus, the acts of growth and of sensation are acts of the animated organism.<sup>53</sup> The animated organism is the "Adequate principle" of these acts. Therefore, the soul, the one source of all our activities, is essentially and immediately the substantial form of the human body, and by its intrinsic union with the body constitutes man in the human species.<sup>54</sup>

§ 46. The principles set forth furnish a ready answer to the question as to the place of the soul in the human body. The soul is the substantial form of the body; it constitutes the body an organism; it communicates life and movement.<sup>55</sup> Therefore, it is whole and entire in every part. It is in every part of the living body, because it is the form of the body, and as such, the source and principle of bodily life; it is whole and entire in every part, because of its simple nature.<sup>56</sup> An illustration can be drawn from the magnet. Every part of the iron possesses the power of attraction. I may crush it into powder without detecting with the eye the force whence springs its peculiar power. In like manner the body may be dissected, yet the scalpel cannot dissect or touch the soul. In both the energy is known

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Following Chapter.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. St. Thomas C. Gentes, BII, ch. 49, 68; Summa Theol. I. q. 76; q. 90, a. 4. That the soul is the substantial form of the body is an article of faith defined in the councils of Vienne and V. Lateran, cf. Denziger's Enchiridion.

<sup>55</sup> S. Theolog. I q. 76, a. 3-7.

<sup>56</sup> "Tota igitur in singulis partibus simul adest, quae tota simul sentit in singulis," Aug. de Immort. an. n. 25; S. Thomas S. Theolog. I q. 76, a. 8.

to exist by reason of its manifestations.<sup>57</sup> That the force in material bodies is essentially different from the soul has been shown.<sup>58</sup> The marvellous structure of the body explains the difference in the functions of our organic life. The functions are all related one to another, and in their action reveal a no less marvellous unity and harmony. One principle and controlling power is over all.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>57</sup> S. Augustine illustrates this by comparing the body to a "word," the soul to the "meaning" of the word. *De quant. An. nn.* 65, 69.

<sup>58</sup> Spirituality of the soul.

<sup>59</sup> *Per totum corpus quod animat non locali diffusionem, sed quadam vitali intentione porrigitur (anima); nam per omnes ejus particulas tota simul adest, nec minor in minoribus, et in majoribus major; sed alicubi intentius, alicubi remissius, et in omnibus tota et in singulis tota est.* Aug. *Ep.* 166, n. 4; *cont. Epist. Manich.*, n. 20; S. Thomas *S. Theol.* I, q. 76.

## THE BRAIN AND THOUGHT.

question  
stated.

§ 1. In the preceding pages the nature of the human soul has been set forth and the special difficulties drawn from the Physiology of the brain examined and solved. A complete and satisfactory study, however, requires an explanation of the real positive relation which subsists between the brain and those activities of the soul embraced under the term thought. This question is proposed here as a complement to the chapter on the Union of Body and Soul, and serves as an illustration, deriving therefrom in return solid principles and a sound basis. But it is more than a subsidiary problem; at the present time the brain is the real battle ground between Materialism and a spiritualistic philosophy; on this the issue depends.

solved by  
scientific  
methods

§ 2. It is a fact that we think with the brain, that the brain in some way concurs in the production of thought. Materialists maintain that it is the organ of thought, e. g., as the eye is the organ of sight. This statement is simple and has a scientific appearance, and therefore seems to be strong. They hold that cerebral functions can explain the phenomena which we regard as spiritual, and that as a consequence the soul is an unnecessary postulate. The question is a scientific one and can be solved according to the methods of science, i. e., by reasoning from data furnished by observation and experiment.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dr. Surbled *Le Cerveau*, ch. XXIII.

## I.

## EXPLANATION OF TERMS.

§ 3. First of all definition of terms is necessary; ambiguity leads to mental confusion and erroneous conclusions; the candid reader will be convinced that Materialism thrives in such conditions; statements in appearance very simple, are in reality very complex. Thus in the phrase: *Thought is produced by the brain*, we must understand (a) what is meant by thought.

thought  
produced  
by brain.

§ 4. With modern writers from the time of Des Cartes, the term is used to designate two orders of phenomena essentially different, viz., sense and intellect. This is especially true of English Philosophy. From Locke to Mill and Spencer, the confusion of these two orders has been a fundamental error of the English mind. Too much stress cannot be laid upon this fact.

(a) mean-  
ing of  
thought.

in modern  
philosophy

§ 5. Scholastic philosophy, on the contrary, has ever taught that the phenomena of sense are essentially different from the phenomena of thought. For proof it appeals to the testimony of consciousness. It is evident to any one who carefully scrutinizes the facts of the inner life that the act of sense is totally different from the act of thought. The object of sense is concrete, material, extended; the object of thought is abstract, immaterial and unextended. Thus, for example I put my hand in the fire; the sensation of burning is not the same as the idea, they are different in nature, and altogether opposed.<sup>2</sup>

In Scho-  
lastic  
philosophy

<sup>2</sup> Arist. de an L2 c2, § 10; Balme Fund. Phil., vol. II, ch. II; S. Thomas C. Gent. Lib. 2c, 66; Mivart Truth, ch. XV.

(b) meaning of "produced,"

§ 6. (b) It is necessary to have a clear notion of the word "produced." It is true that the brain concurs in the production of thought, and can therefore in a certain sense be termed the cause. The real issue at stake is the *manner* of the concurrence, the *reason why* the brain is said to produce thought, the meaning of the word *cause*. In ordinary language the term, cause, has a very wide signification; it may mean the principle, or the instrumental, or the efficient or the final cause, or it may designate the circumstances or the occasion. Thus, ex. gr., in the statement: I chop trees for my health, I am the principle and efficient cause, the axe is the instrumental and health is the final cause, since the axe is the instrument I use, and my health is the reason why I perform the act. In like manner I often allege, as the cause of a conflagration, the existence of combustible material; whereas in precise language such material is the occasion or condition of the fire.<sup>3</sup>

the purpose of the chapter.

§ 7. These explanations put the question in clear light, and we can now proceed in the effort to discover the true relation between the brain on the one hand and the acts of sensation and of thought on the other. The thesis, therefore, is directed against the school of cerebral physiologists, represented by Mr. James.<sup>4</sup>

## II.

### THE BRAIN AND SENSATION.

possible hypotheses materialists.

§ 8. On inquiring into the cause or the subject of sensation, three hypotheses are possible: either the sub-

<sup>3</sup> For clear examples of the distinction between cause and occasion read Balmes *Europ. Civiliz.*, ch. II.

<sup>4</sup> James "Prin. of Psychology;" J. Luys "Brain and Its Functions."

ject is the body, or it is the soul, or it is both united, i. e., the animated body. Materialists hold that the body can account for sensation. Scholastic philosophy contends that the subject of sensation is in general the animated organism, or in particular the animated organ, as, ex. gr., the living eye, ear, etc. Scholastic.

§ 9. (a) The opinion of St. Thomas rests upon incontrovertible facts of consciousness, is sustained by common sense and finds verification in the ordinary language of daily life. Consciousness testifies to the sensations which I experience. I come in contact with the external world through the senses of sight, of smell, of hearing, of taste, of touch with its particular sensations of temperature and of pressure. The general sensibility diffused over the nervous system makes me aware of internal bodily feelings. All these senses can be in operation at one and the same time; in my waking state some always are, busy conveying their own specific message. Even when wearied by constant exertion I seek rest and refreshment in sleep, my senses are watchful. A loving hand laid upon my forehead disturbs my slumber; a noise, maybe a foot-fall, arouses me; a bright light penetrates the closed, heavy lids and my eyes open; or the strange feeling of an unseen presence near awakens me noiselessly from the soundest sleep and I am conscious of every nerve alert to catch the slightest sound. Thus, through the swiftly running moments of the hour and of the day, a thousand impressions excite a thousand varying sensations. (1) a simple subject necessary. This proved (a) by consciousness.  
fact of sensations.

§ 10. Yet these sensations so different in kind and in the power of affecting me or in the length of time they last, do not hasten past into oblivion like the quickly moving figures of a panorama. In some won- this unity.

derful manner they coalesce into a unity. It is *I* who see, and hear and feel. It is *I* who am the one indivisible subject which experience all and suffer all. From early morn until late at night I have been the same constant subject and agent of all the manifold impressions which go to make up the life of a day. It is not the organ of sight that sees, it is *I* who see; it is not the ear that hears, it is *I* who hear; and so it is *I* who taste, or smell, or touch, or feel a shock from without or a bodily pain within. This unity of consciousness in the acts of sensation is an elementary fact of individual experience. It is something intangible, inexplicable, indivisible. I accept it as such because it is part of my very nature. I can only explain its existence by postulating a simple principle which vivifies my body throughout and thus becomes the one agent of my bodily activities and with my body constitutes the one subject of sensation.

(b) by  
common  
sense and  
speech.

conclusion.

§ 11. (b) Common sense and ordinary speech reflect the undivided voice of consciousness. Thus I tell what *I* saw, not what my eyes saw, etc. The same unity of sense-consciousness is observed in the animal. Thus, ex. gr., on whatever part of the body I may touch a dog, he is immediately aware of the impression. We, therefore, conclude that a simple subject is necessary for the act of sensation, in as much as a simple subject alone can explain the unity of consciousness in the sensitive life.

(2) sensation is  
quantitative.  
this proved  
by consciousness.

§ 12. It is a fact of consciousness, evident upon careful observation, that sensation itself is quantitative. The properties of quantity are: that it occupies space, i. e., *extension*: that it can be measured, i. e., *intensity*: that it is produced gradually, i. e., *protensive magnitude*. All these properties are verified of the sensation.

(a) Consciousness testifies that sensation has an extended form. Not only the object felt is something extended, but the very feeling is extended also. Thus, ex. gr., in the sensation of sight, the organ is a certain extended part of the body, the impression made upon the eye is extended, as experiment shows, the sensation is also extended, and its representation pictured upon the imagination has the form, color and appearance of the external extended object. (a) It has extension.

§ 13. In like manner the same can be said of the other senses. The sense of touch, however, presents the most striking illustrations of this truth. The pain, ex. gr., which is caused by the needle piercing the flesh, is definitely localized and circumscribed; again, I hold a coin in my fingers, a limited surface of the skin feels the impression; or I lift my hand to ease the racking headache which may be now in the temples, now on the side, or on the back of the head; or I can indicate the definite tooth that is to be extracted. Now only can the pain in the peripheral organ be localized, but Physiology has traced the nerves which communicate the stimulus and have located the nerve centres in the brain. Therefore, in the act of sensation the subject feeling, the manner of feeling, and the object felt are all extended.

§ 14. (b) Sensation can be gradually produced; hence a certain time may elapse in the production, which has been called *protensive magnitude*. Consciousness testifies that the sensation may be gradually produced, e. g., from the thumb, to the hand, to the whole arm. (c) Individual experience testifies that sensations differ in intensity. Thus, ex. gr., we distinguish a difference of intensity between the candle and the electric light. Now an attempt has been (b) protensive magnitude. (c) intensity.



made to measure these differences. Hence the department of Psycho-Physics. The term is a misnomer. It is not a branch of Psychology; but rather pertains to Physiology. While Psycho-Physics has failed to establish a law which is universal or exact even within the sphere of sensation, nevertheless it can furnish some data which help our position. The law of Weber holds good within certain limits; hence the difference in intensity of, ex. gr., two definite sensations, can be measured. This is all we contend for in this place. We do not speak of the law; we question only the fact; can the intensity be computed? One sole instance suffices.<sup>5</sup>

conclusion  
for sensa-  
tion.

§ 15. Now if we take these two facts of consciousness as the data of our reasoning, the inference is incontrovertible. The *unity* of consciousness can only be explained by the existence of a simple, immaterial principle: the *quantitative form of* sensation requires that the feeling-subject be likewise quantitative. These two facts do not mutually exclude each other; they are found side by side as the two essential elements in every act of sensation.

§ 16. Thus sensation is *simple* and *quantitative*: *simple* because it is the act of a simple principle as is shown from the unity of consciousness: *quantitative* because the form of the actual present sensation is quantitative as consciousness also shows. The elements mutually complete each other in the production of one perfect organic act. Thus we may say that the soul, i. e., the simple principle and the body, i. e., the organ when considered separately, are the partial causes of sensation, but when united in one compos-

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Sully The Human Mind, pp. 81-99.

ite principle form the one adequate cause; in other words, that the subject of sensation is the *animated organism in general*, or the *animated organ* in particular. Now as the nervous system is the organ of sensation, and as this is centred in the cerebral ganglia at the base of the brain, so that if the communication from the periphral organs to the cerebrum be broken, I should no longer feel the impression and sensation would be impossible, it follows that the brain is the central and fundamental organ of sensation.

§ 17. In the name, therefore, of sound philosophy and of true science Scholastics protest against the exaggerated teaching of those who would either refer sensation to the activity of the soul alone, or would seek its cause in the cerebral activities independently of the soul.

The conclusion is in accord with facts.

### III.

#### BRAIN AND THOUGHT.

§ 18. We pass to the consideration of the second part of the thesis; the relation between the brain and the phenomena of mind. The same method is followed, viz., from an analysis of thought, and as a logical consequence its comparison with sensation. The relation between the brain and sensation has been shown to be organic, i. e., the brain is the organ of sensation. Now, if thought can be shown to be different in kind from sensation, it follows of necessity that the relation between the brain and thought is not the same as prevails between the brain and sensation.

question stated.

§ 19. The phenomena of mind are essentially different from the functions of bodily organs: (a) An analysis of thought shows that there is no extended element; hence the thinking subject does not possess

mind essentially different from sensation.

(a) from  
analysis of  
thought.

not ex-  
tended, not  
localized or  
measured.

extension.<sup>6</sup> Thus, ex. gr., abstract thought has the immaterial and unextended for its object, and in act it does not appear under an extended form. It has been shown also that all efforts to localize or measure thought have failed; whereas, on the contrary, I can localize or measure sensations, in some cases at least, approximately; and that it is of the essence of sensation that it affect a definite part of the body.<sup>7</sup>

§ 20. Now if we compare sensation and thought, we find that sensation has two elements, the simple and the quantitative; that thought has but one, the simple. Again we know that the quantitative element in sensation comes from the intrinsic co-operation of the organ with the simple principle to form one adequate cause. Hence from the absence of this extended element in the act of thought, we infer that there is no intrinsic co-operation of the bodily organ in the production of thought; that the simple principle alone is the sole adequate cause; and by this very fact that the simple principle is in its nature spiritual.

(b) from  
compari-  
son of acts  
of mind  
and of the  
body.

§ 21. (b) The acts of mind and body are essentially different, e. g., the acts of the mind are abstract thought, conceptions of spiritual objects, self-consciousness. The acts of the bodily organs belong to a different sphere, e. g., sensation, imagination.

(c) from  
laws of  
mind and  
of body.

§ 22. (c) The laws of matter, of organized matter, and of mind are different. Thus the laws of matter are set forth in the physical sciences of Physics, Chemistry, etc., as ex. gr., the laws of attraction, of gravita-

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Bain Logic BV, ch. V, p. 505.

<sup>7</sup> "Pars intellectiva animae secundum se est supra tempus, sed pars sensitiva subjacet tempori, et ideo per temporis cursum transmutatur quantum ad passiones appetitivae partis et etiam quantum ad vires apprehensivas." St. Thomas Sum. Theol. I2, q. 53, a3 ad. 3.

tion, of chemical affinity, of multiple proportions. The laws of organized matter are explained in Biology, Physiology, etc., as, ex. gr., the law of growth, of assimilation, etc. Whereas Logic is a special science dealing with the laws of mind, and Ethics is a special science which examines the laws of right and wrong. Now the laws of mind and of will are different in kind from those which rule the growth and preservation of the body; just as they are different from the laws of Chemistry or Physics.

§ 23. (d) Finally, the organs of some animals are very much like those of man; ex. gr., the nervous-system and the brain ganglia show marvellous similarities. Nevertheless the mental operations are essentially different. In organic powers the ape is very like man; there appears to be but a slight difference between them. As an actual fact the difference is insurmountable; therefore, it is more than organic. (d) from similar organs in man and animal.

§ 24. Therefore, we can conclude that the thinking subject is not the animated organism in general, i. e., the body; nor the animated organ in particular, i. e., the brain. The spiritual soul alone is the agent and the subject of thought. There is no intrinsic dependence of thought on the brain as is had in the act of sensation. The brain is not the total nor even the partial cause of thought.<sup>8</sup> conclusion.

§ 25. It is not true, however, to say that the mind is absolutely independent of the brain. The dependence denied is that of causation. To deny any relation between them would be to contravert the fundamental thesis which affirms the union of soul and of body in one composite. Hence Scholastic philosophy affirms mind not absolutely independent of the body.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Calderwood "Relation of Mind and Brain, p. 313 foll.; S. Thomas Sum. Theol. I, q. 77, a. 5; q. 118, a. 2.

that the mind depends upon the brain as upon a *conditio sine qua non* of its own activity.

This conclusion in harmony with latest ascertained facts of science.

§ 26. Thus cerebral activity is from man's very constitution a condition of thought. The teaching of St. Thomas is in harmony with the latest discoveries in Anatomy and Physiology. But cerebral activity does not produce nor can it explain the phenomena of intelligence; it is limited to sensation and nervous action; it is common to man and brute. Intellect is the possession of man alone; it has no organ of sense; but in its action it depends upon sense because all our knowledge comes from sense, and a sensitive faculty, i. e., the imagination furnishes the images from which intellect draws its store of thought. Thus the mind depends upon the brain indirectly or *extrinsically*, as Scholastic Philosophy phrases it, i. e., as on a condition, inasmuch as the brain is the organ of sensation. Hence St. Thomas says that the imagination is the point of contact between the brain and the intelligence.<sup>9</sup>

#### IV.

##### THOUGHT IS NOT CEREBRAL MOTION.

question stated.

§ 27. A logical and inevitable inference from these principles is that thought cannot be considered as a movement of brain matter. At first sight it does not call for special treatment. But in late years some writers, who have a reputation with a certain class, have seriously proposed this as a hypothesis able to account for the phenomena of thought.

Its importance.

§ 28. The scientific form in which it is proposed, the claim that it is in conformity with the latest discoveries

<sup>9</sup> St. Thomas I, q. 75, a6; I, q. 84 a 7, c.; I, q. 85; a1; c. Gent. l. 2, c76, 77; Aristotle's Psychology by E. Wallace, BIII, ch. IV.

of Physics, the fact that representative writers champion it in the name of science, has given to it an appearance of strength and conclusiveness. Thus Mr. Spencer says: "It is fast becoming a common-place of science that no idea or feeling arises save as a result of some physical force expanded in producing it."<sup>10</sup> Given the state of the brain, the corresponding thought or feeling might be inferred; or, given the thought or feeling, the corresponding state of the brain might be inferred. But how inferred? It would be at bottom not a case of logical inference at all, but of empirical association."<sup>11</sup> Prof. Clifford advances the same proposition;<sup>12</sup> and, in our own country, Prof. James is its recognized defender.<sup>13</sup>

§ 29. It is true that in language I speak of the motions of the soul; thus, ex. gr., "I was strongly moved by your exhortations," or "I was moved to do so," etc.; but the word "moved" is used in a figurative sense; it does not indicate real motion, i. e., a quantitative or qualitative change. In this sense Aristotle says that joy and grief and reasoning are motions.<sup>14</sup> The figure of speech is based on the fact that thought can be compared to motion; but we should not on that account identify the one with the other.<sup>15</sup>

Thought  
called  
"motion"  
figuratively.

<sup>10</sup> First Principles, p. 280. "Mind is a force, the result of nervous action." Dr. Hammond in "Physics and Physiology of Spiritualism."

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Tyndall Scientific Materialism in Fragments of Science.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Seeing and Thinking, III.

<sup>13</sup> Princ. of Psych.

<sup>14</sup> De an. li. c4, § 11; S. Thomas Sum. Theol. I, q. 81, a 1; "movetur anima non pedibus sed affectibus." Aug. de Joan tr. 48, n. 3.

<sup>15</sup> S. Augustine shows that the soul "grows" and "decreases" in a figurative sense. De quant. An., n. 33, 36-40.

proved (a)  
from the  
conserva-  
tion of  
energy.

(1) thought  
cannot be  
a physical  
force.

(2) thought  
not a reflex  
action.

(3) not the  
conse-  
quence of  
conserva-  
tion of  
energy.

§ 30. Mind is not a physical force; nor as Mr. James contends, can appetite and feeling of effort be traced to simple muscular sensations, the reflects of motions already effected. This is proved *from the law of the conservation of energy*. (1) According to this law the sum of the physical forces in the universe is ever the same, e. g., the mechanical equivalent of heat is 772 foot-pounds. Now this law cannot be applied to thought. Heat, electricity, etc., can be measured and transformed one into the other; not so thought or will. They are beyond the range of mechanical instruments and cannot be computed by physical processes.<sup>16</sup>

§ 31. (2) Again the thought is not as Mr. Spencer and Mr. James maintain a reflex action following on an impulse from without. Very often there is no external impulse, e. g., the thoughts and feelings which arise during meditation or examination of conscience or recollection of the past; often the impulse is had without however producing an effect, e. g., I try to rouse a lazy man to labor, or some one insults me and I repress my temper from a motive of Christian virtue; often there is no proportion between the impulse and the effect produced, e. g., a few words announcing the death of a relative move me deeply. The law of Weber is based on the fact that sensations are not equal to the excitation. Hence there is no necessary correlation or rigorous proportion.

§ 32. (3) But they maintain that there must be a correlation between impulse and thought, although we cannot detect it, because the law of the conservation of energy suffers no exception; hence if thought were not equal to impulse or vice versa, some force would

<sup>16</sup> Cf. McCosh Christianity and Positivism, p. 210 sq.

be lost contrary to the great law of Physics.<sup>17</sup> This is their great argument. It seems peremptory. Nevertheless the answer is as simple as it is complete. We do not here question the law of conservation; there is no necessity to do so. An impulse is received in the sensitive organ, e. g., of touch, with what result? Thought follows as a natural physical effect, they plainly affirm. That thought may follow on an impulse we do not gainsay, that thought is the *only* result, or that thought follows as a *physical effect*, we positively deny.

§ 33. It has been shown by careful experimentation that an impulse upon a sensitive organ produces immediately two physical effects; it quickens the molecular movements of the nervous substance, and as a consequence causes an increase of temperature. These molecular movements and caloric vibrations are always proportionate to the intensity of the external impulse. Hence the law of the conservation of energy remains intact. The movement coming from the outer world and striking the organ is exactly transformed into molecular changes and increase of temperature and thus restored to the external world in combustion and heat. The process has nothing to do with thought. Thought is outside the phenomena and the process of transformation.<sup>18</sup>

§ 34. (b) The transformation of the external impulse into combustion and heat shows how baseless is the contention of Prof. Geo. Barker that "the heat evolved during the reception of an idea is energy that has es-

Two effects  
of an  
impulse.

(b) the  
opinion  
of Prof.  
Barker  
criticised.

<sup>17</sup> This is an illustration of the materialistic theory that all phenomena can be explained by molecular Physics. cf. *Mivart Truth*, p. 391 foll.; *Bain Soul and Body*, ch. VI.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Farges *Le Cerveau l'ame*.



caped conversion into motion.”<sup>19</sup> We have seen that the energy of the impulse is exactly converted into combustion and heat; this may be expressed in the formula:  $E=c+h$ ; there is no loss, no spent energy; both terms of the equation are equivalent.

§ 35. (c) We do deny that the law of the transformation of forces embraces the organic world; thus, ex. gr., there is an equivalence between the heat expended by the muscles in performing mechanical work and the work done. Helmholtz has verified this by experimenting on the muscles of a frog. Let us grant that brain heat is transformed into thought; hence the more profoundly I think, the more heat I should lose, and the cooler the brain should become. As Prof. Barker admits, “In addition to the production of thought, a portion of the energy appears as nerve and muscle power; less, therefore, should appear as heat, according to our law of correlation.”<sup>20</sup> But the very contrary is the fact, as individual observation and scientific experimentation has proved. The argument he adduces from Prof. Lombard, that “the amount of heat developed by the recitation to one’s self of emotional poetry was in every case less when that recitation was oral,” tells decisively against his hypothesis. The increase of heat in the latter case is due to nervous actions.

increase of  
heat pro-  
portionate  
to the in-  
tensity of  
thought.

§ 36. Thus it is a fact of experience that the increase of heat is in proportion to the intensity of thought. The mind does not add to the sum of physical energy. There are potential as well as actual forces in the

<sup>19</sup> Cf. The Correlation of Vital and Physical Forces by Prof. Geo. Barker in *Half Hour with Modern Scientists*, vol. i; cf. also, Ch. Bray Force and its Mental Equivalents; Spencer Chap. Materialism, p. 13.

<sup>20</sup> *Ib.*

human system. The mind simply excites the potential forces to act. Thus it quickens the movements of the organs, e. g., the glance of the eye, the animated appearance of the body; and consequently causes the blood to flow more rapidly. Hence I can account for fatigue felt after severe mental labor, for the perspiration which gathers in drops upon my forehead.

§ 37. It is true also that spent condition of the body is proportionate to the severity of my mental labor, thus, ex. gr., the harder I study the more fatigued I become. But there is no mathematical or scientific equivalence. Daily experience proves that brain effort or organic waste is not index of the powers of mind, ex. gr., a dull child might distill perspiration like rain in the effort to solve a problem which a brighter child could easily work out. Fatigue of body only shows the power of will over the bodily frame, but that power is often exerted without much show of intelligence, ex. gr., in the effort to keep awake, or to concentrate mind when exhausted.<sup>21</sup>

§ 38. (c) Finally eminent scientists admit that the problem is insoluble to physical science. "When we shall possess the intimate knowledge of the brain," says Du Bois. Reymond, "The intellectual phenomena will be to us entirely as incomprehensible. The most intimate knowledge of the brain will reveal only matter in motion. But no arrangement nor any movement of material parts can serve as a bridge to pass into the field of intelligence. Movement can only produce movement or re-enter the state of potential energy. Potential energy in its turn can do

(c) from  
testimony  
of eminent  
scientists.

DuBois  
Reymond.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Abbe' Farges *Le Cerveau L'Ame*, ch. III. IV; "Darwinism and Other Essays," by J. Fiske, p. 72; "Present Day Tracts," No. 29; "Philosophy of H. Spencer," examined by Rev. J. Iverach.

nothing save to produce motion, to maintain equilibrium, exercise pression or traction." A little farther on he adds: "What conceivable connection subsists between definite movements of definite atoms in my brain on the one hand, and, on the other hand, such primordial, indefinable, undeniable facts as these: I feel pain or pleasure; I experience a sweet taste, or smell a rose, or hear an organ, or see something red. It is absolutely and forever inconceivable that a number of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen atoms should be otherwise than indifferent as to their own position and motion, past, present or future. It is utterly inconceivable how consciousness should result from their joint action."<sup>22</sup>

**Ferrier.**

§ 39. "How happens it," asks Mr. Ferrier, "that the molecular modifications in the cerebral cells coincide with the modifications of consciousness? How, for instance, do the light waves falling upon the retina excite the modifications of consciousness called sight-sensation? They are problems we can never solve. We can succeed in determining the exact nature of the molecular changes which are produced in the cerebral cells when a sensation is experienced, but that does not bring us an inch nearer the explanation of the fundamental nature of that which constitutes sensation."<sup>23</sup>

**Tyndall.**

§ 40. Mr. Tyndall is even more emphatic. "The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite thought and a definite molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously; we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any

<sup>22</sup> Upon the Limits of Natur. Phil., Sept., 1875.

<sup>23</sup> Funct. of Brain, §§ 88, 89.

rudiment of an organ, which would enable us to pass, by a process of reasoning, from the one to the other. They appear together, but we do not know why. Were our minds and senses so expanded, strengthened and illuminated as to enable us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain, were we capable of following all their motions, all their groupings, all their electric discharges, if such there be, and were we intimately acquainted with the corresponding states of thought and feeling, we should be as far as ever from the solution of the problem, how are these physical processes connected with the facts of consciousness? The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would still remain intellectually impassible. Let the consciousness of love, for example, be associated with a right-handed spiral motion of the molecules of the brain, and the consciousness of hate with a left-handed spiral motion. We should then know, when we love, that the motion is in one direction, and, when we hate, that the motion is in the other; but the 'why?' would remain as unanswerable as before."<sup>24</sup> Again, "The utmost he (the materialist) can affirm is the association of two classes of phenomena of whose real bond of union he is in absolute ignorance."<sup>25</sup> In the Belfast Address we find: "You cannot satisfy the human understanding in its demand for logical continuity between molecular processes and the phenomena of consciousness. This is a rock on which Materialism must inevitably split whenever it pretends to be a complete philosophy of life."

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Scientific Materialism in Fragments of Science.

<sup>25</sup> *Ib.*

Prof. Ladd. § 41. Finally, Prof. Ladd sums up the discussion of the subject with these words: "The phenomena of human consciousness must be regarded as activities of some other form of Real Being than the living molecules of the brain. They require a subject or ground which is in nature unlike the phosphorized fats of the central masses, the aggregate nerve-fibres and nerve cells of the cerebral cortex; that the Subject of the states of consciousness is a real being, standing in certain relation to the material beings which compose the substance of the brain, is a conclusion warranted by all the facts."<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Ladd *Physiological Psychology*, p. 606.

## ORIGIN OF THE SOUL.

§ 1. Philosophy is an examination of the fundamental causes which determine the existence of things. It embraces the first beginnings, as well as the actual condition and development. A philosophy of soul, therefore, would not be complete without an effort to explain its origin; the more so because attempts have been made which are not in accord with sound reasoning. question stated.

### I.

#### THEORY OF EMANATION.

§ 2. According to this view, the soul is an emanation of the Divine Substance; in its essence, therefore, it is a part of God. We find this opinion in the writings of the Stoics and Neo-Platonists. Pantheists of ancient and modern times have proposed it, if we except the ideal or phenomenal Pantheists, who hold that there is only one reality and that the world is an illusion. Nevertheless, even they resort to the theory of emanation to explain the illusion, e. g., the Vedanta.<sup>1</sup> its advocates.

§ 3. But this explanation is opposed to known facts. The reasons advanced by St. Thomas hold good to-day. He takes his stand on facts. It is a fact that the soul is finite or limited in its being and its powers; that it is changeable in as much as it is subject to modifications and is the subject of action and of passion, which vary with every passing moment; that it does not possess all its activity at one and the same time, nor is it always in act, but passes from potency to act.<sup>2</sup> criticism.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Gough Phil. of the Upanishads; S. Augustine de Gen. ad Lit. l. VII.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. S. Augustine Ep. 166, n. 3.

Hence he infers that such a being is not infinite, all-perfect, immutable; but is a distinct entity finite, imperfect and subject to change.<sup>3</sup>

## II.

### THEORY OF TRADUCIANISM.

exposition.

§ 4. Some have sought in the parents a reason for the origin of the soul. They contend that the soul is propagated to the offspring in the act of generation. The manner of propagation is explained in different ways. With some it is by means of a material force, e. g., Tertullian;<sup>4</sup> with others the transmission is effected by a spiritual agency, e. g., Apollonius as Gregory of Nyssa relates.<sup>5</sup> An illustration of this theory is seen in the way a taper is lighted from a candle. Or, from a materialistic point of view, the soul is considered as a germ or cell which was already precontained in the parent.

criticism.

§ 5. St. Thomas subjects this theory to a severe and judicious criticism. He holds that the soul is a spiritual and intellectual entity, as has been shown. But the act of generation is organic; whereas the activity of the soul is inorganic. Now no effect can transcend its cause, nor can a cause produce an effect of a higher order. Hence he concluded that the act of generation cannot be the sole cause which accounts for the origin of the soul, else we should have an effect of a nature transcending the cause.

§ 6. It is not denied that the act of generation conspires to the origin of the soul. The real point at issue is the nature of that relation. Scholastic phil-

<sup>3</sup> *Contra Gentes*. III, c85; St. Thomas I, q. 90, a I.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. S. Augustine de Gen. ad Lit., lib. X.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. also Augustine Epist., 165.

osophy maintains that it is not a casual relation. It teaches, as we shall see, that the act of generation is an occasion, but that the soul as an intellectual and spiritual entity is due to the creative act.<sup>6</sup>

### III.

#### THEORY OF MANIFESTATION.

§ 7. This seems to be the proper appellation of the view proposed by Prof. Ladd to account for the origin of mind or soul. He denies the theory of Creationism on the ground that it is without warrant and is unintelligible. He says that we "cannot be consistent and yet accept an unknowable entity in the form of a soul that has really not yet begun to be a soul, as the cause of no-phenomena." He speaks of the absurdity in the conception of a "ready-made soul," and at the manner of its being "posited in the tenement of a body."

Prof.  
Ladd's.

negative  
reasons.

§ 8. So much for his negative criticism. His positive and constructive teaching, however, is peculiar and deserving of passing notice. "The origin of every mind," he writes, "must be put at the exact point of time when that mind begins to act; its origin is in and of these its first conscious activities. Before this first activity the mind is not." But he adds: "It can not be admitted that, properly speaking, any mind springs into full being at a leap, as it were." "It springs constantly into a fuller being originating in a higher meaning of the word in a perpetual process, as the development of these activities."

positive  
reasons.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. C. Gent. BII, ch. 86, 89; Summa Theologiae I, q. 90, a 2; q. 100, a 1; I. Q. 118, a 2; I. 2, q. 81, a 1.

<sup>7</sup> Phil. of Mind, p. 364.



§ 9. Conscious, however, that this position was open to criticism, he proceeds to strengthen it by the statement that "in a modified way the theory of creation affords the only intelligible explanation of the first origin and of the perpetual process of originating which belongs to the individual human mind." His confusion and uncertainty becomes more apparent by the strange statement that "a vague reference to the order of nature as conditioning the rise and development of every stream of human consciousness would seem to be the last word that can be said." He then continues: "Out of this Universal Being, without seeming wholly to be accounted for by it, does every stream of consciousness rise." He concludes by quoting approvingly from Lotze: "At the place where and at the moment when the germ of an organic being is formed amid the coherent system of the physical course of nature, this fact furnishes the incitement or moving reason which induces the all-comprehending One Being to beget from Himself, besides, as a consistent supplement to such physical fact, the soul belonging to this organism."<sup>8</sup>

explained  
by his doc-  
trine of the  
soul.

criticism.

§ 10. The explanation of this theory is found in the strange view Prof. Ladd holds concerning the unity of the soul. To him the soul is a potential unity; it has the potency to become a unit and does so by a process of development. Therefore the origin of this unity is explained by the concurrence of the activities which go to form it into a specific entity. The same criticism which showed how unfounded and contradictory this assumption was can be applied to his explanation of the origin of the soul. The act of

<sup>8</sup> Outl. of Psych., third edition, § 81; cf. Lotze Outlines of Psychology, ed. by Prof. Ladd, p. 117.

consciousness by which I recognize myself as a thinking being does not make me so in fact. I was a rational creature before, and consciousness only testifies to the fact.

§ 11. He seems to recognize that the explanation as such is insufficient and has recourse to a modified view of creation. What that *modified* view is and how it differs from the Scholastic theory, he fails to explain. What his purpose is in recurring to the "order of nature" is difficult to perceive. If he means that bodily conditions influence the manifestation of mind, he is undoubtedly correct. But it is strange that he should appeal to bodily influence or the development of mind in a question which wholly concerns its origin. Such an appeal in the present case betrays either vagueness and incorrectness of thought, or a fallacy of reasoning. Compelled to have recourse to God for the rise of consciousness, he does so grudgingly by a modified statement. Yet he has given no reason for the modification. And at last, to add to his confusion, he seeks refuge in an opinion of Lotze, expressed in words whose plain meaning is a kind of Divine generationism.

\* § 12. The manifestations of consciousness or of thought are the effect of the mind or soul. The question at issue is not the explanation of these manifestations. The aim is to explain the origin of that being which produces these manifestations. We seek not the reason of the effect, but the reason of the cause. An illustration can be drawn from the plant-world. We do not explain the origin of the life in a plant by pointing to the first buds or blossoms. It is necessary to go farther back, to seek in the seed, which for days lay in the ground, dead to all appearances,

for the reason of that activity of which the bud and tendrils are only the manifestations. So likewise for the soul.

#### IV.

##### THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

§ 13. No philosophical theory has ever made the deep and widespread impression on the minds of men as the theory of Evolution. Set forth by Mr. Darwin in 1853, it immediately acquires a wide popularity. It was hailed by men as the universal solvent of all the riddles in the universe. Broached originally as a scientific theory, it soon assumed a philosophical aspect by an attempt to solve the origin of things. It was supposed to explain the beginnings of life. And in the hands of Mr. Romanes and Mr. Spencer it was elaborated into a theory which was considered capable of accounting for the origin of thought.<sup>9</sup>

aim of Mr.  
Spencer.

§ 14. In his *First Principles*, Mr. Spencer aims at showing that all phenomena, even those of life and thought, are convertible, and thus explain all things in terms of matter and of force. In the *Principles of Psychology* he applies these Principles to the phenomena of mind, and by an elaborate process attempts to verify them.<sup>10</sup> His task is to show that the phenomena of intelligence came from instinct, that instinct is developed by molecular movements, and thus to establish a unity in all these phenomena, and a continuity in their development.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Cf. S. Augustine de Gen. ad Lit. l. VII, n. 12, 13; X, n. 7.

<sup>10</sup> P. Tannery, in an article published in *Rev. Phil.*, March, 1882, p. 522, contends that the system of Spencer, the law of rythme, of successive integration and disintegration is nothing more than the hypothesis of Anaximandre on a little wider basis. cf. de Roberty "La Philosophie du siecle," p. 37.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Ribot *English Psychology*, p. 124 sq.; Spencer *Prin-*

§ 15. He thus explains the process. The fundam<sup>h</sup> is basis. mental trend of thought with Spencer is the denial of any precise line of demarkation between physiological and psychological facts, between the physical and the mental.<sup>12</sup> Hence there is a continuous series in the progression of life. The problem of Psychology is to determine the order in which one change follows another; i. e., to enunciate and explain the law of intelligence.<sup>13</sup>

§ 16. The law of intelligence follows successive law of intelligence. phases of development, e. g., reflex action, instinct, reflex action. thought and will. Reflex action is simply molecular reflex action. motion; it supposes an afferent nerve, an efferent sensation. fibre and a centre. Sensation is composite because made up of nervous shocks. The combination of nervous shocks into a unity of sensation is the first integration in the evolution of mind. Instinct is reflex action of a certain complexity. The simple reflex action is not accompanied by consciousness. This arises from the complexity, and is accordingly explained in terms of mechanical motion.<sup>14</sup>

§ 17. From instinct he derives reason. The process reason. is explained by an increase in the complexity of mental states. These states correspond to external relations, and as they increase the automatism of their movements is established with more difficulty, hence

ciples of Psychology, p. 349; Guthrie "Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution," 1879, and "Mr. Spencer's Unification of Knowledge," 1882.

<sup>12</sup> Prin. of Psych., p. 510.

<sup>13</sup> The evolutionary theory of soul is not new. S. Augustine refers to it: "omne quippe corpus in omne corpus mutari posse, credible est; quodlibet autem corpus mutari posse in animam, credere absurdum est." de Gen. ad lit. l. VII, n. 26.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. C. Morgan Introd. to Comp. Psychology, ch. XVIII, where the same teaching is found.

the action no longer possesses the mechanical infallibility of instinct, and reason is the result. The difference between instinct and reason consists in this, that the acts of instinct are decisive and rapid, whereas those of reason are slow and apparently hesitating. But he adds that reason can be transformed into instinct when by frequent experience groups of external impressions are allied to groups of mental states and habits result, and habits are acquired instincts. He thus infers that higher animals possess the faculty of special reasoning, that man possesses the faculty of general reasoning, and that between them there is no distinction.

law of  
heredity.

§ 18. But how explain the existence of the necessary laws and forms of thought, e. g., first principles of reason, which exist in the individual mind and are not acquired by experience? Mr. Spencer attempts the solution of this difficulty, and proposes a theory which is peculiarly his own. He sees the insufficiency of evolution and supplements it by the law of heredity.<sup>15</sup> He holds that these laws and forms of thought are the experiences of past ages accumulated and transmitted from generation to generation.<sup>16</sup>

(a) fails to  
explain  
the unity.

§ 19. Criticism: (a) Mr. Spencer speaks of a unity of shocks to make a sensation, and calls instinct a complex group of shocks, etc. But how does he explain this unity? There is a marvelous harmony in his theory; probably this is its most attractive feature; but with him it is a pure and gratuitous

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Present Day Tracts, No. 29, "Philosophy of H. Spencer Examined," by Rev. J. Iverach.

<sup>16</sup> By considering what is *a priori* in the individual to be a *posteriori* in the human race, Spencer and Lewes depart from J. S. Mill, and form a new development in English Psychology. cf. Courtney Studies in Philosophy, ch. V.

assumption. He utterly fails to tell us how and why it is so. Is it due to an innate tendency in the molecular motions? He cannot admit this, because he denies every vestige of finality.<sup>17</sup> Is it due to a co-ordinating principle? He is silent because that would constrain him to admit the existence of a soul. Mr. Spencer is an Associationist; therefore he proposes a Phenomenal Psychology, i. e., mind to him is a series of states. He differs from other Phenomenalists only in the systematic effort to explain this series by the correlation of physical forces. The strange feature is that he does not explain the unity of consciousness which gives harmony to the mental life. Now a theory which rests upon and is pervaded throughout by an assumption is not philosophical.

§ 20. (b) Instinct is not the outcome of reflex action. At most we admit an analogy between them. How can reflex action explain the fact that chickens, two minutes after leaving the egg, will watch the crawling worm or answer the hen's call; or the dread in some birds of the hawk; or the fact that birds fly; or the devices of insects to protect their young and avoid danger to themselves. Reflex action is restricted to the present act; instinct is a definite plan of action which embraces the present and the future.

(b) Instinct has not its source in reflex action.

§ 21. (c) He does not explain the origin of consciousness. He admits that the simplest reflex action is not accompanied by consciousness. Where, then and how, does consciousness arise? If the development from reflex action to instinct and to reason is carried on in the same plan, then consciousness should also be found in the nervous action contrary to Mr.

(c) origin of consciousness.

<sup>17</sup> Mr. Morgan admits a "selective synthesis" in the grouping. Cf. *Intr. to Comp. Psych.*, p. 351.

Spencer's express statement. As it is not, it must have arisen at some stage of the evolution.<sup>18</sup>

(d) unity  
of con-  
sciousness.

(d) Nor does he explain the unity of consciousness. Some indivisible unit-element is necessary to focus, as it were, all these impressions. But in the hypothesis of Mr. Spencer there is no such unifying force. The attempt to explain this unity, after the analogy of the composition of Physical forces is a failure.<sup>19</sup> The unity of many elements explains the *quantity* of the sensation, but consciousness is something differing in *quality* from a nervous shock. He says consciousness implies a change in the subject; but he does not tell what the change is, and forgets that a subject cannot undergo a change unless we admit in it a permanent element.<sup>20</sup>

(e) wrong  
notion of  
mind.

§ 22 (e) To Spencer mind is passive; it is a group-  
ing of impressions.<sup>21</sup> But this is not true. The mind is an active agency. Consciousness testifies to this truth. How can a passive group of impressions under the action of physical force explain the boundless range of the intellect or the existence of a moral law binding on all. The imperative command of duty in face of opposition and contrary to utility is not a passive

<sup>18</sup> "The history of speculation has sufficiently shown that all theories which make consciousness ultimately dependent upon the evolution of unconscious forms of existence, succeed only by smuggling into their explanations something which the very essentials of the theories require them to leave out." G. Ladd "Consciousness and Evolution" in *Psych. Rev.*, 1896, p. 298.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Lotze *Psychology*, ed. by Prof. Ladd, p. 94. Mr. Huxley is more modest than Mr. Spencer. In contending that the organic is the development of the inorganic he bids us "recollect that science has put her foot upon the bottom round of the ladder." cf. Huxley *Origin of Species* III.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Guthrie *Spencer's Unification of Knowledge*, p. 155.

<sup>21</sup> *Prin. of Psych.*, vol. I, p. 626.

state of physical forces. Nor is there any exact equivalence between the impression and the thought as he maintains.<sup>22</sup> He seems never to have perceived the real nature of substance and thus fails to grasp the true meaning of mind.

§ 23 (f) The theory of heredity puts back the problem, but does not solve it. Even granting that heredity may explain the fact that I have necessary forms of thought prior to experiences, how will it account for the first possession of these principles? How can heredity explain the commencement of the difference between man and ape? The meaning of the word "heredity" is "transmission," not "acquisition."

(f) theory of heredity does not help.

§ 24. Again his theory of heredity as applied to mind is gratuitous. It implies that there is no distinction between sensation and thought, between mind and matter. This is absolutely false. It is a refined form of Materialism, and Materialism as a theory is in opposition to known facts. Again, how, according to the theory of heredity, can we explain the great difference between children of the same parents? Or how account for the fact that men of great ability fail to transmit their accumulated experiences to their children? Mind is not the product of individual or of race experience. How explain the creations of poet, artist, musician? Experience gives the stimulus of mental activity; but in the mind itself there is a creative and masterful power which moulds and fashions experience to finer forms and vaster issues.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Chapter on Brain and Thought.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Welch "Faith and Modern Thought," p. 41 sq.; T. Green in *Contem. Rev.* beginning Dec., 1877; J. Caird *Introd. to Phil. of Relig.*, p. 10 sq.; Bowne *Phil. of H. Spencer*, 1874.



## V.

## THEORY OF CREATION.

(a) from  
nature of  
the soul.Soul is  
subsistent.

§ 25. This is the theory of Scholastic Philosophy. St. Thomas sums up the arguments for it.<sup>24</sup> The reasons are drawn from the nature of the soul. (a) The soul cannot owe its existence to pre-existing matter. It is a spiritual entity capable of existing independent of matter. Hence no necessary intrinsic dependence on matter. This consideration has the more force when we bear in mind that St. Thomas proposes the subsistence of the human soul as a distinctive characteristic, marking it off from the souls of brutes. They, he contends, are transmitted by generation, because they depend on matter and are involved in matter. Not so, however, the human soul.

(b) soul is  
spiritual.

§ 26. (b) Again he maintains that it is impossible for a material force to extend its activity so far as to produce an spiritual effect. The intellectual principles in man, i. e., the soul, entirely transcend matter. Hence the mind or soul must come from another source, i. e., creation.<sup>25</sup> (c) Finally the theory of Creation receives strength from the refutation of the other explanations advanced for the origin of the soul. They cannot be held. Known facts and sound reasoning are against them. Hence their rejection can be considered as a negative argument in favor of Creation.<sup>26</sup>

c) from  
refutation  
of other  
theories.

<sup>24</sup> C. Gent. III, ch. 83-87; Summa Theol. I, q. 90, a 2; q. 118, a 2.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Aristotle De Gener. Anim. 12 c3; Cicero Tuscul. Disput. I, I, 27.

<sup>26</sup> Aug. Contra Fortum, n. 12, 13; de actis cum Felice, l. 2, n. XX; De An. et ejus Origine l. I, n. 24; Ep. 166, n. 8; Ep. 190, al. 157 ad Optatum; de quant. an., n. 2; de Gen. ad Lit. L. VII, X.

## IMMORTALITY.

§ 1. The Immortality of the soul is a theme which possesses a singular and fascinating power. It has inspired some of the most beautiful passages in literature; it awakens great and noble thoughts, and rouses to a consciousness of our dignity; it has strengthened the soul to attempt sublime deeds of heroism. The hope that somehow after death man shall yet live on lies deep in the breast of the savage, brings comfort and strength to the heavy labors of lowly life, or shines like a beacon of light and cheer on the solitary meditations of the student. Belief in Immortality is indissolubly connected with our notions of God, of morality, with our convictions of moral freedom, of the sacredness of Right, of the majesty of Truth. We shall here investigate the nature and the grounds of this belief.

### I.

#### METHOD.

§ 2. The belief in Immortality finds expression in many forms. Various also are the considerations proposed by different thinkers as reasons for the faith that is in them. The method to be followed, therefore, considers the question under all aspects and draws from all sources of knowledge. Literature, the mirror of thought, reflects the varied forms in which the human mind clothed its belief that the soul was immortal. History, Philosophy, Psychology, Ethics, the Physical sciences, each has its own considerations which serve as proofs or as analogies to substantiate this conviction.

## II.

## THEORIES.

1) Theory  
of Materialism.

§ 3. (1°) Materialism assumes that matter and force alone exist, that at most the soul is only an organic function of the brain. Hence it concludes that this life is all; that beyond the grave there is nothing. Many reasons can be given to account for the fact that some have denied the life after death.

(a) the  
reason of  
the Free-  
Thinker,

§ 4. (a) There is the reason alleged by the *free-thinker*. His consists in a protest against false, exaggerated or superstitious views of revealed religion. The result is a revolt from revealed truth and a fall to the other extreme of hostility and total unbelief. The notion of a future life, therefore, becomes a myth or fiction of the mind. To maintain that we shall live after death would be to hold some element of religious belief.<sup>1</sup>

(b) worldly  
minded.

§ 5. (b) The reason of the *worldly-minded* comes also as a protest. To them the future life is clouded with dread and gloom. Its belief means a restraint upon the pleasures and joys of life. Happiness is thus destroyed and life is not worth living. Hence life after death is rejected as something visionary; the present alone is real; and the aim should be to catch the pleasures of the fleeting day. This is the position of the Epicure in ancient as in modern times. It appears in the poetry of Horace as well as that of Heine.

(c) from a  
degraded  
life.

§ 6. (c) There are those whose low degraded life has quenched the hope of immortality. This happens either because a life given over to sensual pleasures

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bowen Materialism and Eth. Science, p. 2, chapter 9; Courtney Future States.

carries its own curse; the body becomes surfeited and falls a prey to disease; the misery of existence itself becomes unbearable; death is looked to as the end of all and as such is hailed a blessing. Or the mind and heart made beastly by sensualism give no intimation, emit not the faintest beam of another life. Their higher, nobler nature has been deadened by intercourse with what is lowest and most vile.

§ 7. (d) Scientific Materialism, however, seeks stronger and more cogent arguments. Thus they contend that the soul is not a separate entity; that what we call the soul is only the result of the combination of brain-cells and cerebral activities. Hence with the death of the body, these elements or parts separate, and in consequence the soul vanishes.<sup>2</sup> This reasoning has been shown to be false.<sup>3</sup> Consciousness testifies that the soul is a substantial entity. Its unity is not a collection of parts.<sup>4</sup>

§ 8. (e) Finally resort is had to the fact that death is to all appearances the end of individual existence. We admit that with death the body dissolves into dust. The problem, however, concerns not the body but the soul. To assume the death of the soul, from the actual dissolution of the body is a fallacy, which in Logic is termed "begging the question."

§ 9. The theory of materialism has been called the theory of Annihilation. It is to be rejected because the principles from which it springs are false. Materialism, as has been shown, is not a rational or satisfactory theory of life. It is a partial and one-sided view. In attempting to solve the problems of human life, it

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Dr. Mandsley Physiology and Pathology of Mind.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Substantiality of Soul.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Simplicity of Soul.

destroys the highest, noblest attributes of man, and presents as the result a mutilated humanity.

### 2°. *Pantheism.*

2° Theory  
of Panthe-  
ism.

§ 10. Pantheism denies the existence of the individual soul. It admits that there is in us a divine something. This divine self is an emanation from or a transient phase of the one great Soul which envelops all and is all. Just as the ripples sink into the calm surface of the lake; just as my breath is part of and mingles with the atmosphere which envelops me, so my soul melts into or fades into the all-pervading Spirit.<sup>5</sup>

criticism  
of this  
Theory.

§ 11. This theory keeps the shadow of the soul and the vesture of immortality. But if death brings a loss of consciousness; if I am no longer a person with the capacity to enjoy a rational existence; then there is no future life for *me*. Death means the end for *me*; whatever survives, it is not *I*. This differs from annihilation only in name. Again this theory is a false presentation of what is true. We come from God, but not as parts of His substance nor as manifestations or modes of His essence. The soul is destined to return to God and reach the fullness of happiness by union with Him, but this union is not an absorption into God's essence, nor does it infer a loss of consciousness. Christian Theodicy sets forth the true nature of our dependence on God. The theory of Pantheism has been called the theory of Absorption. It differs in name only from the Materialistic hypothesis.

### 3°. *Scepticism.*

3° Scepti-  
cism.

§ 12. Another theory, or rather aspect of Immortality is presented by Scepticism. It maintains that we

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Emerson, Schleiermacher.

cannot prove a future life, therefore, that the proper and rational state of mind on such a question is one of doubt and suspense. Allusion is made to the *modern* spirit of scepticism. The generation which is now passing has been deeply imbued with its fatal poison. It has blighted minds of great gifts and promises; it has lowered the standard of life; it has brought unhappiness and gloom to many a heart.

§ 13. Thus J. S. Mill in summing up his criticism of its leaders. the proofs for immortality calmly declares that there J S. Mill. is no clear evidence for or against.<sup>6</sup> Mr. Emerson tells Mr. Emerson. us that man fails in attempting to teach separately the doctrine of Immortality; that from the very nature of man a veil shuts down on the facts of to-morrow.<sup>7</sup> Mr. Mr. Arnold. Matthew Arnold holds that belief in Immortality is in excess of the evidence. To him death is

The stern law of every mortal lot  
Which man, proud man, finds hard to bear,  
And builds himself, I know not what  
Of second life, I know not where.<sup>8</sup>

The poems of Tennyson show that its influence had Tennyson. hold on his mind.<sup>9</sup>

But what am I?  
An infant crying in the night;  
An infant crying for the light;  
And with no language but a cry.

Here and there, however, signs of a returning hope are seen. The gloom of doubt hangs over the writings of Carlyle and Froude,<sup>10</sup> of Morley and Renan. The

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Mill Three Essays on Religion, p. 197 sq.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Emerson Essays, "the Over-Soul."

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Hutton Modern Guides of English Thought in Matters of Faith, p. 125.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. In Mem. 54.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Essay on Progress; the Nemesis of Faith.

French novel of Zola, of Manpassant; of Daudet,<sup>11</sup> of Bourget, ex. gr., "Mensonges;" have helped to spread its influence.<sup>12</sup> It is revealed in the work of Thomas Hardy, of Mrs. H. Ward's "Robert Elsmere," and of G. Eliot's "Middlemarch."<sup>13</sup>

### III.

#### SUBSTITUTES FOR IMMORTALITY.

§ 14. The hope of a life beyond the grave is too deeply imbedded in the soul of man to be totally eradicated. The voice of human nature will make itself heard. Immortality is only the expression of that longing and hope for better things than what this life affords. If the true conception of Immortality is denied, man is constrained to invent some artificial substitute.

(a) Immortality of the material elements of my toly.

§ 15. Thus (a) some base Immortality on the scientific truth of the conservation and indestructibility of matter. They maintain that all things possess immor-

<sup>11</sup> Cf. "The Ave Maria," Jan. 29, 1898, p. 150.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. "Neo-Christian Movement in France," in Amer. Jour. of Psych., 1892-93, p. 496.

<sup>13</sup> "I remember," writes Mr. Myers in an essay on G. Eliot, "how at Cambridge I walked with her once in the Fellows' Garden of Trinity, on an evening of rainy May, and she, stirred somewhat beyond her wont, and taking as her text the three words which have been used so often as the inspiring trumpet-calls of men — the words *God, Immortality, Duty* — pronounced, with terrible earnestness, how inconceivable was the *first*, how unbelievable was the *second*, and yet how peremptory and absolute the third. Never, perhaps, had sterner accents affirmed the sovereignty of impersonal and unrecompensing law. I listened, and night fell; her grave, majestic countenance turned towards me like a Sybil's in the gloom; it was as though she withdrew from my grasp, one by one, the two scrolls of promise, and left me the third scroll only, awful with inevitable fate." cf. Hutton Modern Guides of English Thought in Matters of Faith, p. 271.

tality, in this sense that the elements are never destroyed, but constantly combine into new forms. Hence the individual disintegrates, but the elements of his being enter into other combinations. Nature presents the constant and unending process of redintegrations and recreations. Man himself comes under the sway of the universal law. He is part of the totality of being.<sup>14</sup>

§ 16. (b) Others confound Immortality with the scientific truth of the conservation of Energy. To them man is a certain force; this force is the sum of his character and his life; it is manifested in every thought and action. His activity shall never die, but shall go on exerting its influence on the course of subsequent history. Thus a good or bad act, a good or bad life have physical effects in uplifting or lowering the lives of those who are my contemporaries and through them influence those who shall come after me. The influence of my life shall ever go on and shall never cease. In this sense, therefore, they contend that man is immortal.

(b) of the conservation of energy.

§ 17. (c) Closely akin to this view is the teaching of Buddhism. Orthodox Buddhism maintains that man has no soul in our sense of the word.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless it must offer some sanction for a good life, and on the other hand would do violence to human nature if it did not preserve some shadow of a future existence. Hence the doctrine of Karma.

(c) of Buddhism.

§ 18. Karma is not a separate entity. It is another word for moral character; it is the sum of all the moral activities and influences which have shaped my life. Death causes the dissolution of the body. My body

Karma.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Lucretius De Nat. Rerum III, No. 78.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Chapter on Substantiality of the Soul.



no longer exists, but on this account I do not cease to live. My character, the influences which have formed and moulded me into an individual distinct from other men — in a word, my Karma yet lives on. The moment it is freed from this present existence by the dissolution of the body, it enters in all its totality into another corporal existence lower or higher in the scale of being according as my life has been bad or good. In the former view, my character or moral influence was scattered with death and mingled with the totality of force in its perpetual motion. According to the teaching of Buddhism, however, my character whole and entire enters into and determines some new individual form of being. This teaching can be well termed the Transmigration of character, and is a shadow of the Transmigration of soul, a doctrine held by Brahmanism from which Buddhism sprang.

(d) Immortality of glory.

§ 19. (d) Finally there is the immortality of glory and of a good name. As poets immortalize themselves in song; as heroes by their glorious deeds; so should we by a noble life seek a name that shall live forever. The great and good life we led will exert the moral influence of example on those who come after, and generations yet unborn will rise up to call us blessed.<sup>16</sup>

The Immortality of Positivism.

§ 20. This is the immortality of Positivism. Thus Comte contends that "Positivism greatly improves immortality and places it in a firmer foundation by changing it from objective to subjective; this subjective immortality, he says, exists in the brains of the living."<sup>17</sup> The immortality of character is well put by G. Eliot.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Cic. Ques. Tusc. bI, ch. 14, 15.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Comte Catec. of Positiv. Relig. con. 3; A Positivist Primer, by C. G. David, p. 18.

Oh, may I join the choir invisible  
 Of those immortal dead who live again  
 In minds made better by their presence; live  
 In pulses stirred to generosity,  
 In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn  
 For miserable aims that end with self,  
 In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars,  
 And with their mild persistence urge men's search  
 To vaster issues. So to live is heaven.<sup>18</sup>

## IV.

## THE FACT.

§ 21. It is not necessary to make an assumption in the effort to prove the immortality of the soul. The basis of our reasoning is a fact. This fact becomes the strongest of arguments when thrown into logical form. It may be thus stated: It is a fact that all nations, at all times, have always believed in the existence of the soul after death. This belief prevails among the most civilized as well as among barbarous nations.<sup>19</sup> The progress of education and the march of civilization far from destroying only strengthens and perfects the belief. It is a belief inseparably connected with the moral and religious convictions of mankind.<sup>20</sup>

The basis  
 of our  
 argument  
 for immor-  
 tality is a  
 fact.

§ 22. Now it is a law of sound reasoning that a conviction concerning a moral or religious truth, which has always prevailed among all peoples, which grows

The argu-  
 ment form-  
 ulated.

<sup>18</sup> Legend of Jubal.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Cicero *Disp. Tusc.* I; Tyler "Primitive Culture, vol. I, p. 425; II, p. 18; H. Spencer *First Principles*, p. 4, 13; Chateaubriand *Genius of Christianity* B VI, ch. III.

<sup>20</sup> "However degraded these people may be, there is no need telling them of the existence of God or of a future life. These two truths are universally admitted in Africa. If we speak to them of a dead man, they reply 'He is gone to God.'" Livingstone *Explorations in S. Africa*. Quatrefages, commenting on this, says: "All the testimony collected upon points the most remote by different travelers confirm this." cf. Quatrefages "The Pigmies, ch. VII; "The Human Species," "Hommes Fossiles et Hommes Sauvages."

stronger with the advance of civilization, is not due to a temporary or accidental cause, but must have a reason for its existence as sound and as universal as the belief itself; and that this reason can be no other than our common human nature. Therefore, the belief in immortality, inasmuch as it possesses all these characteristics is the voice and the heritage of our own common humanity.

objection  
that na-  
tions differ  
in their  
concep-  
tions of a  
future life.

§ 23. It is by no means true, however, to hold that all peoples have held the same conceptions of the future life. A cursory acquaintance with literature and history shows that the contrary is the case. Thus the Elysium of Homer and Virgil <sup>21</sup> differs totally from the Paradise of Dante.<sup>22</sup> The happy hunting-ground of the American Indian is not the Wandalla of the Norseman or the future state of the Egyptian.<sup>23</sup> These differences are due to the accidental causes of temperament, of occupations during life, etc., and with Dante to the light of Christian Theology. Nevertheless the same universal fact, that we live after death, prevails throughout.

objection  
that indi-  
viduals  
have de-  
nied im-  
mortality.

§ 24. Nor is the strength of the argument weakened by the assertion that some have denied a future life. We contend only for a moral universality. This admits the possibility of individual exceptions. Individuals have been found who from one reason or another have refused to believe in immortality. Their isolated stand only emphasizes the fact that all others do accept it. Moreover, in denying the true conception, they are constrained to hold a substitute. They cannot blot it completely from their lives.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Odyssy* B XI; *Eneid* B V.

<sup>22</sup> *Paradise* XXXIII.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *Book of the Dead*.

§ 25. A difficulty of more weight is the contention advanced that there have been nations who have not believed in a future state. Two instances, e. g., the Jews of the Old Testament and the Buddhists, have been cited. Upon examination, however, it will be found that this objection has more apparent than real force.

objection that nations have not believed in Immortality.

### 1°. *The Jews.*

§ 26. There is no doubt that the Jews, from the time of the captivity, have believed in a future state after death. The writings of the period give unmistakable traces of this belief. The contention is that the Jews before that time had no such conviction; that the new doctrine was learned from other nations.<sup>24</sup>

objection examined (a) for the Jews before the Captivity.

§ 27. Nevertheless a careful study presents reasons which strongly incline to the fact that at all times the Jews held the same belief. Thus (1) Moyses is said to have been well versed in the learning of the Egyptians and we have indubitable evidence that the Egyptians held the existence of a future state. (2) It is hard to suppose that God would have left them, His chosen people, in ignorance of a truth which has so important a bearing on daily life. (3) Express mention is made of the Sadduces as a sect which denied the resurrection. Now how can we explain the fact that a few only, and for unsound reasons, denied future existence, while the rest of the Jews held the belief, unless for the same reasons which account for the prevalence of the doctrine with other peoples. (4) In the early books of the Bible there are indications which assure us that belief in a future state was common. Thus divination is severely prohibited;<sup>25</sup> Saul is instanced calling up the

(1) from intercourse of Jews with the Egyptians.

(2) the Jews were God's chosen people.

(3) the Sadduces denied this truth.

(4) from the passages of early books.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Mallock "Is Life Worth Living," p. 27.

<sup>25</sup> Deut. XVIII: Leviticus XX.

witch of Endor;<sup>26</sup> the patriarchs are "gathered to their people" and "buried with their fathers."

(5) the  
Jews  
of the Pen-  
tateuch  
were a  
Theocracy.

§ 27. (5) It is true that in the Pentateuch temporal blessings and menaces are the sanction for the observance of the law. But we must remember that the Jewish nation of the time was a Theocracy. Hence the temporal promises or punishments were addressed not to the individual, but to the nation as a whole. A nation's prosperity and destiny are earthly; so likewise are its laws and means of government. To transfer these to the individual would be an egregious error.

The con-  
clusion.

§ 28. The conclusion therefore is beyond doubt. Only a partial view or falsification of facts could induce the statement that the Jews of ancient times denied a future life.

## 2°. *Buddhism.*

(b) for the  
Buddhists.  
(1) dis-  
tinction  
between  
creed of  
Buddhists  
and the  
belief of  
Buddhists.

Meaning of  
Nirvana.

It is necessary to draw a distinction between the philosophical creed of Buddhism and the common belief of Buddhists themselves. To confound one with the other is to commit a logical blunder and open the way for confusion and error. The goal of Buddhism is Nirvana. The philosophical meaning of the term is disputed. Some writers incline to the view that it means total extinction of life or being. Others, e. g., Colebrooke,<sup>27</sup> Wilson, Hodgson, Vans Kennedy, Williams,<sup>28</sup> maintain that it is a state of apathetic calm. Prof. Davids,<sup>29</sup> Kellogg<sup>30</sup> and Childers,<sup>31</sup> however, say

<sup>26</sup> I. Kings, XXIV, 7.

<sup>27</sup> Essays.

<sup>28</sup> Buddhism.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Buddhism.

<sup>30</sup> The Light of Asia and the Light of the World.

<sup>31</sup> Pali Dictionary.

that Nirvana sometimes means a mental state of absolute calm attainable in this life, a state which infallibly issues into total and everlasting extinction of being, i. e., into Parinirvana. Finally some, e. g., Brahmo-Somaj, by Nirvana mean the peace and rest which comes from the subjection and conquest of carnal self.<sup>32</sup>

§ 30. But if we examine the practical belief of the Buddhists themselves, there is no doubt that they accept the doctrine of a future life. Gotama himself, who preached the gospel of annihilation, is worshipped as a God. The heaven of the Buddhist is an abode with Buddha, attainable after a long series of transmigrations. Their descriptions of it are very fanciful and often ludicrous. Nevertheless it is a contribution which swells the universal accord in the existence of another life. Thus Max Muller says: "Even if Nirvana, in its original meaning, were an utter blank, then out of that very nothing human nature made a new Paradise."<sup>33</sup>

§ 31. Hence we may safely conclude to the fact that belief in the immortality of the soul is universal. But this universal belief is not inconsistent with the fact that some have denied it. Moreover, the belief has been fashioned and colored by circumstances of race, of time, and of place; but in most cases it appears as a belief in a shadowy existence in some under-world. Finally the belief has been purer and more in accord with truth, in proportion as peoples have held a purer

<sup>32</sup> To P. Deussen Nirvana is the goal of morality. His works is a blending of Kant, Schoppenhauer and the Vedante. cf. *Elements of Metaphysics* by P. Deussen.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Muller *Science of Religion* "Buddhist Nihilism;" *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. I, Lecture XI.

conception of God and possessed a more perfect standard of morality.<sup>34</sup>

## V.

## REASONS FOR THE BELIEF.

Intrinsic  
and Ex-  
trinsic Im-  
mortality.

§ 32. Scholastic writers make a distinction between an intrinsic and an extrinsic immortality. Thus the soul is said to be *intrinsically* immortal because its nature is such that it cannot cease to exist by a dissolution of parts or by its separation from the body. It is *extrinsically* immortal because it cannot be annihilated by another power, i. e., God.

1°. *Intrinsic Immortality.*

Proofs for  
Intrinsic  
Immortality.  
(a from  
nature of  
the soul.

The soul  
is not  
made up  
of parts.

The soul  
is not  
dependent  
on the  
body.

The considerations which are brought forward to prove that the soul is immortal are drawn from various sources and have a cumulative force. (a) *From the nature of the soul:* The first proofs proposed by St. Thomas for the immortality of the soul are drawn from its nature as a spiritual entity.<sup>35</sup> He says that the soul is a simple spiritual entity not made up of parts; hence it is not corruptible, because decay has effect only in compounds which are dissoluble. Again he says that the soul is a subsistent entity, i. e., it is a spiritual being independent of the body; hence it does not cease to exist by its separation from the body. The conclusion, therefore, is evident that by its nature the soul is capable of an immortal existence. The immortality of the soul is therefore the logical and inevitable consequence of its spiritual and inorganic nature.<sup>36</sup> The latter leads to the former. Now, as the spirituality has

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Alger, *Doctrine of a Future Life*.

<sup>35</sup> C. Gent. III, ch. 55, 79; Sum. Theol. I, q. 75, a. 6.

<sup>36</sup> S. Thomas S. Theolog. I, q. 105, a. 4.

been placed beyond doubt, we must also accept the immortality.<sup>37</sup>

§ 34. Prof. Ladd approves the line of reasoning. He holds that all inquiry into the reasonableness of the belief in immortality should take its start from the psychological point of view.<sup>38</sup> Yet he maintains that immortality of mind cannot be proved from its nature as that of a real, self-identical and unitary being; nor is its permanence, as known to itself, of an order to allow the sure inference of its continued and permanent existence after death.<sup>39</sup>

§ 35. The reasons alleged for this view are principally (1) the existence which we call "Mind" is never known—even when observed in its most exalted states and in the exercise of its most highly spiritual activities—as released wholly from bodily conditions.<sup>40</sup>

(2) The deniers of immortality are strongest in their appeal to facts of physiological psychology and Psycho-Physics. For the fact appears to be that under certain material conditions the mind ceases from all that in which its only known and intelligible being actually consists. Hence he concludes that in the arena of Psycho-Physics it is a drawn battle.<sup>41</sup>

§ 36. These two reasons have no real weight against our thesis. They were carefully examined in treating the spirituality of the soul. Their force was seen to be more apparent than real. If they could not weaken that thesis, a *fortiori* they have no power to overturn

<sup>37</sup> We do not, therefore, as Lotze seems to think, draw the immortality from the *substantiality* of the soul. cf. *Outlines of Psychology*, ed. by Ladd, p. 112.

<sup>38</sup> Ladd *Philosophy of Mind*, p. 397.

<sup>39</sup> *Ib.*, p. 398.

<sup>40</sup> *Ib.*, p. 400.

<sup>41</sup> Pp. 402, 403.



our present contention. The source of Prof. Ladd's difficulties is the failure to grasp the true nature of the soul, to see it as a simple spiritual entity.

(b) from  
the moral  
order.

revealed in  
conscience.

§ 37. (b) From the moral order: The existence of a moral order in the world is a fact which cannot be denied. There is in the soul of every rational creature a hidden monitor which proclaims the ineradicable distinction between good and evil. Its voice is heard at every waking moment, directing, urging, constraining us to good acts; restraining from, forbidding bad actions; praising, rewarding for work well done with peace and buoyancy of mind; or reproaching and punishing with the sting of remorse and sorrow. It is the judge of our every thought and act, and its decisions are the promulgations and applications of an eternal law which is grounded in the very depths of our being. We may fly to the ends of the earth, we cannot escape its vigilance or its sentence. Hence the commands of "duty," the consciousness of moral obligation — the "ought" or "ought not" which is never absent. Kant felt the force of this categorical imperative, and from it reasoned to the existence of God.<sup>42</sup>

In the laws  
and cus-  
toms of  
mankind.

§ 38. What the conscience of the individual so clearly reveals pervades the laws, literature and religious beliefs of mankind. Everywhere is found the distinction between good and bad; everywhere the indelible marks of a morally constituted world. If peoples differ as to the morality of individual acts, the difference is due to the difference of circumstances or to an error of judgment. The great fundamental distinction between good and bad is never obliterated.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Chateaubriand *Genius of Christianity* B VI, ch. II; cf. Knight "Essays in Philosophy," p. 300; Newman *Grammar of Assent*, p. 106 sq.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Mivart *Truth*, p. 282.

§ 39. But a law so universal, so imperative is its be- necessity  
hests, must have a sanction. Ethics show that sanc- of a sanc-  
tion is an element which is of the essence of a law.  
Now in this case our present life contains no sufficient  
sanction. The distribution of the goods of this world  
is not just. The virtuous suffer throughout life and  
the wicked are prosperous. The reader can recall  
instances where noble and pure lives go down to the  
grave unrewarded, or perhaps aspersed by calumnious  
and envious tongues. The conditions under which  
men enter life are unequal. Worldly advantages of  
wealth and social position, endowments of body and  
of mind, opportunities for education and self-improve-  
ment are not the same for all. So, too, we pass through  
life at times under great disadvantages. To many life  
is an arena of tentative, baffled and incomplete effort.<sup>44</sup>

§ 40. How can the moral order of the universe be true, if those who violate it prosper and those who  
strive to obey its commands suffer miserably? Hence  
we infer the existence of another life where virtue shall  
receive its full and just reward, where the inequalities  
of the present existence shall be removed. This found  
in another  
life.

§ 41. (c) *Philosophical*: Under this heading are  
grouped all those considerations which arise from the  
study of the great powers with which man is endowed.  
Of all creatures inhabiting the globe man alone pos-  
sesses intelligence. Mind is a supreme and unique  
gift. Its powers can never be exhausted. The thirst  
for knowledge is never satisfied; the capacity for it is  
infinite. Swifter than the flash of light is the course  
of thought. Boundless is its range. It penetrates the  
(c) Philo-  
sophical.  
from  
powers of  
mind.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. the Psalms; Martineau "Study of Religion," vol. II, p. 370; Newman "Grammar of Assent;" Mivart Truth, pp. 487, 251.

heavens above and the earth beneath. In restless activity it ever seeks new worlds to explore and to subdue.<sup>45</sup> The material universe does not furnish sufficient food for thought. The mind passes its bounds, contemplates and puts into consistence the great truths of the moral order, e. g., justice, goodness, merit, reward, punishment, morality; nay even rises to God and discourses on His infinite perfection.<sup>46</sup>

from  
powers of  
will.

§ 42. Again man has a will which tends to and seeks the good. He is capable of love in all its forms and fullness. These higher emotions common speech locates in the heart. Here is found the meaning, the depth and the perfection of a life. Whence come the beautiful and noble emotions? The objects we see about us only occasion their exercise. They can never satisfy us. The heart is too great and deep to find in the passing pleasures and objects of life the satiety which it longs for. The author of Ecclesiastes had sounded all the sources of life's pleasures, and they brought him "sorrow and affliction of spirit." "Ad altiora nati!" was the exclamation of a Pagan.<sup>47</sup> The aspirations of a life so varied in passing forms, reaching back to the earliest childhood, increasing in vigor and definiteness as the years turn into youth and manhood, taking color maybe and affected to some extent by the circumstances of our condition, standing out

<sup>45</sup> Aug. Soliloq. l. II, n. 1. From the perpetuity of truth S. Augustine draws an argument for immortality of the soul. cf. Solil., n. 3, 4, 24, 33.

<sup>46</sup> Illuc (i. e., ad Deum) perge, anima," exclaims S. Aug., "contemptis ceteris vel etiam transcencis; illuc perge. Nihil potentius ista creatura, quae mens dicitur rationalis, nihil hac creatura sublimius; quidquid supra ipsam est, jam Creator est." In Joan tr. xxiii, n. 6; S. Thomas S. Theolog. I, q. 75, a 6.

<sup>47</sup> Cicero de Finibus l. II, n. 113.

like stars which guide our footsteps and incite us ever onward — all tell with persistent and increasing force that this world is not an abiding dwelling-place; that life is only a pilgrimage; that the fruition and rest lie beyond.

§ 43. Finally there is implanted in our souls a desire for happiness. Instinctively and irresistibly we seek what shall make us happy. This yearning is not blind and irrational; it is the bloom of our intelligent nature. The longing for happiness is universal with mankind, and appears in strongest and purest light with those who try to lead a noble and virtuous life.<sup>48</sup> from the desire of happiness.

§ 44. But the happiness of this world is fleeting and partial. Individual experience is proof that a heavy load of sorrow presses upon the children of men. We may strive for days and for years in the hope of enjoying a little happiness; when it comes some new care dispels the purity of our joy. The truth of this is seen in the philosophy of Pessimism, which has taken a deep hold on the minds of the present century; in the fact that the aim of our Christian religion has ever been to make men truly happy; in the conduct of our Divine Redeemer, who appealed to this insatiable desire of the human heart in the beautiful opening of the Sermon on the Mount, his first authoritative promulgation of "The Kingdom."<sup>49</sup> true happiness not found in this life.

§ 45. Unless, therefore, the desire for happiness be a delusion and folly, we must admit a future existence where it can be realized. That it is not a delusion is shown by the fact that it is the common possession of humanity. If to these considerations we add the slowness of human growth, the difficulties attending on the conclusion.

<sup>48</sup> August Serm. 150, n. 4; Card. Newman Apology, p. 267.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Matthew, ch. V, "Blessed are the poor in spirit," etc.

development of our higher powers, the shortness of the period during which they can be exercised, the argument derives a strength and cogency which convinces an impartial mind.<sup>50</sup>

Testimony  
of Literature.

§ 46. These thoughts find expression in the most beautiful passages of Literature. Socrates on the eve of death strengthens his soul with these reflections. Plato has preserved them for the delight of future generations.<sup>51</sup> Cicero tells that Plato seems to have convinced himself and to have made others wish he were right.<sup>52</sup> It comes out in Miss Proctor's "Incompleteness;" in Longfellow's "Psalm of Life;" in Wordsworth's "We Are Seven" and "Intimations of Immortality;" in Addison's "Cato;" in Gray's "Elegy." It faintly shines through Emerson's essay on Immortality and lines on death of his child.<sup>53</sup> Tennyson reasons that we cannot conceive of love as perishable,<sup>54</sup> expresses the common aspiration of the human race in "The Two Voices," and faces death with the hope strong, though vague within him.

"That I shall see my Pilot face to face  
When I shall cross the bar."<sup>55</sup>

It has inspired Mrs. Browning's "Sleep," and imparts the subtle magic charm to the most beautiful hymn in the English language, "Lead Kindly Light."

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Knight "Essays in Philosophy," p. 289 sq.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Phaedo, Republic.

<sup>52</sup> Quest. Tuscul. I, 21. "Ut enim rationem Plato nullam afferret (vide quid homini tribuam) ipse auctoritate me frangeret. Tot autem rationes attulit, ut velle ceteris, sibi certe persuasisse videatur."

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Brownson's Quarterly Rev., vol. I, p. 262, new series.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. "In Memoriam;" cf. Rob. Browning's "Evelyn Hope," "Reverie."

<sup>55</sup> Cf. "Crossing the Bar."

§ 47. (d) From Analogy — The Physical sciences (d) from Analogy.  
do not give proofs properly so-called for Immortality.

They move in a different sphere. Nevertheless they present some striking illustrations which to some minds add a certain weight to the main line of thought.

Thus science has shown that there is no such thing as death in the sense of annihilation. Death is only a dissolution, a transformation, a change in the mode of existence. The conservation of matter and of force are truths of science. In the vocabulary of science, therefore, there is no such word as annihilation. Now the soul is a spiritual entity having its own subsistence. Hence to affirm that it ceases to exist at the dissolution of the body is a gratuitous assumption unsupported by a single fact and directly opposed to the known truths of science. This is the line of argument followed by Bishop Butler in his "Analogy;"<sup>56</sup> and more recently was set forth by H. Drummond in his suggestive work, "Natural Law in the Spiritual World."<sup>57</sup>

Science has shown that there is no such word as death in the sense of annihilation.

§ 48 (e) Finally the belief in Immortality is not isolated. It permeates our intellectual and moral life; it is inseparably connected with other truths, e. g., God. Liberty, Justice, Providence, Morality. To suppress one is to suppress all. They stand or fall together. If I admit one, I must admit the others. This very con-

(e) from the intimate connection of Immortality with other truths.

<sup>56</sup> Ch. I "Of a Future Life."

<sup>57</sup> Some writers draw an argument for Immortality from the theory of evolution. To them man's place in nature is the last and best; all lower creations lead up to him; he is the crown and the explanation of the whole. Hence they argue that the whole process loses its meaning by the denial of the persistence of the spiritual element in man. Thus they are led to accept Immortality not as a demonstrable truth of science, but as a supreme act of faith in the reasonableness of God's work. (Cf. Fiske's "Destiny of Man;" Tennyson "In Memoriam;" T. Munger "The Appeal to Life." P. 245, 281 sq.)

nection adds a special force to the independent arguments.

2°. *Extrinsic Immortality.*

conclusion  
for intrinsic  
immortality.

§ 49. We therefore conclude with absolute certainty that the soul shall survive its dissolution from the body. But shall its existence be eternal and immortal; i. e., can we infer that God will not annihilate the soul? The reasons which go to prove the eternal duration are drawn from the nature of immortality, and from the attributes of God. Immortality means eternal felicity. The desire for happiness so strong and insatiable could not be satisfied with less.<sup>58</sup> To suppose that God would have created man with a nature which in every way and form seeks an eternal existence,<sup>59</sup> and would then annihilate him is to affirm that God, who is Wisdom itself, would do things foolishly, that God, who is all Justice, would deprive man of what He has given intimations and hopes.<sup>60</sup> Everything we know of man demands immortality; everything we know of God assures us that the demand is not futile and will have fulfillment.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>58</sup> S. Thomas S. Theol. I, q. 75, a. 6.

<sup>59</sup> S. Thomas C. Gentes l. II, ch. 55.

<sup>60</sup> "Quae (Immortalitas), si nullo modo dari homini posset, frustra etiam beatitudo quaereretur; quia sine immortalitate non potest esse." Aug. de Trin. l. XIII, n. 10.

<sup>61</sup> Prof. Ladd's conclusion, therefore, is not correct. He says "The so-called arguments for the immortality of the human soul really consist of a variety of considerations which tend to render reasonable the faith or hope that it is so; to say that they demonstrate the soul's power to exist after the bodily substrate has been removed, is to affirm of them more than they can sustain. But to deny that they suggest the possibilities, or even the probabilities of this continued existence, is to deny to them more than there is need. And so we may return from the discussion of the question on grounds of science and metaphysics of mind with a faint but reasonable confidence in the possibility of its affirmative answer as one net result." Phil. of Mind, pp. 397-403. cf. Fr. Hecker Aspirations of Nature, ch. X, XI.

## PERSONALITY.

§ 1. Personality is a term of peculiar and significant force. We speak of animals as beings, of inanimate creation as things; man alone is called a person. There is a reason for this constant and characteristic use of the word, since language is the expression of thought. Now mind is the mirror of matter. Therefore, words tell of external objects, and the nature of the object explains the peculiar use and meaning of the word. Person applied to man alone.

§ 2. In a general way, personality seems to express all those attributes which mark man as different in nature from the brute. At times also it is employed to designate a man's character; thus, ex. gr., we speak of an attractive personality. Nevertheless it has its own special philosophical meaning; it expresses the true worth and dignity of man, the highest perfection of his rational nature. its general meaning,

§ 3. The problem of personality is a very difficult one. The history of its development; the various explanations advanced especially by modern writers; the danger of confounding conceptions of things closely connected show the difficulties attending its solution and at the same time invest the subject with a certain charm. its difficulty.

§ 4. The examination and solution of the notion of Personality is the work of Christian Philosophy. In the Pagan writers we find no discussion bearing upon it. Aristotle and Plato do not touch the question. With the Incarnation of the Son of God new light was thrown upon the problems of mind, as well as upon the principles and motives of life. The great task of the early Christian Church was to prove that and explain, The work of Christian Philosophy.



as far as human reason could, how the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity assumed our human nature. For four centuries the conflict between truth and error raged; one after another the false views were exposed and condemned; until in the Council of Calcedon, 451 A. D., the full truth was defined amid the plaudits of the assembled Fathers. The definitions of the Church, the explanations scattered through the writings of the Fathers were collected by the Schoolmen and thrown into systematic form. The teaching is found in the writings of St. Thomas in all its precision, lucidity and fullness

## I.

## LOCKE.

**Locke.** § 5. Locke is called the "Father of Modern Psychology."<sup>1</sup> In the Essay on the Human Understanding, his aim was to investigate the sources of knowledge, to account for its certainty and extent, to explain the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and assent.<sup>2</sup> The purpose here is not to inquire whether his work was well done, and satisfactory. We are concerned only with his definition and exposition of Personality.

**His view of Personality.**

**consists in memory.**

§ 6. Locke holds that personal identity consists in consciousness, but especially the consciousness which reaches back in memory to what has passed. "As far as this consciousness," he writes, "can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then."<sup>3</sup> Hence personality is constituted by con-

<sup>1</sup> Transcendentalism in New England by O. B. Frothingham, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Essay BI, ch. I.

<sup>3</sup> Essay BII, ch. 27, n. 9.

scious memory, i. e., "by the present representation of a past action."<sup>4</sup> He holds that if the same consciousness be preserved whether in the same or different substances, the personal identity is preserved.<sup>5</sup> Consciousness alone can unite remote existences into the same person; therefore, whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong. Hence self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only by identity of consciousness.<sup>6</sup>

§ 7. Consciousness of the past does not constitute *criticism*. personal identity; on the contrary it supposes this identity. How could I be conscious of past acts as *mine* if they were not united by a bond which made my recognition possible? My mind does not make truth, it finds truth. So my personality is a fact presupposed by conscious memory. I may remember or forget the past; that does not change what has actually taken place. Again, if personality depends on memory, what happens in case the power of remembering the acts of my past life be lost? Yet, according to Mr. Locke, I should become a different individual. Again, how could I advance in a court of justice or even to any sensible person that I did not commit a certain action, because I have no memory of having

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, n. 13.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 16, 23, 24. Mr. James Mill says that the Self is "a train of ideas which run as it were, into a single point." This point is memory. cf. *Jas Mill Analysis I*, p. 331. J. S. Mill holds that "The phenomena of Self and that of Memory are merely two sides of the same fact, or two different modes of viewing the same fact." cf. *Jas. Mill's Analysis with notes of J. S. Mill*, vol. II, p. 175. The difficulty of this position he himself recognizes, and attempts a solution which is a confession of its weakness. cf. *Exam. of Hamilton*, p. 263.

done so? Yet I could use this argument, if I were a consistent upholder of Mr. Locke's view.<sup>7</sup>

## II.

### KANT.

His  
system.

§ 8. The efforts of Locke, Berkeley and Hume to form a theory of knowledge had failed. Kant felt that the problem should be placed on a different basis. He attempted in *Philosophy* a revolution analogous to that brought about by Copernicus in *Astronomy*.<sup>8</sup> Kant held that the failure of the English writers was due to the subordination of mind to the external world. He proposed to turn attention from the objects of knowledge to the constitution of the human mind, to make mind the centre around which external things should revolve, to make "things conform to cognition, not cognition to things." Hence, the system of Transcendental Philosophy, "which concerns itself not as much with objects as with our mode of cognition of objects." That the mind may obtain knowledge of things through experience, Kant postulated certain categories or subjective conditions. He called them the forms of all knowledge. With these forms the mind invests or clothes the objects it conceives. The mind never sees the pure objects, i. e., the objects in themselves as they really exist. It perceives the objects only as they are clothed by the ideal forms. Hence the proper objects of the mind is the ideal appearance, or phenomenon, as he terms it. This will enable the reader to rightly estimate the

<sup>7</sup>Cf. Butler Analogy, "Disser. on Personal Identity," p. 334.

<sup>8</sup>Cf. Preface to 2d Edition of *Critic of Pure Reason*, Muller's Trans., p. 693.

definition Kant gives of Personality and his criticism that it is a paralogism of pure reason.

§ 9. To him consciousness constitutes the essence of Personality. "Whatever is conscious of the numerical identity of its own self at different times is in so far a person." He says that in his own consciousness the identity of person is inevitably present. What makes me a person, therefore, is consciousness and the possession of consciousness is the constitutive element of my personality.<sup>9</sup>

Personality constituted by consciousness.

§ 10. But he contends that consciousness proves only the logical identity of the I, not the numerical identity of my subject. The subject, he maintains, may change. The consciousness I have is not the consciousness constitutive of real ego, but only of a logical ego; hence, I cannot infer the identity of the person or the real ego.

but consciousness proves only a logical Personality.

§ 11. It is false to hold that consciousness constitutes Personality. Else how explain the fact that personality abides despite the loss of consciousness, e. g., in sleep? Or how is it that I am the same person, although consciousness may testify to the so-called

criticism.

<sup>9</sup> "The consciousness of self and the knowledge of self, i. e., 'The synthetic unity of apperception,' which binds our states of consciousness together, which enables, that is to say, the series to be aware of itself as a series, is the underlying unity produced by the knowledge that these states successively and altogether belongs to me." cf. Courtney Studies in Philosophy, ch. VII.

<sup>10</sup> "The concept of Personality is transcendental, i. e., a concept of the unity of subject which is otherwise unknown to us. In this sense such a concept is necessary for practical purposes, and sufficient, but we can never pride ourselves on it as helping to expand our knowledge of our self by means of pure reason which only deceives us if we imagine that we can conclude an uninterrupted continuance of the subject from the mere concept of the identical self." (Cf. Critic of Pure Reason, Muller's trans., p. 294 sq.)

change of one personality to another or to the phenomena of double personality?

The error.

§ 12. The mistake is made in confounding the Personality with the means by which I am made aware of it. Thus consciousness testifies to my personality, but by no means constitutes it. The personality is supposed as already existing, and consciousness in stating the existence of the fact does not thereby make it exist. The peculiar distinction between the logical and real ego on which rests the paralogism of Personality is the result of Kant's peculiar theory on the constitution of knowledge. The influence of this theory on subsequent philosophy has been most deleterious. Even the ardent sympathizers of Kant acknowledge it as the least satisfactory part of his system.

### III.

#### BAMPTON LECTURES OF 1891.

Modern writers.

§ 13. Later writers seemed content in reproducing the thoughts of the two great thinkers whose opinions have been criticised; or in exposing the defects in their definitions, ex. gr., Butler,<sup>11</sup> or in confessing their inability to give a logical definition.<sup>12</sup>

The Bampton Lecturer of 1891.

§ 14. But the subject is too important to be passed over in silence. The defects pointed out in the current explanations of Locke and of Kant; the Theological necessity of setting forth the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, demanded a clear and precise definition of Personality. This was attempted by the Bampton Lecturer of 1891.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Analogy.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Stewart Phil. ess., p. 77.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Personality Human and Divine by Illingworth, M. A.

§ 15. At the outset the writer gives a general notion of what he means by Personality. To him Personality is "the unifying principle, or, to use a more guarded expression, the name of that unity in which all man's attributes and functions meet, making him an individual self."<sup>14</sup> From these words it is evident that he is aware of the delicate ground on which he is treading. Yet it is difficult to understand how "the name of a unity" is a more guarded expression than "the unifying principle" itself. Is the writer a Nominalist in his theory of intellectual notions, and does he imagine that by considering Personality as a tag marking out a thing as distinct from other things, he is shielding himself the more from adverse criticism?<sup>15</sup> The very contrary is the case.

opinion  
of Mr. Il-  
lingworth.

criticism  
"the name  
of a  
unity."

§ 16. Indeed the unity he speaks of is not a simple but a synthetic unity. This he himself acknowledges.<sup>16</sup> Personality, therefore, in his definition, is not a distinct perfection in man, it is only a sum of certain attributes, or "to use a more guarded expression," the name of this sum.

This unity  
is syn-  
thetic.

§ 17. In the analysis of the notion the author adopts the correct method in appealing to the historic development of the Incarnation. Nevertheless his acquaintance with the important contributions on the exposition of the notion scattered through the writings of the Fathers and of the Schoolmen, seems to be very superficial. He fails to expose their teaching on Personality. On the contrary he hastens to Kant, in whom he finds the most satisfactory and complete exposition in the evolution of the concept.

His  
method to  
get the  
meaning of  
the word.

<sup>14</sup> P. 6.

<sup>15</sup> On nominalism cf. Fr. Clarke's Logic Stonyhurst Series.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. p. 29.

His  
analysis.

§ 18. He finds the fundamental characteristics of Personality to be *self-consciousness, desire, self-determination*; hence the three elements which constitute the notion are *thought, desire, will*.<sup>17</sup> But, he continues, these faculties are never separated in act; they more or less interpenetrate; they are found more or less united. Thus as an actual fact, he says, there is a synthetic unity in Personality which is further emphasized by the sense of personal identity.<sup>18</sup>

The bond  
of this  
synthesis.

§ 19. How comes this unity and what is the bond uniting these elements? He proceeds to tell us. "I am one," he writes, "in the sense of an active unifying principle which can not only combine a multitude of present experiences in itself, but can also combine its present with its past."<sup>19</sup> To him character is the issue of personality's growth, being the result of the living interaction of its elements.<sup>20</sup> For he writes that Personality is at first a mere potentiality which gradually develops or realizes itself.<sup>21</sup> It is not necessary for the present purpose to follow the writer in his application of this conception of Personality to the Trinity and the Incarnation. That would take us into a question of Theology. We confine ourselves simply to the analysis he gives of the notion itself. He has made a new attempt at a definition, or to speak more correctly, he has thrown old explanations into a new form.

criticism.

§ 20. (1) He considers Personality as a synthetic unity, whose elements are reason, desire and will.

<sup>17</sup> P. 29.

<sup>18</sup> Ib. "Our personality is a synthesis, an organic unity of attributes, faculties, functions, which presuppose and involve and qualify each other, and never exist or operate apart." P. 75.

<sup>19</sup> P. 38.

<sup>20</sup> P. 41.

<sup>21</sup> P. 70.

But reason, desire and will are activities of the soul. From the nature of these acts the proof for the spirituality of the soul is drawn. Again it has been shown that the soul is not a synthetic unity but an indivisible entity. Its activity is manifested in various ways. Desire, reason and will are only modes of its manifestation. They are not different activities which combine into a synthetic whole. Now the soul is not the same as Person. We cannot explain the concept of Personality by explaining the nature and meaning of soul. They are different words and they have different significations.<sup>22</sup>

(1) Personality not the soul.

§ 21. (2) He considers *reason, desire and will* as elements of Personality. But why could they not be considered as activities of our human nature? In point of fact I ascribe the difference between man and brute to the difference of their natures. I say that a man exercises the higher powers of reason and of will because he possesses a nature of a higher order than the brute. If, therefore, these activities can be referred to *nature*, why are they considered to be the characteristic elements of Personality? Human person is not the same as human nature. There is a distinction between these concepts. Personality is a perfection and the highest perfection of our nature. But it shows a confusion of thought to explain personality, which is one perfection of human nature, by the attributes which are common to human nature. The mention of one may call

(2) personality not nature.

<sup>22</sup> Dicendum quod anima est pars humanae speciei. Et ideo licet separata, quia tamen retinet naturam unibilitatis, non potest dici *substantia individua*, quae est *hypostasis*, vel *substantia prima*; sicut nec manus, nec quaecumque alia partium hominis. Et sic non competit ei neque definitio personae neque nomen. St. Thomas Sum. Theol. I, q. 29, a. I. ad 5.



the others to mind; it does not give us sufficient reason to identify them.

(3) he  
unites  
Kant and  
Locke.

§ 21. (3) Since Personality is a synthetic unity, he finds it necessary to explain the bond uniting these elements into a whole. The explanation advanced can lay no claim to originality; it is rather an attempt to reconcile the opinions proposed by the two thinkers already mentioned. Mr. Illingworth finds in Kant an advance on all that had been written concerning personality. Nevertheless he is an Englishman, and more or less acquainted with Locke. Kant placed personality in consciousness; Locke finds its essence in conscious memory. Mr. Illingworth unites the two and maintains that his personal identity consists not only in the combination of present experiences but rather in the combination of the present with the past.<sup>23</sup> But by uniting these two theories he exposes himself to the criticisms urged against both. The main defect is in holding that consciousness and memory constitute the person; they do not constitute it, they only make us aware of our personality.

(4) Person-  
ality not a  
growth.

§ 22. (4) Finally, he assumes that personality is a growth, and that character is the result of this growth. But this is not true; it betrays confusion of concepts; and their natural consequence, false views. The child of one year is a person, as well as the man of eighty. In the young man we find personality, nature, character. But one is not the other. Nature is the fundamental concept; personality is a perfection of nature and character is nothing more than the sum of the habits acquired in living. Character is not, therefore, a direct modification of personality but rather of nature. We may say that a person possesses a cer-

<sup>23</sup> P. 38.

tain character; but upon examination we find that character bespeaks certain habits of mind and of will; now mind and will are faculties of our human nature. We do not deny that a person has a human nature, i. e., mind, will, bodily faculties, and also an acquired nature, i. e., a character; but we maintain that these in themselves do not constitute personality, that over and above them there is an element or principle which is their natural perfection, and which in union with them forms the human person.

#### IV.

#### THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

§ 23. The theory of evolution has been advanced in our day to explain all the problems of life and of mind. It was reserved for M. Ribot <sup>24</sup> to apply it to the notion of Personality. To him personality is an aggregate whole made up of organic emotional and intellectual conditions.<sup>25</sup> It is not, therefore, a transcendental entity; nor is it a mere "bundle of sensations," as Hume's followers hold.<sup>26</sup> M. Ribot compares personality to an orchestra composed of many pieces which nevertheless unite in maintaining a harmonious tone. Yet it is not so much the aggregate of pieces as the consensus and harmony of the whole. The parts and functions of the body are the elements; their harmonious consensus is the personality itself.<sup>27</sup> In this way he accounts for the charac-

Mr. Ribot  
on Person-  
ality.

<sup>24</sup> Diseases of Personality.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. M. Ribot, pp. 3, 84.

<sup>26</sup> P. 85.

<sup>27</sup> P. 101. This opinion is criticised by St. Thomas, who attributes it to Empedocles and Dinarchus. cf. *Contra Gentius* II, 64; St. Augustine de Gen. ad Lit. lib. x, n. 37.

teristic trait of personality, viz., its continuity in time or permanence, which is called identity.<sup>28</sup>

His  
method.

§ 24. According to the teaching of evolution the the higher forms of individuality must have proceeded from the lower.<sup>29</sup> Thus the elements of personality are to be sought for in the most elementary forms of life. Hence, the ruling idea of his study.<sup>30</sup> The fundamental form of personality he finds in the sense of the body or general sensibility; hence he speaks of physical personality.<sup>31</sup> The sense of the body or coenesthesia is the great woof which sustains and unifies everything.<sup>32</sup> He denies that physical consciousness or memory constitute personality.<sup>33</sup> To him coenesthesia is the general consciousness of the organism,<sup>34</sup> hence, rather a vital feeling.<sup>35</sup> This vital feeling or organic individuality is the basis of all the highest forms of personality, which are only the products of its perfection.<sup>36</sup>

The pro-  
cess of  
formation.

§ 25. At the lowest stage of the process there is a mass of elements; gradually the common vital feeling is formed analogous to the development of a strong centralized power in an association of states in the political order.<sup>37</sup> The factor of co-ordination is the nervous system, its development is a sign of progress to a more complex and harmonious individuality.<sup>38</sup> "The co-ordination of the nervous actions of the or-

<sup>28</sup> P. 85; cf. Chapter on Positivism, § 14.

<sup>29</sup> P. 139.

<sup>30</sup> P. 19.

<sup>31</sup> P. 21.

<sup>32</sup> P. 105.

<sup>33</sup> P. 90.

<sup>34</sup> P. 89.

<sup>35</sup> P. 88.

<sup>36</sup> P. 90.

<sup>37</sup> P. 143.

<sup>38</sup> P. 144.

ganic life, by means of the spinal chord is the basis of the physical and psychical individuality; all other co-ordinations rest upon and are added to it; it is the inner man, the material form of his subjectivity, the ultimate reason of his manner of feeling and acting, the source of his instincts, his sentiments, his passions and his principle of individuation."<sup>39</sup>

§ 26. Psychic individuality is only the subjective expression of the organism,<sup>40</sup> nor is it a complete expression; it is rather an extract or synopsis of all that takes place in the nervous centres.<sup>41</sup> The consensus of consciousness is subordinate to the consensus of the organism; therefore the problem of the unity of the ego is, in its ultimate form, a biological problem.<sup>42</sup> Consistently with these principles he maintains that to the normal individual the idea of the ego is always an effect, a result, terminus.<sup>43</sup>

Physical  
and Psy-  
chic Per-  
sonality.

§ 27. Thus personality is a progress from below and completes itself in full consciousness.<sup>44</sup> He compares the complete ego to a piece of tapestry, of more or less intricacy, woven over the organic sense, which is at once its basis and bond of union.<sup>45</sup> Hence he concludes "The unity of the ego is but the co-ordination of a certain number of incessantly renascent states having for their support the vague sense of our bodies."<sup>46</sup> In a psychological sense, it is the cohesion, during a given time, of a certain number of clear states of consciousness, accompanied by others less clear, and by a

His  
summary.

<sup>39</sup> Pp. 148, 149.

<sup>40</sup> P. 145.

<sup>41</sup> P. 53.

<sup>42</sup> P. 157.

<sup>43</sup> P. 118.

<sup>44</sup> P. 121.

<sup>45</sup> Pp. 89, 156.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Mandsley Physiology of Mind, chap. I.

multitude of physiological states, which without being accompanied by consciousness like the others, yet operate as much and even more than the former."<sup>47</sup>

criticism.  
(1) false  
definition.

§ 28. (1) He defines Personality as a consensus or harmony of the organism; a feeling which results from the co-ordination of all our activities. But this is false. The ego is not a result. The infant of a day is a person, yet there is no organic feeling or harmony of which he is conscious; nor is there any opportunity for a co-ordination of elements to take place and constitute a distinct personality.

The error.

§ 29. M. Ribot confounds the ego with the states of the ego. The former is the real subject; the state of the ego is the apparent subject. He overlooks the real subject and tries to explain the apparent subject. Thus to-day I am sad, to-morrow joyful, next day I may, in a fit of insanity, look upon myself as another person. But there is no change in the real person; I am the same throughout; there is, however, a change in my states; they succeed each other constantly. Ordinary language and common sense bear witness that a person may become insane and yet be the same person. The fact that the insane man forgets his former states and imagines himself to be other than he is, does not make him a different person. M. Ribot's

<sup>47</sup> P. 157. Akin to this is the opinion of Hoffding: "The unity of mental life has its expression not only in memory and synthesis, but also in a dominant fundamental feeling, characterized by contrast between pleasure and pain, and in an impulse, springing from this fundamental feeling, to movement and activity." Thus, the nervous system and consciousness, i. e., coenesthesia are the uniting bond. cf. Hoffding *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 49. For Mr. James' opinion the reader had better consult his *Psychology*, vol. I, ch. X. It would be impossible to do justice to the writer in a brief summary. It is hard to conceive how a thinker could formulate such teaching. He goes to any extreme rather than admit the existence of a soul. Ch. also vol. I, ch. IX.

"Diseases of Personality" may be more properly termed "Diseases of Memory."<sup>48</sup>

§ 30. (2) In considering Personality as the outcome of Evolution these writers fall into the vital mistake of making thought of the same nature as organic activity. Reason and volition are higher powers of man, different in kind from organic functions. This has been set forth already.<sup>49</sup> Again the theory of evolution cannot explain the origin and nature of reason. Thought does not differ from organic acts in complexity only.<sup>50</sup> There is a difference in kind. Evolution has failed miserably in the attempt to solve man's nature. It is based on assumptions, its arguments "beg the question" to be proved: its conclusions are wide of the premises.

§ 31. This is the judgment upon the evolutionist explanation of Personality. Its initial point is "Ignorantia elenchi," in as much as it confounds the states of the ego with the ego itself, and instead of proving the latter, sets forth a theory to account for the former. The method of investigation runs on the lines of evolution; it thus assumes that intelligence is only a higher form of feeling; it seeks in the lowest form of life for the germs of man's highest perfection; and this without giving the slightest proof for its position.

## V.

### THEORY OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

§ 32. St. Thomas defines Person in the words of Boetius "A singular substance of a rational nature."<sup>51</sup> Definition of St. Thomas.

<sup>48</sup> Griesinger in "Mental Diseases" confounds the phenomenal with the real ego. cf. Amer. Society for Psychological Research, vol. I, pp. 366, 552.

<sup>49</sup> Ch. V.

<sup>50</sup> Ribot, p. 139.

<sup>51</sup> I. q. 29, A. 1.

At first sight the definition seems somewhat obscure. To grasp its full meaning it is necessary to examine it in parts.

Its ex-  
planation.  
(a) rational  
nature.

§ 33. Person, therefore, embraces (a) a rational nature. The elements of a rational nature are *intelligence*, i. e., the higher powers of mind, and *will*, i. e., the higher affections and emotions. Now rational natures are not all the same; they can differ one from another; in matter of fact they do so differ. Thus there is the Divine Nature, the Angelic Nature, the Human Nature. The nature of God is purely spiritual, infinite and uncreated; the angelic nature is purely spiritual, but created and finite; rational human nature is not purely spiritual but composite, in the sense that it has a spiritual soul intrinsically destined to animate a material organism; this union of body and soul constitutes our human nature. The distinction of nature is very important. It is not expressed in the definition of St. Thomas. The reason is that the Angelic Doctor gives a definition of person in general; he does not aim at explaining human person only. On the contrary, in the passage cited he is dealing with divine personality. But in as much as person supposes a rational nature, it will readily be understood that a difference in the rational natures is the cause of the difference in the person

(b) indi-  
vidual  
substance.

§ 34. (b) Person embraces also "an individual substance." This is the characteristic element in the notion; by it person is distinguished from rational nature. By "individual" is understood a singular concrete entity. By "substance" is meant not essence as, ex. gr., if I ask you to give me the "substance" of a sermon, I should expect to hear the

main ideas or lines of thought which made the sermon what it was; but by "substance" is understood the supposition or subject or the thing itself of which we were speaking; thus, ex. gr., when I say the "stone was very valuable," I simply mention a thing, about which we were speaking, and do not enter into an examination of its essence or constitution, by reason of which it becomes valuable. "Individual substance," therefore, means a concrete actually existing substance, or a substantial individuality

§ 35. After this exposition of the meaning of the words, Person may be defined as "a rational nature possessing its own individual subsistence." The "individual subsistence" is the distinctive element of personality; it constitutes the rational nature in its actual concrete existence; it imparts to the rational nature a principle by which this nature has the control of its own acts, is *sui juris*, and as a result is held accountable or responsible. Its meaning.

§ 36. Thus Personality is distinguished from rational nature. Rational nature may be considered as the thing itself; personality as the mode of its subsistence. This distinction has its source in the revealed doctrine of the Incarnation. The Second Person of the Blessed Trinity assumed our human nature, not the human person. In Christ there is a perfect human nature with its attributes of intellect and will; nevertheless, in Christ there is only one mode of subsistence, only one subject acting, only one principle which controls His actions, giving to them a value and merit; and this subject or principle is the Personality of the eternal Word.<sup>52</sup> Illustrated in the Incarnation.  
inference from the fact.

§ 37. The exposition of Personality just set forth finds an illustration and also a confirmation in lan- (2) in civil law.

<sup>52</sup> S. Thomas Sum. Theol., p. 3, q. 2.



guage. Thus the civil code speaks of Personality; in fact passes special legislation for those whom it does not consider as persons. Let us examine what is understood by a person in the sight of the civil law. The fact is better grasped if the concrete case be taken. A boy of ten years, ex. gr., is not regarded as a civil person. Yet the boy has intelligence and consciousness; he possesses also a rational will or motive power of action and a memory. The law, however, does not consider these to be sufficient. It regards the child as dependent upon others, as under the guidance and control of others. As long as the child is in this condition, it is not a person before the law. Over and above intellect and will, the civil law requires that the person should have the dominion of his own actions, should be, *sui juris*, his own master.

inference  
from this  
fact.

§ 38. Personality, therefore, means the possession of a principle which gives to a man the control of his own actions and renders him accountable for them in a court of justice. When he obtains this power of acting he enters upon the full exercise of his civil manhood and is considered a perfect man before the law.<sup>53</sup>

(3) "moral  
personal-  
ity."

§ 39. Again we use the expression "moral personality." By this is understood a community which

<sup>53</sup> "In general only those human beings are by law denominated Persons who can be the subjects of rights. According to the law of nature every man is capable of rights, and is, therefore, a *person* in a technical sense. Positive law may change this. Thus, the slave is a man; yet, by the Roman law he was incapable of rights, therefore, was not a person. cf. Mackeldey Roman Law, 14 ed., §§ 128-133, who cites as authorities § 4 I. i. 16, of Theophilus ad § 2 I. 2 14; Nouvel. Theod. Const. 24, § 2; Cassiodorus Var. VI 8; Gaius I, § 9; fr. I 3; frag. 3 II. I. 5. Austin admits that in modern jurisprudence the term Person is limited "to human beings considered as invested with rights." cf. Austin "Jurisprudence," ed. by R. Campbell, vol. I, Lect. XII; cf. also Savigny "Roman Law."

possesses intelligence and will, by reason of the members composing it, and also has the power of ruling itself, of making its own laws, of determining their sanction, and of acting more or less as an independent body.<sup>54</sup> the inference from this fact.

§ 40. Finally Rhetoric mentions a figure of speech called "Personification." We are said to personify things, when we attribute to inanimate objects the attributes of a person. Thus, ex. gr., in the fables of Aesop plants and animals are represented as acting like human beings, so also this figure of speech is found in some of the noblest productions of genius, ex. gr., Dante. Now in personification we give to inanimate creatures not only a human nature, e. g., intellect, will, but we also attribute a personality, i. e., we consider them as distinct individuals having the guidance and control of their actions and as a consequence, responsible for what they do. (4) in Rhetoric.  
inference from this fact.

§ 41. In explaining the notion of nature, it was pointed out that rational natures differ. Therefore, as Personality is the mode of subsistence of a rational nature, the difference in the nature will cause a difference in the person when nature and personality are viewed in their concrete actual existence. Thus Divine Personality, which is a perfection of Divine Nature, is by no means the same as Human Personality, which is only the highest perfection of human na- Human and Divine Personality different.

<sup>54</sup> "The positive Roman Law applied the term *Persona* to such men only as had the capacity for rights, and at the same time extended it to all those things and corporations which are regarded as subject of rights, ex. gr., municipalities." Note to Mackeldey Civil Law, 12 ed., § 116. "In legal language the word person is applied to those things and corporations which are regarded as the proper subjects of rights, such as *collegia*, *municipia*." 7c. cf. Rathigan Roman Law of Persons.

ture. Personality is a perfection; where the nature is infinite, the personality is infinite; thus it is false to maintain with Schelling, Hegel and Schleirmacher that personality of itself means limitation.<sup>55</sup> But human Personality is the subsistence of a human nature. Human nature is composed of body and soul, hence the human person implies a body and soul. If, therefore, one should deny the existence of a personal God, because he cannot admit a God with a body, he errs by considering human personality to be personality itself; as, ex. gr., I call all existing things by the name of *being*, but I do not mean that all *beings* are alike. In like manner I say God is a person, and man is a person, but I do not mean that the personality of one is identical with the personality of the other. On the contrary the appellation, *person*, is true of God in a way far exceeding that of the creature.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Cf. German Philosophy by Stuckenberg, p. 87.

<sup>56</sup> Respondeo dicendum, quod *persona* significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet *subsistens in rationali natura*. Unde cum omne illud quod est perfectionis, Deo sit attribuendum, eo quod ejus essentia continet in se omnem perfectionem, conveniens est ut hoc nomen (*persona*) de Deo dicatur, non tamen eodem modo quo dicitur de creaturis, sed excellentiori modo. St. Thomas I, q. 29, a 3 c.

## CONCLUSION.

Such, therefore, is the teaching of Christian philosophy concerning the human soul. Clear and definite it appeals to men of to-day with the same force as to the minds of Justin and Augustine. The advance of time has made no change in its fundamental tenets. It has seen the rise and fall of system after system. Its vitality is due to the power of truth. Progress in knowledge, and especially in the physical sciences, has served to make its outlines bolder and to add new arguments to its well-known conclusions.

This has been called an age of transition. Lines of demarkation are no longer drawn hard and fast. What has satisfied the past generation is insufficient for the present. The mental unrest is expressed in various forms. Men have outgrown the teaching of the past generation. They seek something more permanent, more in consonance with mind and heart. The marvellous progress of the physical sciences has drawn attention to the material side of life. The study of the forces of nature, of the human body has taken possession of the field of thought. Man has been considered a mere animal. Works like Huxley's "Man's Place in Nature" and Romanes, "Mind in Man and Animals" have attempted to set forth this position in a scientific form. Such teaching cannot be lasting. It stifles the highest, noblest aspirations, it lowers man.

To our times Christian philosophy brings its message of light. It tells us what man really is. Its view is comprehensive, not partial. It proclaims that man is a spiritual being. It emphasizes the fact that we are creatures of God, and are made in His likeness.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>57</sup> S. Thomas I, q. 93, a 4; Aug. in Joan. tr. 3, n. 4; de Gen. ad Lit. l. 6, c 12; de Civ. Dei xii, ch. 23.

These pages contain nothing new. The outlines and main trend are familiar from childhood. The sublime philosophy of Christianity is unfolded in the catechism. The only effort made is to show that the teaching of our early years is in harmony with the results of scientific thought. Hence, when we grow to manhood and mingle in the great world, whether in high schools, universities or in the busy walks of professional life, we should not forget or throw aside the beautiful lessons of our nature and dignity. True progress is not had in asserting that we are on the same level with the brute. True philosophy is Christian philosophy. The true philosopher is one who understands and lives up to the teaching of the catechism; who holds firm and fast the truth so simple and profound that we are creatures of God, composed of body and soul, that our soul is made in the likeness of God, because it is a spirit endowed with intelligence, and free-will and is immortal, that is to say, it can never die.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Nunc tamen de anima; nihil confirmo nisi quia ex Deo sic est ut non sit substantia Dei; et sic incorporea, id est, non sit corpus, sed spiritus, non de substantia Dei genitus, nec de substantia Dei procedens, sed factus a Deo; nec ita factus ut in ejus naturam natura ulla corporis vel irrationalis animae verteretur; ac per hoc de nihilo; et quod sit immortalis secundum quemdam vitae modum quem nullo modo potest amittere." Aug. de Gen. ad Lit. l. VII, n. 43; l. VI, c. 12; In Joan tr. 3, n. 4; S. Thomas S. Theol. I, q. 93, a. 4. "Fecerat hominem ad imaginem suam; quod utique secundum animam rationalem fecisse intelligitur." Ep. 166, n. 12; de quant. an., n. 3; S. Thomas S. Theolog. I, q. 93.

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
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